Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

On several threads recently (The Dual Mandala, Indigo Buddhism, and maybe some others), we've been touching on the intersection of Buddhism with postmodernism while also “looking forward” to an Integral formulation of Buddhist belief and practice.  I wanted to start this thread to explore these things in a more concentrated way, if anyone is interested.  In particular, I want to talk in more detail about the “postmodern fire” and what it has in store for a tradition like Buddhism (which has its own resources for dealing with some of the issues postmodernism has highlighted).

I am still actively exploring these questions, so in no way have I arrived at any definitive conclusions, but in my opinion, the relationship of Buddhism and postmodernism (for example) is neither simple nor straightforward.  I am actually sort of a latecomer to my Western heritage, having preferred (and concentrated on) Eastern approaches for most of my life, so in the past couple years, inspired in part by Wilber, I've been trying to catch up in this area.  From my perspective now, which is admittedly still limited, I believe that Buddhism is pre-(post)modern in some aspects, while it is post-postmodern in others.  Because Buddhist and postmodern philosophies are both quite subtle and complex, and because Buddhist arguments in particular depend  for their apprehension on the attainment of various levels of contemplative insight, the many issues involved are not very easy to tease apart.  (At least they aren't for me!)

In thinking about these things lately, I've been looking at a number of things:  Wilber's writings on postmodernism and Buddhism; texts by and articles about various postmodern thinkers (Derrida, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Habermas, Tarnas, etc.); Buddhist and Dzogchen sources which discuss postmodernism (David Loy, Robert Magliola, Anne C. Klein, Tarthang Tulku, Elias Capriles, etc.); and the work of Japanese philosopher, Nishida Kitaro, which isn't really part of the postmodern stream but which represents a Buddhist-influenced modern philosophy which has a number of points of intersection with the ideas of postmodern philosophers such as Derrida.  I will try to bring in perspectives from each of these people throughout this discussion.

Wilber's arguments are probably familiar to most of us here.  He often summarizes the “important truths” of postmodernism as the following three claims:  “1) Reality is not in all ways pregiven, but in some significant ways is a construction, an interpretation (constructivism); 2) Meaning is context-dependent, and contexts are boundless (contextualism); 3) Cognition must therefore privilege no single perspective (integral-aperspectivism).”  Following Heidegger and other postmodernists, Wilber argues that “interpretation goes all the way down, all the way up,” meaning that at all levels of manifest
experience, interpretation plays a constructive role in what appears. 

For a tradition which claims that the ground of enlightenment is non-conceptual – not just beyond the dualities of conventional language, but radically beyond thought – what is the import of such a claim, and at what levels does it impact Buddhist perspectives?

In relation to this, on an earlier post, I wrote:  “Buddhism represents a very particular way of viewing the world – a view which privileges direct experience, and which also involves 'interpretation' of contemplative experience (Right View involves both conceptual and experiential components).”

In response to this, Lol asked:  By “.. 'interpretation' of contemplative experience ..”, are you referring to the notion expressed in IS and elsewhere that, for example, a 'non-dual state experience' as it's called is automatically and invariably 'interpreted' by/from/within the worldview or altitude that the experiencer is inhabiting or embedded in? Or are you merely referring to the 'conceptual component' aspect of Right View?

If the former, do you not consider that when relaxing and deepening into non-dual awareness, that all apparent 'objects' that co-emerge or tetra-arise along with their respective sense consciousnesses (and already accepting that they are not 'givens' even if they ordinarily may compellingly appear to be 'givens') – that they don't condition, affect, distort or influence said non-dual awareness in any way, analogous to the way that the reflections in a mirror don't condition, taint or colour the mirror itself? If so, is there anything in or of non-dual awareness 'itself' (not the reflections / arisings) that can be interpreted? And would you not agree with me that even if 'out of non-dual awareness' the ordinary mind were to develop attachment to an experience (nyams) of emptiness or clarity or sensation that arose within a period of non-dual 'contemplation', and then were to try to interpret it, bearing in mind the advice given in the teaching to avoid doing precisely this, that such a thought/association/interpretation would itself self-liberate if one allowed oneself in that moment to re-discover one's 'natural state' and relax into it again?

I appreciate where your question is coming from, brother Lol, and I think it is important.  It touches on a perspectives which, I believe, are rather unique to Dzogchen thought (rigpa or naked awareness, self-liberation, spontaneous manifestation, etc.) and therefore may not be clear to everyone here.  I think we will need to get into some of them later, particularly when considering more deeply those aspects of Buddhism which may
actually be post-postmodern.

For now, yes, I agree with you that thoughts do not condition non-dual awareness.  This is its soteriological power; the roots of karma/samsara are broken when conditioning and reactivity are broken.  The nonconceptual “natural state” of Mind-as-such (sems-nyid), in itself, is beyond beyond duality and therefore cannot be an object of analysis or interpretation.  However, at this point in my understanding (both of Dzogchen and postmodernism), I have to make a few caveats.  One, as conditioned human beings, we nevertheless do “situate” this open awareness in a system of meaning and interpretation:  we carefully select words to describe it or point towards it (the inseparability of emptiness and clarity, buddha nature, Big Mind, primordial purity, great completeness, “the single sphere, unbounded wholeness”); we orient towards it, and its import, within the context of a particular worldview; and we strive to “realize” or “relax into” it because it represents the “solution” to a problem (even when we later, or even simultaneously, realize there is nowhere to go and no one to do the going.)

Lol continued:  If the latter, and accepting, for example, that the “Five Madhyamaka Lines of Reasoning” used to establish emptiness / shunyata in Gelugpa Prasangika, being conceptual components of Right View, are open to be interpreted, debated etc., as is the conceptual idea of what the direct apprehension of emptiness is, wouldn't you say that the “wisdom-mind of emptiness” itself is non-conceptual and therefore beyond interpretation?

Yes, I would agree.  Or as I might put it, there is a difference between self-illuminated nonconceptual awareness (understood, in Dzogchen, as empty and clear) and, say, the concept (conperception?) of emptiness as “lack of inherent self-existence” or the “co-dependent origination of phenomena.”  In Wilber's view, this is the only case of a “perception without a perspective.”

However, as I suggested above, this is a bit tricky, because the very label we use for nonconceptual awareness (say, “wisdom mind of emptiness”) conveys, and betrays, a Kosmic address.  As long as we are talking about it, we have to engage in some sort of interpretation and “mapping,” even if in the very process we attempt to “erase” the marks we are putting down (or otherwise self-critically challenge the conceptual traces we are generating).  (In fact, the felt need to erase these tracks is arguably also a good indicator of Kosmic address…)

In my previous post, I remarked that postmodernism challenges the notions of “direct experience” or “immediacy of experience.”  I want to comment on this briefly here because I think this is one area where Buddhism is already “up to speed” with postmodernism (if not beyond it).  When Derrida (for example) critiqued the notion of the “immediacy of experience” as the “new transcendental illusion,” he was primarily criticizing the Western phenomenological tradition.  In my view, Buddhism would challenge this tradition for similar reasons.  Here is what Dzogchen teacher, Elias Capriles, says about the implicit metaphysics (and lack of understanding of emptiness) in Husserl's phenomenology:

“We have seen that Husserl mistakenly assumed the supposed substantiality of consciousness, maintaining the error of the Cartesian cogito, and that he went so far as to posit a 'transcendental ego' as absolute being and as the nonphenomenal – and as such overly metaphysical – foundation of phenomena, thus breaching the rules of his own method and producing a metaphysics under the guise of a phenomenology. This provides us with the occasion for establishing a further condition philosophical systems must fulfill in order to call themselves 'metaphenomenologies': they must acknowledge human consciousness and the mental subject to be phenomena in the sense of being mere appearances that exist only insofar as they appear (which is one of the reasons why below I say that Sartre reached the threshold of metaphenomenology), and that both consciousness and the subject in question are delusive phenomena which conceal the true condition of reality and which must dissolve for the condition in question to be realized.  Furthermore, for a system to legitimately bear the label 'metaphenomenology,' like Derrida's philosophy, it must deconstruct identity; however, together with identity it must deconstruct difference and differance. Despite the fact that the existing Dzogchen teachings arose four and two millennia ago, respectively, and that the Madhyamaka School of philosophy arose two millennia ago, both systems fulfill all of the requisites of metaphenomenology established to far.”

In a similar vein, Anne Klein, a Buddhist scholar and a student of my own teachers, describes another way in which she believes Dzogchen parallels but goes beyond Derrida and deconstruction:  “[D]econstruction…seeks to undo simple either/or structures, as well as both/and and neither/nor – it sets its sights at highlighting the fluidity of linguistic boundaries.  Dzogchen here is not altogether dissimilar to this aspect.  For Dzogchen, however, there actually is an unboundedness that somehow includes the very disjunctions whose oppositions its presence undermines and that becomes something unknown to contemporary theory, a place to rest, an objectless subject which, far from blank, simply knows itself and, in the process, all things that are immutably related to it.  This would seem at odds with Derrida's statement in Positions that 'differance is not preceded by the originary and indivisible unity of a present possibility.'  Derrida here also describes differance as the '[active and passive] movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reversing.'  In an important sense, in fact, Derrida's differance ontologically contradicts, is opposed to, any principle outside of itself, for such a principle, which Derrida calls presence, is precisely what is deferred through the play of differing and deferring verbs.  In some ways Dzogchen, though apparently more conservative in its call to unbounded wholeness, is even more radical than Derrida, precisely because its evocation of play and dynamic display, though every bit as fluid as the effulgence of differance, is nonetheless not held in binary or any other kind of opposition to Dzogchen's structural equivalent of presence, namely, unbounded wholeness.”

[I will save a discussion of the Dzogchen theses of unbounded wholeness, indefiniteness, multi-perspectivality, spontaneity, etc, for a subsequent post – but it is relevant here.  Essentially, Bon Dzogchen argues that the multiplicity of perspectives in the Kosmos actually demonstrates unbounded wholeness.  Another important point:  while “discoverable” through engaging Dzogchen injunctions, and hence not a mere speculative metaphysical object, Dzogchen's empty “open awareness” is not considered a consciousness – which is at odds with the belief in other Buddhist schools that emptiness itself is apprehended by an impermanent consciousness.]

I wrote:  Buddhism recognizes that different sentient beings will perceive phenomena differently based on their respective karmic propensities, but does not appear to have recognized that some of its archetypal visions, while “empty of inherent self-existence,” are also culturally mediated and will not appear to all humans irrespective of culture or conditioning.

Lol replied:  I beg to differ, because what you're alluding to in “.. but does not appear to have recognized etc. ..” certainly isn't the view of my teacher, and I'd be surprised if this is the case for him only. As he describes it, the yidam Yamantaka for example first manifested directly out of the Dharmakaya to beings belonging to the (non-human) Yama “class of beings” who had the capacity to perceive and receive the wisdom and transmission from the Sambhoghakaya “dimension”. In our historical time mahasiddhas had access to the dimension where this tantra originated and transmitted it and taught its practice to
humans. Sure, any sceptical person could declare this to be a load of mythico-magical thinking, but this example does at least demonstrate that Yamantaka was culturally mediated in relation to the 'class' of Yama! Likewise, my teacher says that the Peaceful and Wrathful Deities that are said to appear in ones internal vision in the Bardo will only appear as such if one has the transmission of the practices relating to them, and has familiarity and experience of those practices in one's lifetime… so again, there is not a consideration here that they will “.. appear to all humans irrespective of culture or conditioning.”

I do not think I understand the point of your first argument.  Are you saying that “Yamantaka,” as a yidam, has been “mediated” by the culture of the Yama class of beings?  Is the Yama class of beings something that can be demonstrated in a way that would satisfy modern and postmodern critics?  If we seek to verify their existence, do they “show up” outside of a particular LL field? 

I suppose a relevant question is, how do we interpret Buddhist descriptions of supernatural classes of beings and so on?  Are these images and stories the products of a particular mythopoetic culture, or do they refer to beings every bit as “real” as Neanderthals and dinosaurs and tapirs?  Even if they ARE as real as dinosaurs, their “appearance” (e.g., our conperception of them) would still be, in part, culturally influenced.  But I think the real challenge of modernism and postmodernism to Buddhism is whether some of the features and “inhabitants” of Buddhist cosmology stand up to AQAL scrutiny (in this case, “appearing” outside of the LL field when we take a broader range of perspectives.)

I recall when I was visiting Triten Norbutse monastery, Lopon Tenzin Namdak talked about some of the paintings on the perimeter of the temple, and he seemed almost apologetic about the mythological, non-scientific nature of the “maps” of the world that were drawn there.  The “space” being mapped, with its mountains and its special spiritually significant regions, was not a space we can traverse in an airplane.  Though traditionally, it was apparently imagined to be objectively real (which is why Lopon-la appeared somewhat apologetic about the images).  He took a similar tone, later, when describing the spiritual beings (one-legged humanoid creatures, mischevious sprites, etc) that are said, in Tibetan Bon-po tradition, to inhabit different landscapes…

As you know, Wilber argues that some elements of the Tibetan/Buddhist worldview are not objective facts which have formed right-hand grooves in the Kosmos; they are cultural fashions, he says.  Some of these things are easy enough, in my view, to sort out (nagas, sprites, etc), but others are not…

This part of our conversation could get fairly complex fairly quickly, so I won't say any more for now.  But it relates, in my view, to a more general consideration of the role of “Kosmic address” in our con-perception of the various “objects” of the Buddhist universe.  As you are  aware, Wilber argues that everything that is perceived, and which we can describe or “map,” has a Kosmic address.  What we can perceive at any moment depends on the Kosmic address of the perceiver and the perceived, and it can't be said to exist apart from that “intersection” of perspectives (e.g., it is, to use the Buddhist term, an appearance).  So, the question is, how and in what ways does this argument (assuming it is valid) apply to objects in the Buddhist worldview?  Do yidams and dakinis have a Kosmic address?  How about the “sound, rays, and lights” that manifest spontaneously out of the Base?  These questions push past postmodernism and get us into the territory of Integral spirituality
Wilber is laying out.  (Wilber's post-metaphysical “fix,” of course, is to encourage Buddhists to “locate” the objects of their universe in AQAL space.  A question to consider here is just to what extent this is necessary in Buddhism, what its areas of blindness are, etc.)

I was planning to say more about Habermas' criticism of the “philosophy of consciousness” and about the relative blindness of Zone 1 Buddhist approaches to Zone 2 and 4 perspectives, but this is long enough… :-)

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

The following excerpt from Love of Knowledge by Tarthang Tulku shows one way a Buddhist teacher and thinker (though here in a TSK book) has addressed several core issues commonly discussed in postmodern literature - the role and prevalence of interpretation at multiple levels of experience, the shortcomings of correspondence theories of knowledge, the question of an “underlying reality” (e.g., a given world), etc.  If you are familiar with strategies in Madhyamika and postmodernism, you will see he engages in a similar technique of problematizing conventional binary categories (here, subject and object; model and reality; self and world).  Interestingly, his inquiry (though not complete in this passage) takes him on a path similar to one followed by Derrida, where notions of “time” and the “subject” are both given critical scrutiny…

“Interpretation at the Core

To investigate why we follow models, the models themselves, including models for how to inves­tigate, must be put aside as far as possible. Unless we turn directly to experience, we will continue to play one model off against another, trading in old belief structures for new ones. If we have no model for how to investigate without applying models for investigation, this is probably all to the good.

Conventional understanding asserts that a model (which might be expressed in the form of a statement, interpretation, theory, or story) is ‘true' when it offers knowledge of ‘the facts', or what is ‘really so'. But this model of ‘the truth' is not easily maintained, for it seems that ‘facts' are nowhere to be found. In trying to contact an ‘objective' world, we make use of a model and its constructs to do so. The world that we are accus­tomed to, even in its most ‘direct' and ‘immediate' manifestations, is an intricate and overlapping complex of models, built up out of interpretations, presupposi­tions, concepts, meanings, values, and memories.

Such constructs can be seen in operation in the shift­ing views of physical reality through history. Earlier cul­tures generally accepted earth, air, fire, and water as the basic qualities of all that was physically ‘real'. A similar model was accepted by the Greeks, and was followed by Western culture until a few centuries ago. This picture offered more than just a theory; it described the way that ‘reality' was actually experienced.

After the discovery of oxygen in the eighteenth cen­tury, modern science embarked on a course that led it to reject this view. The old ‘elements' were set aside as faulty interpretations of reality, and a new set of ele­ments, more directly tied to the idea of substance, was put in their place. However, the new model continued to accept the model of a physical world ‘out there', built up out of fundamental elements that existed indepen­dent of human knowledge concerning them.

In this century, that model has changed once again. Elemental atoms were found to be composed of more fundamental particles, and these in turn were inter­preted as fluctuations of energy or fields, or even as probabilities. It was also suggested for the first time that the exact nature of these particles might depend on how they were observed, thus linking knower and known in a way that goes against the grain of everyday under­standing and the structures of temporal knowledge.

Through all these changes, however, scientists have continued to uphold the basic model that our interpreta­tions apply to an ‘underlying reality'. Thus, the physical sciences go to great lengths to eliminate from their data ‘subjective' elements such as bias, faulty perception, or interpretive structures that might come between the observer and the ‘hard data' that represent ‘reality'.

It does not seem that this attempt can be success­ful. The drive for ‘objectivity' still depends utterly on a model that gives meaning to such concepts as ‘object', ‘measurement', and ‘replication', and on the collective understanding embodied in our models of ‘science', ‘sci­entist', and ‘valid means of knowledge'. When the ‘facts' of human experience are conditioned by such ‘subjective' elements, how can they be ‘objectively' true?

An Underlying Reality

Philosophers and students of knowledge have long been aware of such difficulties. Despite their persistent ques­tions, however, common sense continues to maintain that a ‘reality' more fundamental than models, con­structs, and interpretations does exist. Some philoso­phers have sided with common sense, and the resulting debate has continued for millennia without resolution.

Let us explore this debate briefly, without trying to make any definitive contribution, in order to see the limits within which descriptive knowledge operates.

The most convincing evidence that models ‘corre­spond' to an underlying ‘reality' appears to be pragmatic. Some interpretive structures ‘work' while others do not; therefore, some interpretations are true, others false.

‘Truth' in this sense is understood to mean cor­respondence with the ‘actual' facts. For example, if a hungry man imagines that he sees food before him and tries to eat it, he will not satisfy his hunger. Even if he is so deluded that he imagines in perfect detail the sen­sations of smelling, tasting, chewing, and swallowing, he will receive no actual nourishment. If he persists in eating such ‘meals', he will soon starve to death.

This example seems to demonstrate what we already understand to be the case: that it would be foolish to deny the distinction between true and false as a work­ing principle. But it is quite another matter to conclude that ‘true statements' (or ‘true' perceptions) are ‘true' insofar as they ‘correspond' to an independent reality. Without disputing the trustworthiness of the ‘facts' that we rely on in our conduct, we can acknowledge that the understanding of those facts as existing independently of our interpretations is itself an interpretation of what it means to label a statement as true. Applying a prag­matic test to see whether a statement matches ‘the facts' simply means looking to see whether one set of interpretations corresponds to another.

If we take the view that ‘facts' are ‘real', we only shift the interpretive dimension to the issue of what is ‘real'. A novelist who gives his hero blue eyes in chapter one cannot give him brown eyes in chapter five. Does this mean that the hero's eyes are ‘really' blue? Within the ‘reality' of the novel, the answer is yes, but if we apply the quite different standards of conventional reality, we can only say that the hero himself is fictional, and that it makes no sense to speak of the ‘real' color of his eyes.

When ‘underlying reality' is itself a construct, it seems that we can never move beyond the descriptive realm of models and interpretation. Perhaps our inter­pretations can be more fully worked out and refined, so that they guide our actions more effectively; perhaps they can integrate other interpretive structures, so that they become more comprehensive and thus more accurate. But they cannot point to anything ‘beyond' or ‘under' interpretive structures.

When one construct matches another, does this prove that either is real? Suppose that what we under­stood to be fundamental elements of experience were simply interpretive projections onto a random matrix, with meanings, actions, and results all expressions of the original act of projection. If this ‘act of projection' were ‘fundamental' would our experience necessarily differ in any way from what it is right now?

Only Interpretations

Language, concepts, and reasoned arguments can all be understood as sets of interpretive structures, point­ing only to more such structures. But if this is so, what ‘solid' foundation is there for knowledge? When we have an experience ‘within' time, who ‘has' the experience and where? Does the mind ‘receive' the content of know­ing or ‘create' it?

When ‘we' ask ourselves a question, is the answer an echo of the question? If there is confusion, who is confused? From where would clarity come, and how would it be communicated? By what measure will we know there has been ‘real' understanding?

When we ask whether the domain of meanings and meaningful distinctions is meaningful, we ‘receive' an answer in the terms that language makes available to us.

What significance attaches to such linguistic con­structs? The speaker finds meaning in each word, but a foreigner may hear every word as meaningless noise. Which understanding is ‘really true'? How could the speaker convince the foreigner that his words had meaning? Language is a complex, self-referring system, a highly structured game. But can it be said to have any ‘objective' significance?

Human experience testifies to what can be achieved through communication based on agreement that words refer to specified subjects of discourse. Yet ‘achievement' and ‘communication' are themselves concepts. If they were unavailable, there could be no ‘meaningful distinction' between a random motion of the hand and the skillful actions that help construct a bridge, organize a meeting, or shape a sculpture. Could a foreigner who considered such distinctions meaning­less be shown to be mistaken?

Suppose you dream you are dreaming. Within the dream, there would be no way to determine what was dream and what was reality. If you ‘wake up', this awak­ing might still be part of the dream within a dream. Or it might be a waking up into the dream. Finally, it might be a ‘real' awakening. How could you tell?

The Witness

Firmly trapped within interpretation, we face a funda­mental ‘not-knowing' that defies penetration. Analysis and questioning themselves arise within interpretive structures, so how can they illuminate those structures?  How can we counter a ‘not-knowing' that throws into doubt each and every interpretive structure?

From within conventional experience, only one answer seems possible. Turning from logic and reason­ing, we can point to an ever-present ‘witness': the ‘feel­ing' of reality, or the conviction that ‘this is so'. Wholly apart from subtle philosophical investigation, it is this feeling we rely on in conducting the business of our lives. Thus, the difference between waking up into a dream and waking up into ‘reality' is ultimately a mat­ter of feeling tone and conviction: We simply ‘know' what it is like to experience the real.

Imagine observing a cup on the table before you. Next, imagine that you have closed your eyes and are imagining the same cup as vividly as you can. There remains a difference in quality between these two experiences. This ‘quality' is the ultimate guarantor or ‘witness' of the real. What we perceive in the imagina­tion lacks this quality, and that is why we consider it unreal; what we dream appears to possess this quality, but when we awaken from the dream we realize that the witness was only a ‘dream witness'.

If the witness deceives us, so that we assert the reality of what is ‘unreal', we speak of delusion, hallucination, and even psychosis. Such a description can be applied only from outside: Within the experience the testimony of the witness is conclusive. We may disregard what the witness tells us, because it conflicts with our beliefs or with conventional definitions of ‘valid' experience; even so, we are applying external criteria to dismiss what we would otherwise ‘know' to be true. In determining what is ‘true' about the truth, the witness is more powerful than the content of what is witnessed.

Philosophers of several traditions have noted that the content of our experience may be doubted at the deepest level, but that the sense that ‘I am experienc­ing' seems somehow beyond doubt. Reflection on the nature of the witness thus seems to lead in the end to the sense of self. It is the self, impelled by its own needs and intentions, that unites the momentary observations of the ‘perceiver' into a coherent whole. This coher­ence is inseparable from the ineffable but seemingly undeniable quality of ‘the real'. Temporal knowledge proclaims itself ‘true' precisely because it is knowledge acquired by a self. The self stands squarely at the center of experience, the knower and doer, the measure of all things. Because the self ‘exists', the world is ‘real'.

To continue our inquiry into temporal knowledge, the self and the patterns of intentionality out of which the self emerges must come under investigation. But when we turn to initiate this inquiry, we find that the structures of space and time implicit in our investiga­tions until now undergo a sharp and sudden shift. It is almost as though we were entering a different world…”

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I'm not a Buddhist.

I have however already for a long liked Tibetan Buddhist recitation and Dalai Lama, and the deep wisdom he seems to embody. A few years ago I also saw a film about Dalai Lamas childhood and his youth called 'Gundun'. I saw the film many times because I liked a lot the subtle energies in the Tibetan actors, and strongly resonated with the whole Tibetan culture as it was presented in the movie. I also love the Tibetan paintings of their deities.

Later when I learned that some Tibetan teachers were going to visit my city, I participated , and have done that every time since then. Mostly I have just been in silence sensing the energies. Some features in the teachings however I did not feel comfortable with, and during the last visit I started for the first time seriously to ask questions.

The teacher was talking about how there really is no individual ”I”. I knew pretty well what he was pointing to with his teaching as I'm a long time meditator. I just felt his expressions were not accurate and easily is misleading in the modern western world. This no ”I” experience could be phrased more elegantly, because if we truly had no coherent ”I”, we were deep in psychosis, and could not create a coherent whole of our experiences and sensations. For me as long as I think  I'm hungry and I'll go to eat something, there is also a perception of an ”I”. Modern psychology understands that what we call ”I” is actually formed from different parts that serve different functions. The most important part of our ”I” has a function to form a whole with continuity from our sensations and interpretations. There is also another ”I” that deals with self-identity, whom we perceive ourselves to be. I suggested to the teacher that it would be helpful to make a distinction between these two different functions of ”I”, and explain that he is referring in his teachings to the ”I” as a self-identity.

The teacher got quite irritated about my questioning and suggestions, not about the other people's questions that were much simpler, and tried to silence or ignore me. He probably did not at all understand, what I was talking about and saw me as a nuisance. He told me that I'm thinking too much, I'm too analytical, too intellectual, which is not true. In my daily life there is much more direct sensing and observing of different subtle energies, vibrations in the nature , sensations and feelings than intellectual analyzing.

After that I kept silent for a long while. When the teacher started to explain about the right view, I finally asked him again, how he can be totally sure, as he seemed to be, that the right view is truly a right view. Then he got really nervous with me, and asked me if I think myself to be the most intelligent person in the world. I said no, and kept silent after that, but inside my mind I was making interpretations and evaluations. This teacher was clearly high in states, but in stages around amber. And why, what keeps these people so low in their stages?

Had the teacher really been able of post modern level of thinking, my questions would have been relatively easy to answer. Actually I knew already, when I asked my questions, how they could be answered without making any sacrifices in the essential teaching.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Part of my text got again cut away as often happens at Zaadz, when I use Mozilla Firefox as my browser. Here is the rest of the text.

I'm myself a Freemason. It has long been the only spiritual path, where I have not stumbled on problems like the above. I belong to a co-freemasonry organization Le Droit Humain. Its constitution does not allow any dogmas. We need just to accept some widely accepted ethical principles. The approach is ritual, ceremonial, and symbolic. In the Masonic rituals there are many hints pointing toward deeper and more subtle realities, but our hands are left free in our interpretations of the symbols and rituals. Each member is encouraged to find his or her own path towards a deeper truth.

The opening of a lodge is done through a complicated ritual in which everyone actively participates. Through this ritual a common inner we space opens up that functions as one entity, an inner space where each participant has a special function, and special tasks. We form a hierarchical whole, where the active participation of each member is important. When this inner common space is opened up, the outer world largely ceases to exist, and in this shared space we communicate and present our ideas and discuss them according to certain simple rules. I have always been able to present my ideas relatively freely in this space without severe confrontations. So far this has been practically the only place for me.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

And again it got cut off. Intenrnet Explorer does not work on this computer, so I continue with my trials with Mozilla…

When we have finished our discussions and other work, we close the lodge again through a complicated ritual, to be able again facing as separate individuals the outer world.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

The Integral Community seems also to have a structure that makes possible an integral or postmodern level of sharing even if its approach is quite different.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi, Irmeli,

Thank you for persevering in spite of the internet difficulties!  I have read your posts elsewhere and respect what you have shared there, so I welcome your insight here, Buddhist or not.  (I don't exclusively identify as a “Buddhist” either; it has been my main practice tradition for about 15 years, but that is alongside two other “ways” that I also follow.)

I have had similar experiences to the one you described – though, thankfully, not very often.  The first time was in a Malaysian monastery on Penang island, where the sermons in between vipassana practice sessions were almost like something straight out of a Southern Baptist church:  long, dire, frightening warnings about the fires of hell.  As Amber as it gets.  Interestingly, though, when I talked privately with the Buddhist priest (about progress and problems in my practice), he appeared fully capable of engaging with me at a different level.  So, it may be that he was pulling out all the Amber stops for the rebellious Malaysian youths who were also doing the retreat.

Years later, at a Theravadin “mindfulness” retreat in the U.S., a Western bhikku gave a speech on religious tolerance – invoking many ideals that sounded fairly pluralistic and open, calling for dialogue among religions, describing the role Buddhism could play, etc.  A friend and I addressed him about some practice questions during the talk, and when we told him we were both students of Bonpo Dzogchen teachers, his expression totally changed.  He said, “Look out for the demons!”  And he refused to engage with us openly after that.

So, yes, there are certainly teachers out there who do not embody what I believe are the highest ideals and perspectives that Buddhism has to offer.  A number have Amber or Orange centers of gravity; some, as in the Boomeritis Buddhism Ken describes, are decidedly Green.  I think you are right that there may be ways that Buddhism is practiced and taught that keep people at certain levels of first-tier thinking, even though the tradition itself clearly points beyond that in a number of ways.  I think that is something that can and should be addressed, as we consider what an Integral Buddhism will be like – not just in terms of higher teachings, but in terms of living sanghas or practice communities.

But with that said, I also want to say that I would not go so far as to say that Buddhist teachings themselves keep people at Amber or Green or whatever, even in traditional settings.  Several of my teachers, at least, appear to be second-tier in the cognitive and values lines.  I believe the advancement in the cognitive line is definitely the result of the rigorous intellectual as well as contemplative training they have undergone in traditional monastic settings.  The advancement in the values line may be as well, or it may be a combination of that in coordination with study of and just general exposure to modern (Western) perspectives.  (I say this with some reservation, because Buddhist “boddhisattva” ideals and associated trainings are, I believe, quite sophisticated and vast; but there are still certain model social values and perspectives that, for whatever reason, do not appear to have been naturally emergent in the Buddhist context, but which have been grasped and welcomed by these teachers once they were exposed to them.)

Warm wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi Bruce

It's really great you've got this conversation going …. although I appreciate you're waiting for others to join in!

I've just read your opening post, a rich appetising starter, and wish I had time to respond to the points you've raised - unfortunately the dance retreat schedule has only offered brief moments to dip into the pod, have a quick look around then out again.

I probably won't be able to join in til Sunday, but am looking forward to it.

Best wishes,

Lol

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi, Lol, thanks for poking your head in here!  I knew you were on retreat this week, so I wasn't expecting anything from you yet…  I look forward to hearing from you when you get back, though.

I just reread my opening post, and my feeling now is I wasn't focused enough.  I'm kind of all over the place in that post, partly because there are so many angles I'm thinking of (I've only shared a portion of them so far) and I was trying to cover a number of them, but also because I'm not entirely clear on this issue myself.

“Postmodernism” is not a monolithic philosophy.  It consists of many different streams weaving in and out of each other.  So, it's not easy to summarize, simply, what the “impact” of postmodern critical theory is on traditional religions because there are so many perspectives you have to consider.  And Buddhism complicates the issue, because in some areas I believe it surpasses postmodern understanding.

I guess an open question here is, in what ways does postmodernism represent a “fire” (to use Pelle's term) that Buddhism has to pass through (a force which may incinerate some of its traditional features), and in what ways does it represent a complementary vision (which reflects basic principles and perspectives of Buddhism, but which applies them in areas Buddhism has tended to ignore, such as social or gender power relations)?

I hope we can explore that a bit here.

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hey Bruce & All,
 

Pre-modern > Physical & metaphysical world exists but the true reality is metaphysical (i.e. heaven). Mythic religions.

Modern > Physical world exists and is the only true reality. Metaphysical does not exist. Scientific materialism.

Postmodern >> Both above exist within a cultural story. True reality… ha, ha, that is funny!

Post-postmodern >> All of the above are merely perspectives that when enacted are true but dependent upon the enactment itself i.e. performatism       .

Pre-modern and Modern suffer from the myth of the given which is predicated on the thing in itself i.e. soul in the first case, irreducible atomic particle in the second.

Does Buddhism suffer from this? IMHO no. Why? Dependent Origination. Simply, there is no isolatable thing from the get go.  Everything arises dependently and is not a thing onto itself i.e. there is no ontology. There are no a priori givens in Buddhism to have epistemological myths about. This was Nagarjuna's return back to the middle way. The Abhidhammists created an atomistic psychology out of the teachings. They tried to say that the ‘things' the Buddha used to teach with (i.e. 5 aggregates, etc) were ultimately existent (ontological) and so they tried to create an epistemology that contained the “Truth” i.e. Buddhist psychology. Nagarjuna, going back to the original teachings, sought to dispel this wrong view.

Here is the main sutra from the Buddha that Nagarjuna used to accomplish this. Notice how the Buddha avoids both extreme givens and points to Dependent Origination (the middle). As an aside, the Buddha said that one who sees Dependent Origination sees the Dhamma (truth) and one who sees the Dhamma sees Dependent Origination. But the truth he was talking about was not a (post)metaphysically postulated truth but simply the truth in realizing suffering and it's end.

love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I have a question e:

Is post-postmodernism aperspectival, i.e., not enacting any one (meta)perspective? It seems that it is enacting/performing, so can enactment arise without a perspective? Which of course circles around to one of Bruce's points: Is there a “direct” perception that is not a perspective?

Now I understand that there isn't  a “given thing in itself.” But it seems that the very defintion of  dependent origination is that every thing is related to every other thing, hence embedded in relative perspectives. There is no “outside” apersepctival point of reference. One might even say that such a perception that is not a perspective is a fine example of the myth of the given.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi, e,

I think that's nicely stated.  For a number of years, my default position was, Buddhism does not subscribe to the myth of the given and clearly demonstrates knowledge of the contextuality and constructedness of phenomena through its doctrine of dependent origination (and therefore was “ahead of its time,” from a postmodernist's point of view).  With Wilber's recent writings, though, I've been looking back at Buddhism afresh, looking for areas where perhaps (historically, if not doctrinally) it has unconsciously preserved some presuppositions as “givens.”  What do you think?

As I just suggested above, a helpful approach might be to consider ways in which Buddhist culture defends certain given myths, even if doctrinally there is no clear support for taking them as “given.”  Some obvious examples:  the notion that women cannot obtain enlightenment (until the reincarnate as men), or even the suspicion that Westerners are not capable of understanding the Dharma.  These are obviously rather Amber perspectives, and you do find some support for them in scripture (at least for the spiritual inferiority of women), but I don't think you can actually defend the “givenness” or absoluteness of these conclusions based on Buddhist principles.

So, Buddhism quite effectively deconstructs the (ultimate) inherent self-existence of worldly phenomena, but historically, it has not lent its powers of insight and analysis to deconstructing relative (social, cultural) presuppositions and prejudices.  To the degree that it doesn't address these things, allowing practices to be taken as “given” if only because they lie outside of its traditional scope of concern, Buddhism is prone on these fronts at least to (justifiable) postmodern critcism.

Would you agree?

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Thanx e, I was wary of getting into this again, but you summed it up nicely.
Also, it is important to note that Buddhist philosophy does not say that what you see, hear, taste, etc… is a thing in and of itself. There has also been confusion about this point from
Huang Po's quote: “A wise man believes what he sees and not what he thinks.” Po being the 2nd Chinese Chan (Zen) patriarch.
He is not saying here that what one sees is what there is, as in the myth of the given, he is saying that what one see directly, and not through any conceptual filters is all one can believe in. Since there is nothing experienced directly that is anything in particular or not in flux, then seeing directly is to see that there is No Thing that can equal a “This means That,” concept.

That is what this moment is, whatever it is, cannot have an ontological explanation. It can't be talked about without being fragmented into dualistic concepts. This means that what Huang Po is saying is that there is nothing to believe in, as belief is what negates Truth. Reality doesn't sit around still long enough to be fixed into any conceptual “This means That,” belief structure.

Nagarjuna states in his writings, as e has mentioned, that he's not coming up with something new, but returning the Dharma to its original message. He also notes in his deconstruction of the existence of motion, and the fact that motion doesn't actually exist, in and of itself, that whatever we physically see has already changed by the time we actually perceive it. The rest of the senses are the same.

So simply saying that the Dharma has yet to face the fire of post-modernism makes no sense. It has long since gone past post-modernism, as e has also brilliantly shown.

To get back to Pelle, and his stating that the Dharma wasn't complete in and of itself as a framework of reality, as it doesn't have AQAL or modern psychiatry, etc…
We have to ask ourselves what the purpose of the Dharma is. It isn't to add to more relative concepts. I'm here because Zen simply refuses to do this, and as an academic, this is what I do.
So the Dharma is absolutely complete; good in the beginning, middle and end, but for what?
To understand the nature of suffering, and to end suffering. To do this one must understand our true natures, and that is all. There is a Zen saying, “It is enough to be awake.”
It gets to the heart of the human condition and deals with the capital Reality, whereas AQAL deals not with this, but the everyday reality. That is fine, so let's not confuse the essence of things, nor the purpose of the Dharma in the hands of people.
All you have to do is take a moment and stare at the wall and try to explain the experience of that very moment with a framework.

Balder: “With Wilber's recent writings, though, I've been looking back at Buddhism afresh, looking for areas where perhaps (historically, if not doctrinally) it has unconsciously preserved some presuppositions as “givens.”  What do you think?”

That's fair, and I think unavoidable. In many parts of Asia Buddhism is combined with local mythologies and cosmologies and becomes the default 1st teir mythology. In Japan you'll see some monks with Rolex's, and find out that they are only monks because their fathers were monks, and it is kind of a family business. Japanese law states that in order for a monk to own property, they must be married, and this is the only way temple land can be passed on.
Looking over my own life and the beliefs that I've had over the last decade, I can say that it took that decade for me to realize that the Dharma wasn't stating that there weren't in fact truths in and of themselves, that reality was based upon. I recently got kicked off a Buddhist forum for saying that reincarnation is antithetical to the understanding of dependence origination, and that one can't have a belief in reincarnation without an equal belief in some permanence of self. I got a PM from a mod saying that reincarnation was a cornerstone belief in Buddhism and I couldn't refute it. 
So I have no doubt that the development within various schools that Nagarjuna was writing against, didn't end with Nagarjuna and are still alive today. This is because, as with Christianity, the majority of the populace of Buddhist nations are still 1st tier, and their default religion is Buddhism. In Thailand it is customary to spend 2 years as a monk at the age of 18, of example.
So of course, there is a great deal of misunderstanding, and this is why the Bodhidharma called many of the monks during his time in China, “The densest of fools.”
This however, has nothing to do with the Buddha or what he taught, what was taught to me, and what still survives today among many Sanghas of the world.



I'll get to some of the other comments later on.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

A correction to the above post:

“Looking over my own life and the beliefs that I've had over the last decade, I can say that it took that decade for me to realize that the Dharma wasn't stating that there weren't in fact truths in and of themselves, that reality was based upon.”

Should read:
Looking over my own life and the beliefs that I've had over the last decade, I can say that it took that decade for me to realize that the Dharma wasn't stating that there were in fact truths in and of themselves, that reality was based upon.

Too many negatives.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Rick (and e, Lol, theurj, et al),

I think it is irresponsible to say that Buddhism has left postmodernism in the dust.  In some ways, as I've argued previously, and as I'll try to demonstrate more clearly in this post, I do believe Buddhism has gone beyond postmodernism.  But postmodernism consists of more than just a critique of ontology (which is what e addressed in his letter); it represents a very searching analysis of the social construction of knowledge, the hidden “texts” or presuppositions that underlie and unconsciously drive our cultural conventions and social institutions (even in Buddhist cultures), and the whole dimension of relative emancipation (in contrast to Buddhism's focus on absolute emancipation).

We might wish to divorce “Buddhism itself” from the many social milieus in which it has been practiced historically, but such an effort is also  inspired, I believe, by an unrecognized adherence to the myth of the given:  believing that there really is a monolithic “true Buddhism,” which exists independent of the social contexts in which it is practiced.  If we look at Buddhism wherever it is found in the world, it has both strengths and weaknesses – and we should not simply sweep the weaknesses under the rug, pretending that they were just social accretions that dimmed the light of “true Buddhism” (to which we now have supposedly undistorted access).  To do so, or to ignore the sociocultural dimensions of Buddhism historically, is not Integral, and as I said, may potentially smuggle in a “myth of the given” (that Buddhism exists as a thing-in-itself, which can be spotlessly extracted from the messiness of history and culture.)

Some of the weaknesses of Buddhism, as I mentioned above, are in the sociocultural sphere, where women have commonly (but not universally) been considered spiritually inferior to men, or have been denied positions of authority within Buddhist communities; or where foreigners have been considered “unworthy barbarians” and not really suitable for the Dharma; or where social inequities in general have not been addressed in as nearly a thoroughgoing way as has taken place in the modern West (the example of King Ashoka's mythical Buddhist kingdom notwithstanding); or where Buddhist authorities have given support to brutal feudal regimes or programs, etc. 

Modern and postmodern teachers have something meaningful to communicate to “Buddhist culture” in these areas.  As Wilber states, an Integral Buddhism will focus on relative emancipation as well as absolute emancipation.  We may decide that Buddhism does not need to cover these areas, in itself, and turn to other sources for guidance … but this in itself is an interpretive move that will shape “Buddhist culture” in novel ways, and therefore I think it is important not to focus only on Buddhist philosophical perspectives (on emptiness, ontology, thinghood, etc), but on the larger contexts of Buddhist practice as well.  Buddhism focuses, rightly, on the “end of suffering”; postmodernism points clearly to relative causes of suffering which, historically, have not been highlighted or much appreciated in many Buddhist cultures.

With that said, I do believe that the Buddhist understanding of the relativity (radical interdependence) of selves and things is consonant with, but also surpasses, many prominent postmodern perspectives on the same. 

Here are the areas in which I believe Buddhist and postmodern perspectives are consonant:

* They both agree that the self and nonsentient phenomena exist only in dependence on multiple causes and conditions (e.g., on nested contexts, which are boundless; on the “endless play of differences”), and therefore lack inherent (independent, absolute) self-existence.
* They both agree that there is no proposition or thing which, in its “being,” does not imply (implicate) the whole universe.
* They both agree (as Buddhist teacher and feminist, Anne Klein, points out) that it is, in fact, the constructed status of the self that allows for the possibility of agency.
* They both agree that the doctrines of emptiness of inherent self-existence / differance are not nihilistic denials that anything exists at all, but rather are ways of describing the nature of appearance.
* They both agree that language is an imperfect, ever-incomplete system and do not naively expect perfect “correspondence” between words and their referents.

And here are the ways that they differ:

* Buddhists contend it is possible to experience the unconditioned, whereas this possibility is generally not admitted or even considered in postmodern theory. 
* Buddhists contend that it is possible for something to be both “unconditioned” and a dependent arising, which is in contrast to postmodern understanding.
* Buddhism recognizes “something” apart from the endless process of difference/deferral that may be known “directly” in the context of dependent origination via nondual cognition.
* Similarly, Buddhism does not reduce consciousness to thought, verbal expression, or textuality, as postmodernists often do, but instead recognizes the existence of deeper, nonconceptual/nonverbal dimensions of subjectivity (and therefore sees that language does not have equal conditioning influence on all subjective states).
* Contrary to the postmodern claim that it is impossible to know anything completely, Buddhism contends it is possible to know the “unconditioned” – emptiness – directly and completely.  This is not because Buddhism does not recognize the radical contextuality, interdependence, and incompleteness of things or signifiers (it does), but because it is referring, not to a conceptual/verbal grasp of the particular details of any given phenomena (which Buddhism also recognizes as sliding and bottomless), but to a nonceptual clarity and intensity of awareness.  This is the unconditioned emptiness that is co-present with the momentary, endless effulgence of dependently arising phenomena.
* Buddhism cultivates modes of awareness, first through the development of concentration and calm abiding, and later through various deepening practices, that are very rarely addressed or even considered in postmodern literature and theorizing, but which radically impact living experience and the arising of insight.

It is my belief that, in the areas above, Buddhism has gone farther than postmodernism.  Since this is long, I won't develop the above arguments here, but I'd enjoy exploring them in more depth in subsequent posts. 

To recap:  I think it is irresponsible to say that Buddhism has completely left postmodernism behind, because there are too many things Buddhism (as a culture, as multiple streams of tradition) simply hasn't addressed yet.  But I also think it is naive to claim that Buddhism still has the whole of postmodernism ahead of it, or that its insights are classically Amber or Orange.  In a number of ways, it is fully capable of meeting the challenge of postmodernism, and also of pointing a way forward for (interested) postmodern theorists.

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

From Integral Spirituality (draft), pp. 295-6:

Here are our summary points on how to locate anything in a post-metaphysical universe:

1. Since there is no fixed center of the universe, or even foundational level (it's turtles all

the way down), then the location of any phenomenon or thing or event or process or holon can only be specified in relation to a set of each other.

2. Further, there is no pregiven world, existing independently and apart from all

perception of it. Nor are all things merely perceptions. Rather, there is the sum total of the

mutually disclosing things and events that disclose themselves relative to each other (i.e., relative to each other's perspective). In reality, this means that each thing is a perspective before it is anything else. And this means that in the manifest world, there are no perceptions, only perspectives. Put bluntly, perception, prehension, awareness, consciousness, etc. are all 3rd person, monological abstractions with no reality whatsoever. As far as we know or can know, the manifest world is made of sentient beings with perspectives, not things with properties, nor subjects with perception, nor vacuum potentials, nor dharmas, nor strings, nor holograms, nor biofields, etc. Those are all perspectives relative to some sentient being.

3. Therefore, in order to specify the “location” of any occasion-in order to specify

where it can be found-we have to specify the location of both the perceiver and the perceived, relative to each other. This location has at least two components: a vertical, developmental, and evolutionary component (altitude), and the perspective in which (quadrivium) or through which (quadrant) the occasion is being accessed. We can specify other components to help us locate a phenomenon, but those two (levels and quadrants) are the minimum. So we need the altitude and the perspective of both the perceiver and perceived.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Balder,

You have compared and contrasted the generalities well. However I'd suggest that not all of “Buddhism” posits that one can directly experience the unconditioned completely, or at all, for that matter. I suggest that Nagarjuna's insight might argue that there is no unconditioned (or absolute) that is apart from the conditioned (or relative), and therefore no direct perception at all. Certainly there is no consensus on Nagarjuna's “true” meaning, even within Buddhist scholars and practitioners. But you must admit that the interpretation I'm using is certainly a recognized one and antithetical to the one you propose, even among Tibetan sects.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

For example, there are a number of interpretative perspectives on nonduality itself that I provided by quoting kela in the Indigo Buddhism thread. I also explored the topic in the Open Integral thread ”The two truths of Nagarjuna.” Below is a related quote from that thread by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche at this link:

In order to understand these two truths, the ultimate and the conventional, they have to be approached through the different Buddhist traditions. It is difficult to understand them without approaching them in that way.

The traditions can be divided into the Vehicle of the Hearers, or the Shravakayana, and the Great Vehicle, or the Mahayana. In the Vehicle of the Hearers, there is the division into the way of positing the two truths in terms of the Vaibhashika school and the way of positing the two truths in terms of the Sautrantika school. And in the Great Vehicle, or Mahayana, there is first the way of positing the two truths in the terms of the Cittamatra, or Mind-Only school, and then the way of positing these truths in the Madhyamaka tradition. In the Madhyamaka tradition, further there is the Svatantrika approach to positing these two truths, and the Prasangika approach of positing them. Then there is also the empty-of-other approach. It is better to use the Tibetan word for this, which is zhen-tong. “Zhen” means “other,” and “tong” means “empty.” Literally it means “empty of other. ” In English it is a little awkward, so we will just say zhen-tong. And finally, besides the zhen-tong approach, there is the mantra approach to positing the two truths.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

That is true, Edward – there are a number of different understandings of the meaning of emptiness within Buddhism.  (I think Integral Buddhism will increasingly need to “GigaGloss” these terms, to differentiate them…)  In my post, I purposefully stated the points the way that I did because I wanted to leave it open enough to be acceptable both to something like the Gelukpa school of Buddhism, which relies upon the (fairly mainstream) Prasangika interpretation, as well as to the Nyingma (Dzogchen) schools with which I am more familiar (and with which I have more affinity.)  But it's even more complicated, because one of the main schools in which I've studied – Bonpo Dzogchen – doesn't even rely on the “two truths” doctrine at all, and in fact considers that an unsatisfactory and incomplete way of framing things. 

It's late for me now, but in the morning I'll explain more about what I believe the points I included in my last letter imply.  For the moment, I'll stress that I am not positing “emptiness” as some kind of metaphysical Platonic Form or Idea.

Best wishes,

Bruce

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Theurj,

Isn't that because form is emptiness and emptiness nothing but form? We can't really separate them?

And isn't this what e pointed at with his draft from the sutta? -the extremes of existence and non-existence?

Turtles all the way down…? I wonder? Doesn't it all lead back to the Big Bang? This is at least my personal experience.

Sorry to jump in this late, with nothing but a layman's ignorance to add.

Bruce,

I see your point of not ignoring the cultural influence on religion, thinking there is a true Buddhism out there somewhere, but isn't that exactly what we are meant to seek? Didn't the Buddha or Jesus really want us to find the absolute truth and from that perspective be able to discern all aspects of it?
So really we are all seeking the truth, not true Buddhism or true Christianity as such. But once we dive deep we will be able to recognize the truth of various statements made by these giants.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce, I think your missing the point of what e and I are saying. When one says Buddhism or Christianity or Islam, one can't really separate these words from the people that say they practice them, but in a sense we can also look to the heart of these traditions as well.
In this, the basic practices of Buddhism, it's doctrines, the 4 noble truths, the 8 fold path, etc… are beyond post-modernism.
The shit that people who grew up in countries where you automatically label yourself as a Buddhist, the way people do with Christianity here, do isn't usually even 2nd tier.
Zen for example never posits any claims to Truth, and all claims are simply people's own mind made up concepts based upon nothing pointing at any solid truth beyond the nature of suffering and dependence origination. That's it. From these things all other Buddhist principles are formed.
Now it is obvious that Buddhism isn't actually a thing beyond anyone's mind, it doesn't actually exist. But when we look at the foundations of the Dharma, that I've listed above, we can see that all of the mythic structures existing in Asian countries are literally antithetical to these things. You might want to say that the same can be said for any wisdom tradition, but you really can't, because the Dharma is the only one that doesn't posit anything that isn't directly available via direct experience. If anyone would like to deny the impermanence of all things, or the lack of inherent self-natures of all things due to their impermenence, then go ahead, but these are still directly available facts. These are the only directly available facts.
Can you deny these facts? If you can't, then you are a Buddhist regardless of what you call yourself, and that is the whole of the practice, eveything else are just practices to help you see this directly.
All mythic aspects of Buddhism were incorporated to the practice as it spread into different cultures. In Japan you can find straight Zen, but 99% of the time your gonna get a local mythology, mixed with Shinto, Zen and Confusionism on top of a great deal of local folklore.
The Buddha laid down no mythic structures, but he did so in a very magic/mythic period.
All of the world wisdom traditions are founded upon mythic structures and are now moving beyond them in an integral fashion. The new American Buddhism however isn't innovating the Dharma. We are rather stripping away all the cultural baggage over the last few thousand years, which is what all the great masters did anyway. Every Zen patriarch said the same thing from the beginning. You can read their words from a hundred years ago to a thousand and their points don't change about the true nature of self and reality.
I'll repost that Sutra that e hyperlinked to here:

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi Bruce, just a short note. While you're making quite a few useful distinctions in your analysis of pomo/buddhist agreements and disagreements, I believe in general this comparison is a mismatch based on their incommensurability. First, postmodernism is a system based on relative truths, while Buddhist philosophy is a two-truths system. Second, there are siginificant differences within the Buddhist tradition itself, depending on whether the two-truths are strongly related (Hinayana), indivisible (Madhyamaka), or convertible (Yogacara). Thus, in each case there is a subtle shift in the meaning of dependent co-arising, but most importantly, emptiness itself is empty of inherent existence, which is to make sure we don't run into the abyss of nihilism. Thirdly, the luminous mind is the source of all dharma, irrespective of school, and so also Buddhism has been interpreted and applied as primarily UL approach so far (not that it should continue to be limited in that respect). Postmodernism, on the other hand, even though starting from a relative stance altogether, has applied its analysis to almost everything in sight, from epistemology to sociology. In brief, there is a huge difference in basis or givens (relative truths vs. two-truths), and also in application or scope (traditional Buddhist methodology exhibiting a subtle UL quadrant-absolutism if one would imply Buddhism “explains everything”), and finally there's a difference in purpose. As to whether Buddhism has left postmodernism behind, you recap it quite corerctly:

“…there are too many things Buddhism (as a culture, as multiple streams of tradition) simply hasn't addressed yet.  But I also think it is naive to claim that Buddhism still has the whole of postmodernism ahead of it, or that its insights are classically Amber or Orange.  In a number of ways, it is fully capable of meeting the challenge of postmodernism, and also of pointing a way forward for (interested) postmodern theorists.”

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce, an addition to my post. Namely, structures and states.:-) It's one thing to observe personal experience dissolve into shared contexts of signifiers and signifieds (i.e. meaning is never “personal”, and neither is the meaning of meaninglessness), and it's quite another thing dissolving personal experience into the primordial purity, i.e. non-conceptuality in the sense of dharmakaya (reached at any structural level through training in state stages or even spontaneously through an inherent propensity of awareness). That is, such purity necessarily involves a structurally unbounded cognition, bliss/feelingness and compassion/responsiveness. And then, how such unboundedness becomes framed and contextualized and expressed IS a structural matter. But even so, it is impossible to find anything as a “postmodern” formulation in any Buddhist lineage. There are tricky linguistic overlaps that need not confuse one. To understand the meaning of anything, one needs to view the larger context wherein the meaning is found, and the larger context is not postmodern in Buddhist case, due to a lot of premodern baggage. Should we find that baggage dispensable? Only if it's correctly understood as a relatively valid form-expression in historical and cultural and worldview dynamics. So far, a clear formulation of a postmodern Buddhism IN ALL FOUR QUADRANTS has yet to emerge, including a reformation of institutions and models of instruction and transmission.

“Engaged Buddhism” offered by several Buddhist leaders is a modern step (e.g. Nhat Hanh or Sulak Sivaraksa), as is a sharp critique of Buddhist history offered by “Zen at War” (review here) and static institutions (e.g. in Zen/Ch'an Buddhism by Lachs here, here and here). Both of these steps offer only an entry into the postmodern formulation, which itself must take into account the crucial postmodern contribution applied to Buddhist path: meditation does not take place in a semantic vacuum, and all meanings are embedded in collective and socio-economic conditions, not just cosmic universal characteristics (we need to reconsider some Buddhist universalities to start with, such as e.g. precise modalities of rebirth and the arising of environmental effects of karma etc., not to say we are still unable to internationalize the core-institutions due to strong ethnocentric bias of many awakened beings even though their cultures were also recipients of a generous Dharma-sasana not so long ago; in practice, these things tend to encounter strong AQAL resistance, as it should be).

These are just examples, but I think you get my drift. Please add your thoughts on this.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Comrads in inquiry:

I have a few “postmodern” questions. What is our motivation for even discussing this topic? Are we really trying to get at the “truth?” If we accept the pomo assertion that there is no ultimate, foundational truth (as Ken stated above), that there are only relative perspectives in relation to each other, then is not some form of unconditioned, primordial pure awarenss that claims to steps outside of that relativity an assertion of the very metaphysical ground which Ken just deconstructed? I understand Balder and Hokai that Dzogchen takes the Madhyamika “one step further” (as interpreted within the former tradition) to posit this primoridal awareness and that it takes great pains to explain how it's not a metaphysical “thing in itself.” But this very point is in fact a quite old bone of contention between some schools of Madhyamika and some schools of Dzogchen.

Hence one of Ken's latter points above, given the first 2 premises, it how we relate the relative perspectives using at least altitude, quadrants and quadrivium. And herein lies the battle for defining the higher reaches of altitude, for when one includes in that definition one's preference for a dual nonduality, as Ken does below, one is choosing a particular, relative intepretation from among many within Buddhism itself to define what is a higher altitude. So the very real postmodern issue of power does come into play, as it always has when it comes to “reality,” of which interpertive perspective is “more true” than the other.

Don't get me wrong: I agree with Ken's 3 assertions above, including altitude. But there is still much legitimization to go on before a consensus of a community of the adequate, to which I belong, has pronounced its verdict on the accuracy of such relative truth and altitude. And to posit an absolute truth derived from an unconditioned awareness is part of the myth of the given, despite the “qualification” to the contrary. IMO.

And as to the post-postmodern, we are naive and arrogant to think we've even begun such a thing, as we are as yet within the adolescence of the postmodern. Such is more graniose delusion from a hyper-individualist, narcisstic and erroneous “integral” altitude sickness that has yet to even understand the postmodern accurately to date. Hence the very real power stuggle and dynamics to define “integral” in the first place. Again IMO.

From Integral Spirituality (draft) p. 130:

EMPTINESS AND VIEW ARE NOT-TWO

When one is in deep meditation or contemplation, touching even that which is formless

and unmanifest-the purest emptiness of cessation-there are of course no conceptual forms arising. This pure “nonconceptual” mind-a causal state of formlessness-is an essential part of our liberation, realization, and enlightenment.

In the Theravada, or early Buddhism, this formless state of cessation (e.g., nirvikalpa,

nirvana, nirodh), is taken to be an end in itself, a nirvana that is free from samsara or

manifestation. Mahayana Buddhism went further and maintained that such a view is true but partial, and promptly dubbed Theravada “Hinayana Buddhism” (“Small Vehicle Buddhism”). Mahayana Buddhism maintained that while the realization of nirvana or emptiness is important, there is a deeper realization, where nirvana and samsara, or Emptiness and the entire world of Form, are one, or more technically, Emptiness and Form are “not two.” As the most famous sutra on this topic-The Heart Sutra-puts it: “That which is Emptiness is not other than Form, that which is Form is not other than Emptiness.” This realization of Nonduality is the cornerstone of both Mahayana (“Great Vehicle”) and Vajrayana (“Diamond Vehicle”) Buddhism.

When it comes to the nature of enlightenment or realization, this means that a complete,

full, or nondual realization has two components, absolute (emptiness) and relative (form). The “nonconceptual mind” gives us the former, and the “conceptual mind” gives us the latter. Put it this way: when you come out of nonconceptual meditation, what conceptual forms will you embrace? If you are going to enter the manifest realm-if you are going to embrace not just nonconceptual nirvana but also conceptual samsara-then what conceptual forms will you use?

By definition, a nondual realization demands both “no views” in emptiness and “views” in the world of form. Meditation in particular is designed to plunge us into the world of emptiness; and what is designed to give us “correct form”? That is, what conceptual view or framework does nondual Buddhism recommend?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi, Hokai, thanks for joining in to offer your perspectives. 

You wrote:  While you're making quite a few useful distinctions in your analysis of pomo/buddhist agreements and disagreements, I believe in general this comparison is a mismatch based on their incommensurability. First, postmodernism is a system based on relative truths, while Buddhist philosophy is a two-truths system.

Yes, in fact, this was the distinction I was trying to make.  I didn't mention “two truths,” but many of my points in the second group deal with (or point towards) the “absolute truth” end of the spectrum, the unconditioned, which postmodernism does not recognize.

You continued:  Second, there are siginificant differences within the Buddhist tradition itself, depending on whether the two-truths are strongly related (Hinayana), indivisible (Madhyamaka), or convertible (Yogacara). Thus, in each case there is a subtle shift in the meaning of dependent co-arising, but most importantly, emptiness itself is empty of inherent existence, which is to make sure we don't run into the abyss of nihilism.

I agree.  It gets even more complicated if you bring in Dzogchen (of Nyingma or Bon varieties), because then you have not only the two truths, but the contextualization of the two truths within the Dzogchen conception of unbounded wholeness.  The point that emptiness is also empty of inherent existence is what I was intending to communicate with my point above that Buddhism recognizes that “something [can] be both 'unconditioned' and a dependent arising.”

You wrote:  Thirdly, the luminous mind is the source of all dharma, irrespective of school, and so also Buddhism has been interpreted and applied as primarily UL approach so far (not that it should continue to be limited in that respect). Postmodernism, on the other hand, even though starting from a relative stance altogether, has applied its analysis to almost everything in sight, from epistemology to sociology. In brief, there is a huge difference in basis or givens (relative truths vs. two-truths), and also in application or scope (traditional Buddhist methodology exhibiting a subtle UL quadrant-absolutism if one would imply Buddhism “explains everything”), and finally there's a difference in purpose.

I think this is the gift of Integralism: to free a perspective or discipline by limiting it, on the one hand; but also to enrich it by pointing to perspectives it has neglected or not yet discovered.  Briefly, as to what postmodern perspectives can bring to Buddhism to enrich it, I think an important understanding is the intersubjective dimension of dependent origination.  Classically, Buddhism has formulated the dependent origination of the self in impersonal terms, as the co-determining interaction of impersonal processes.  But there are also interpersonal dimensions to the formation of the sense of self and other that are, I believe, more clearly articulated in (post)modern traditions, psychological and otherwise, and which have their own relative merit.  Another gift, particularly from constructivist theorists, is the whole notion of stages of development (which I'll touch on when I respond to your second post). 

An important point, which Wilber stresses, is that the Buddhist emphasis on UL perspectives and “direct perception” overlooks important dimensions of our relatively co-arising world simply because these dimensions are not available, phenomenologically, as objects of pure moment-to-moment awareness.  A question is, How much does this matter, at least with regard to the Buddhist project of enlightenment?  For instance, are the intersubjective factors of the dependent origination important considerations on the path of enlightenment?  If so, in what ways…?

After agreeing with my general assessment of where Buddhism stands with regard to Buddhism, you wrote:  That said, the situation gets hopelessly complex:-) if we acknowledge that there is traditional Buddhism as a continuation of textual and ritualistic transmission (orthodoxy and orthopraxis), there is a modern/critical Buddhism (in Japan and elsewhere), there is a postmodern Buddhism already (somewhat sick from equating emptiness to differance, but there it is), and a post-postmodern Buddhism is already emerging, whether integrally-informed or otherwise. Any thoughts?

I can only agree with you that it is terribly complex.  Neither Buddhism nor postmoderism can be viewed as a monolithic tradition.  Each is a complex nest of perspectives, some of which are differentiated by horizontal factors, some by vertical ones.  Even in Buddhist scripture, you can find a range of perspectives which reflect, or emerge from, different points along the developmental scale, and post-postmodern Buddhism has to begin to sort these things out. 

I'll get to your second post a little later today. 

Best wishes,

Balder

P.S.  Rick, I'll be responding to you later today too.  I think we may both be misunderstanding each other…

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Balder said:

“Classically, Buddhism has formulated the dependent origination of the self in impersonal terms, as the co-determining interaction of impersonal processes.  But there are also interpersonal dimensions to the formation of the sense of self and other that are, I believe, more clearly articulated in (post)modern traditions, psychological and otherwise, and which have their own relative merit.”

This is apparent in one critic's review of the book Healing Deconstruction: Postmodern Thought in Buddhism and Christianity edited by David Loy. While the following is criticizing western academians of the Buddhist/pomo confluence, the same might be applied to what Balder is saying above about Buddhism itself. From that review:

The following constitute the principal limitations of their work. First, by making the transformation of the self the primary, if not sole, prerequisite for the creation of a “new way of relating to the world,” these authors reduce this project to a matter of individual conversion or, in secular terms, psychotherapy. Second, each author theorizes suffering as being primarily, if not entirely, an effect of discursive, cognitive, and especially philosophical conditions of existence. In doing so, they theorize suffering in fundamentally idealist terms. Suffering is caused, for example, by dualistic thinking, the metaphysics of presence, and the idea of the autonomous self. Third, and closely related to the second limitation, as a result of their assumptions regarding the discursive, cognitive, and philosophical causes of suffering, none of the authors investigates the role that particular institutions and structures may play in terms of causing people to suffer today. In short, their position is idealist and ahistorical. For these authors, suffering and healing have been and forever remain essentially epistemological, rather than sociological, problems. Fourth, and finally, I would suggest that these limitations characterize a mode of academic intellectual practice that remains alienated from most, especially working class, “selves.” Ensconced like secular monks in close-knit circles of professional associations, intellectuals rarely connect their scholarship and pedagogy to the needs and concerns of “selves” who suffer not from “dualism,” the idea of the “autonomous self,” belief in “inherent existence,” or a conception of “healing as holism,” but rather from the absence of empowering conditions of labor and life. Unless academic intellectuals working to develop a more “holistic praxis ” engage with life beyond the academy, their work will at most result in absolution therapy for middle-class scholars, while those who make the luxuries of reading and writing philosophy possible will continue to suffer. In what follows I elaborate on these limitations and suggest an alternative approach to healing.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I'd like to revise something I wrote earlier that I think it too easily misinterpreted.

Me: “Can you deny these facts? If you can't, then you are a Buddhist regardless of what you call yourself, and that is the whole of the practice, everything else are just practices to help you see this directly.”

I mean this in the Absolute sense and not the relative. As Hokai said, the basis of the Dharma is this very Mind, which is a more direct way of saying it. Starting from this the rest of my last post becomes clearer in the sense that other wisdom traditions begin with relative truths and over time work their way up to the Absolute Truth of all things, whereas the Dharma begins with this Absolute nature of Mind, and breaks up into relative concepts to help people see this Truth.  It is in the breaking up of the Whole to explain or point to the Whole that all issues being talked about here arise.
I personally don't think it is a good idea to try to make the Dharma fit all 4 quadrants, as the relative understanding of the AQAL map is still barely past the inchoate stage of emerging. As I've said earlier, especially the lower 2 quadrants.

Hokai, there are many people on this forum that aren't as versed as you are in Buddhist terminology, so for the sake of a broader inclusion of participation and understanding, could you please qualify or define the more obscure jargon?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce: “The point that emptiness is also empty of inherent existence is what I was intending to communicate with my point above that Buddhism recognizes that “something [can] be both 'unconditioned' and a dependent arising.””

How can there be “something” that is also unconditioned. Trying to reify or think about emptiness as a thing is only gonna imbue paradox and confusion into the mind.
We are all just going to have to live with a great deal of uncertainty when it comes to 'all This'.
I'm starting to think that much of the confusion of this two truth doctrine is arising over the fear or aversion of not knowing. 
As katagiri roshi said, “How can we live in a contradictory world? Yet here we are.”

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi Rick,

I'm not sure where my words are in what you have writen, i.e. what sort of Buddhist terminology is there to explain or define. From what I see, those are all very basic notions in Buddhism, like the “nature of mind” or “Dharma” or “Asbolute Truth”. If one was unfamiliar with these basic notions, why would one even wish to discuss Buddhism vs. Postmodernism? Please clarify what you deem being obscure jargon.

Thanks,

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce,

you point out: “…Buddhist emphasis on UL perspectives and “direct perception” overlooks important dimensions of our relatively co-arising world simply because these dimensions are not available, phenomenologically, as objects of pure moment-to-moment awareness.  A question is, How much does this matter, at least with regard to the Buddhist project of enlightenment?  For instance, are the intersubjective factors of the dependent origination important considerations on the path of enlightenment?  If so, in what ways…?”

There are a number of issues there, some of which not easy to deal with. The “project of enlightenment” or, perhaps more accurate, awakening remains the most clearly articulated and sophisticated path if we limit our observations to core teachings. A Buddhist is free to interpolate post/modern issues that arise in his or her event-horizon, in other words, is free to interpret path-experiences in fresh ways. On the other hand, someone interested in Buddhism superficially, uninterested in undergoing the transformational discipline, is not in position to do such a thing, since such person is not competent (or “adequate”). What are and what are not objects of pure awareness is a separate issue. “Pure awareness” is not something limited to meditation or even phenomenology (those are just methods of liberating the inherent capacity), since it should be brought to all modes of knowing, in due time. Frankly, such application in Buddhist training pertains to post-awakening stages known by various names in different lineages. So, it is wrong to equate fundamental awareness with anything dependent, or available through meditation, introspection or other training. Also, exclusively 1st person approaches are quite rare, i.e. Buddhism is NOT ALL about meditation.

(The Buddhist preference for consciousness - not just 1st person! - is quite pragmatic. Since experience appears to be experienced by the subject on this side of experience, the Dharma speaks in those terms. Such experience includes any number of perspectives.  One might as well ask, why does experience appear in such a way? Still, that consciousness remains the locus of confusion and clarity.)

Now, the basic premise today is that the project of enlightenment is not a Buddhist project by definition. Even so, Buddhist strategies of awakening are considered, practiced and discussed by their practitioners, i.e. Buddhists. Such a possiblity has been already allowed in various sutras and tantras (not always to posit a superiority of the Buddhist view pertaining to such a project). The intention was to express a deeper, esoteric level at which different spiritual truths converge, but one must still master a definite path to establish oneself at such a level in order to discuss it. It is a pomo habit to relax sacredness just enough in order to be able to speak of everything and anything, as if all had been reduced to a concept. Other people also discuss Buddhism with unclear motives. There are definitely other, non-Buddhist ways of awakening to the fundamental reality available. Our words ought to be backed by the golden standard of realization, or else we may disclose a purely conceptual grasp, at best a correct conceptual grasp, of notions such as God and Dharmakaya, admiting our ignorance on their referents.

The contemporary task is not just to develop a language and framework that allows for a methodological richness (a framework that legitimizes methodological supplements and new sorts of skilfull means) but also a view that allows a genuine post-metaphysical dialogue across great traditions (so far, it's difficult to even discuss across Buddhist lineages). But let me re-emphasize, awakening is to be realized-and-discussed, not just discussed for fun or intellectual curiosity; one needs to be firmly on the path, deep  into the territory to even consider such awkward things as “the meanings of emptiness”, or one risks serious unending confusion. Therefore, some things are better left unsaid in a public discussion. Your thoughts?

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I think it is a mistake to assume the pomo insight is all about concepts/language and not about direct experience. Even a pomo would not deny that our immediate experience is authentic, or deny that there is also nonconceptual awareness. The point of contention comes in when we say that this immediate and at times nonceptual awareness is unconditioned. It might be true that it is “pre”conditioned at birth, but from that moment on it becomes increasingly conditioned. So what is it exactly we experience when we go into nonconceptual awareness later in life, with or wihout training? I suggest it is the pre-conditioned unconscious, not a post-rational, unconditioned “absolute.” And I say this after over 20 years of insight meditation training and experiencing nonceptual awareness on a regular basis.

So this brings me to Hokai's contention that one must have the requisite referential experience to even talk about emptiness. He says that one doesn't necessarily have to have Buddhist training but at least training within some “tradition” whose goal is this unconditoned awareness. And I suggest that one can have experience nonconceptual  awareness outside a tradition via training and/or sponteneously, and that by the very nature of such traditions one is “conditioned” to interpret such experience as “unconditioned.” So it seems to be a catch-22, that one cannot enter the discussion unless they assume the “condition” of unconditionality. Whereas the experience of nonceptual awareness does not, in itself, presuppose such a nonconditioned interpretation. The latter is rather one of those “spiritual prejudices” that close further debate. And that is certainly not unique to Buddhism. I might even suggest that this is indeed one of the altitudinal advances of pomo over traditional paths, including Buddhist.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi Edward,

who exactly assumed that “the pomo insight is all about concepts/language and not about direct experience”? Whoever did that terrible mistake should indeed be scolded.:-)

When did “nonconceptual” become equal to unconditioned or absolute? There are all sorts of nonconceptuality, and every conscious being has experiences of nonconceptual awareness on a regular basis, with or without 20 years of insight meditation. As to the unconditioned, that's something else. The “nonconceptuality of awareness” discussed in my post to Bruce is a notion from mahamudra and refers specifically to dharmakaya.

One may say this or that as to the nature of the unconditioned, it's not a game, but a realization. Is that a prejudice? Not if you have realized the Unconditioned, nor if you're devoted to such realization. Within each Buddhist practice-lineage, the “Unconditioned” or whatever you wish to call it, even “conditioned” is fine by me if it does it for you, is recognized and confirmed by precise features that are immeditately accessed. Language on those features is secondary, and just sufficient for two realizers to share the fundamentals. Again, it's not a matter of entering a discussion through assuming this or that, but a matter of entering realization through directly realizing that which is free of conditionality. It's then quite easy to pursue discussion and words lose their power to be so reality-defining. This liberation is quite different from what pomo suggests in “altitudinal advances”, though there's still nothing wrong with that suggestion in itself. It's just that those two are not even similar. A postmodern Buddhist can still realize the Unconditioned, attain to the stages and fruits of the path, and unmistakably confirm when you do. No differance.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai said:

“When did “nonconceptual” become equal to unconditioned or absolute? There are all sorts of nonconceptuality, and every conscious being has experiences of nonconceptual awareness on a regular basis, with or without 20 years of insight meditation. As to the unconditioned, that's something else. The “nonconceptuality of awareness” discussed in my post to Bruce is a notion from mahamudra and refers specifically to dharmakaya.”
 
I agree that one need no training whatsoever to have nonceptual awareness; it's a birthright One might also say that so it primordial awareness, that it's even sort of an everyday awareness and nothing special. But the latter might be more of a zenish type interpretation and not a Tibetan or Dzogchen one. So I wonder about these different ways of viewing different kinds of awareness as needing lenghthy training or is it just ordinary, everyday awareness.

I did not say that nonconceptual awareness was equal to the unconditional. I said that it could be interpreted as such, like Ken seems to have done above in the discussion of the two truths. I am also aware that you were referring to a specific form of awareness posited by Dzogchen that is interpreted as unconditional. But again I wonder if such an interpretation isn't from the cultural milieu that prefers it. Of course the “experience” is authentic, but is the interpretation accurate? Or at least adequate to the so-called postmodern fire? I guess I'll have to wait for someone like Derrida to take up the injunction and let me know. I don't think that person is Ken, as he has not taken up the pomo injunction fully  enought to realize its deeper implications.

Even if I assume that there is this unconditioned awareness,  I am wondering if such an experience is necessary for one to realize nonduality? I'm also wondering if such an endeavor to have such experience isn't sort of like horizontal or lateral skill development, sort of like taking basketball to the NBA level, when a much lesser degree of training is necessary to realize the nondual. Like some yogis can bend their body is amazing pretzels, but is that lateral level necessary to reach the goal of “union?”

To qualify all of my comments, I am not now nor have I ever been a Dzogchen student or practitioner. So I cannot speak to an experience of their specific unconditioned awareness. I just question it from the outside and of course this is one of Hokai's points, that one cannot unless one does the training or enacts the paradigm. But I also wonder if such paradigms (Buddhism and pomo) are really so incommensurable as to make some orienting generalizations, even about states of consciousness. It seems it has been argued that Buddhism can “compete” with pomo on its own terms, that it has enacted a similar paradigm when it comes to the deconstruction of metaphysical “presence,” yet the benefit of the doubt does not flow in the other direction for states. And if states are natural and training them only provides lateral skills not necessary to realize the nondual, then what's the point? Metaphorically bending backward until I can look up my anus?

Ah, but there's (one of) the rub(s): according to Ken one cannot be “enlightened” unless one has acheived the highest state (nondual) and highest level (indigo). And one cannot achieve the nondual unless one undergoes state training and passes through the causal “unconditional.” I'm not so sure of either claim.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Edward,

all that you're wondering is available through mastering stages of the path. That is the whole point. No amount of our discussion will do it. And no amount of reading Ken's books will do it. The age old recipe is quite simple: Find a teacher who has realised what you're seeking for and who is capable of guiding you through the steps he or she has mastered, and follow his or her instructions earnestly until the very end. It's like going to school and mastering postmodernism and publishing a book on pomo. And it takes the same amount of time and money and effort.

Errata corige: according to Ken one cannot be FULLY  enlightened in the twofold sense  without mastering both states and structures.

But you seem to be picking on all the uncertainties. There's quite enough certainty to go around and make the next step, why bother about all the things we yet don't know?

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai, I meant all the words that aren't English, nor have direct English translations. Simple terms like Emptiness, Dharma, Zen, etc… are hard enough to define or explain. When you get into the more jargonistic Pali or Sanskrit terminology, it becomes much harder to follow.
I'm just saying this because this isn't a Buddhist forum, but an Integral one, so there are many people here that have had only a cursory study of the Dharma if at all.
But from what I read in your later posts, is your intent is to speak to those already on the path, as the taste of Just Seeing, is something that is required to even speak of these things. That is Mind to Mind trasmission becomes an impossible chore?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hey, Rick, the only non-English I've used in the original post was names of three schools (Hinayana, Madhyamaka, Yogacara). Now I remember - I did use Dharma-sasana, signifying the Buddhist teaching in terms of the whole Buddhist culture surrounding the actual words of the teaching, and in another post I did use Dharmakaya, the “reality-body” of Buddha.

By the way, “emptiness” is not a simple term, and very few people can really understand that sort of English. It doesn't help to pretend we can discuss something by writing about it in English.:-) Just kidding, English is a foreign language to me, anyway.

Then again, perhaps this is not a Buddhist forum, as you correctly point out, but then who'd be interested or even competent to discuss the monster called “Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism” after, as you say, “only a cursory study of the Dharma if at all”???

Thanks,

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

So true! I personally don't like the term Emptiness, as it is more derived from western philosophy. It took me about 2 years just to get past that term to stop reifying it.
From my experience much of the confusion that arises in the translation of Buddhist philosophy into western culture comes from our inflexible use of language to describe something. It's like we automatically toss around words like Emptiness and assume that someone will understand them, even though it took most of us a long time to understand them. And then, only after a lot of practice.
I noticed that when I talk about these things to other people, I really have to watch my intent and ego processes. There is such a subtle and incidious power dynamic that I have to watch when explaining, teaching, or just discussing something to/with someone. A subtle power play. I think this has something to do with our use of language, at least for me.
This I think is one thing that post-modernism a la Focault shines a light on.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

“But let me re-emphasize, awakening is to be realized-and-discussed, not just discussed for fun or intellectual curiosity; one needs to be firmly on the path, deep  into the territory to even consider such awkward things as “the meanings of emptiness”, or one risks serious unending confusion. Therefore, some things are better left unsaid in a public discussion. Your thoughts?

Hokai”

That whole post was amazing, thank you. We are of one mind.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Lots of good stuff here to respond to!  I had planned to write more today, but the Dharma intervened and I've been away from home longer than planned.  I went out this afternoon to eat something and then to read a bit at a coffee shop (a book on the history of Western thought, in preparation for my upcoming class; a book on Dzogchen for the purposes of this particular discussion), and while I was sitting at my table, a woman approached me and said, “I see you're reading about Dzogchen.  Did you know that there is an exhibit right next door of Buddhist relics?”  I wasn't aware of that.  So, I put my book away and walked across the little Spanish-style plaza to a room that had been transformed into a temporary reliquary.  There was a large statue of the Maitreya Buddha in the center of the room, surrounded by relics from probably about 30 or 40 Buddhist masters, ancient and modern.  I received blessings from a monk, paid my respects to the relics, and spent awhile just chanting and meditating with others there.

So, this afternoon provided me with a beautiful, unexpected interlude of premodern relic reverence as I contemplated the many fine, and often abstruse, points of the intersection of Buddhism and postmodernism…!  (Unexpected because the town I live in is small and unexceptional, not a likely place for a worldwide tour of such things.)

Anyway, I'll return to this thread tomorrow…

In the meantime, if any of my fellow Buddhists here want to share what, if anything, you believe postmodernism may “add” to the Buddhadharma, I'm interested in hearing your opinions.  Whatever we may believe, I don't think Ken would accept the idea that Buddhism is already postmodern (or beyond) in every way that matters.  Do you?

Best wishes,

B.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce: “Whatever we may believe, I don't think Ken would accept the idea that Buddhism is already postmodern (or beyond) in every way that matters.  Do you?”

Depends on the person.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I was asking some very specific people.  :-D  Namely, you, e, Hokai, Lol, and theurj (though I'm not sure theurj identifies as a Buddhist).

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi, Rick,

I wanted to add this on to my previous post to you, but I was too late and the editor function has vanished.  Impermanence!

I said:  The point that emptiness is also empty of inherent existence is what I was intending to communicate with my point above that Buddhism recognizes that “something [can] be both 'unconditioned' and a dependent arising.

Holden responded:  How can there be “something” that is also unconditioned. Trying to reify or think about emptiness as a thing is only gonna imbue paradox and confusion into the mind.
We are all just going to have to live with a great deal of uncertainty when it comes to 'all This'.

I agree that reifying emptiness into a thing or an archetypal Form is problematic.  That isn't what I was trying to suggest with that language.  I was thinking specifically of traditional discussions of emptiness within the Tibetan tradition (Geluk as well as Nyingma, and therefore in accordance with the Prasangika interpretation of Madhyamika).  According to this perspective, it is legitimate to describe emptiness as a phenomena, because it is something that can be accurately ascertained.  For instance, it is possible to correctly perceive the absence of something.  Emptiness is a phenomenon that is “found” when we perform an ultimate analysis upon a given object, disclosing its objective lack of inherent existence.  As such, it is an ultimate truth.  However, if you try to take emptiness itself as an object and examine it, searching for its essence, trying to determine if it exists from its own side, independently of anything else, then you will find that this isn't the case – that emptiness, also, lacks inherent (ultimate) self-existence.

So, thinking of the Buddhist convention of treating emptiness as a phenomenon (under certain conditions), I said, ”something [can] be both 'unconditioned' (e.g., ultimate) and a dependent arising.”  But I probably should have put it in quotes to let you know I'm not trying to naively reify it.

As Hokai says, talking about the different types of emptiness can lead us into difficult territory, and maybe it isn't something best pursued here.  Because it is quite complex, and the word is used in different ways, with different referents, in various doctrinal and practical contexts.  But I believe it is relevant to a discussion of postmodernism and the “myth of the given,” if only because a common pomo criticism of traditional religious perspectives is that they are prone to the myth of the given.  As a number of us have acknowledged, the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination, the avoidance of extremes such as eternalism and nihilism, and other factors all appear to suggest that Buddhism is careful to avoid the naive substantialism and metaphysical thinking that postmodernism criticizes.  But even if this is generally the case (and I think it is), I do not think it is wise to assume that Buddhism is immune to postmodern critique in all areas.  It may also embed certain unrecognized presuppositions which postmodern criticism might serve to highlight.  Even if the answer turns out to be negative, I think it is a question worth asking and investigating.

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Theurj,

I hope to respond to points you and Hokai made tomorrow.  Tonight, before I turn in for a little dream yoga (or, more likely, samsaric sleep), I wanted to post a quote from a Dzogchen text in response to your comment/question about Dzogchen's “rigpa” or “mind-as-such” to ordinary awareness.  The text is entitled Rig-pa ngo-sprod gcer-mthong rang-grol, or “Self-Liberation through Seeing with Naked Awareness.”

As for this sparkling awareness which is called “mind,”
Even though one says that it exists, it does not actually exist.
(On the other hand) as a source, it is the origin of the diversity
 of all the bliss of Nirvana and all the sorrow of Samsara.
And as for its being something desirable, it is cherished alike in
 the Eleven Vehicles.
With respect to its having a name, the various names that are
 applied to it are inconceivable in their numbers.
Some call it “the nature of the mind” or “mind itself.”
Some Tirthikas call it by the name Atman or “the Self.”
The Sravakas call it the doctrine of Anatman or “the absence of
 a self.”
The Chittamatrins call it by the name Chitta or “the Mind.”
Some call it the Prajnaparamita or “the Perfection of Wisdom.”
Some call it the name Tathagatagarbha or “the embryo of Buddhahood.”
Some call it by the name Mahamudra or “the Great Symbol.”
Some call it by the name “the Unique Sphere.”
Some call it by the name Dharmadhatu or “the dimension of
 Reality.”
Some call it by the name Alaya or “the basis of everything.”
And some simply call it by the name “ordinary awareness.”

Now, when you are introduced to your own intrinsic awareness,
 the method for entering into it involves three considera-
 tions.
Thoughts in the past are clear and empty and leave no trace
 behind.
Thoughts in the future are fresh and unconditioned by anything.
And in the present moment, when your mind remains in its own condition
 without constructing anything,
Awareness at that moment in itself is quite ordinary.
And when you look into yourself in this way nakedly (without
 any discursive thoughts),
Since there is only this pure observing, there will be found a lucid
 clarity without anyone being there who is the observer;
Only a naked manifest awareness is present.
(This awareness) is empty and immaculately pure, not being
 created by anything whatsoever.
It is authentic and unadulterated, without any duality of clarity
 and emptiness.
It is not permanent and yet it is not created by anything.
However, it is not a mere nothingness or something annihilated
 because it is lucid and present.
It does not exist as a single entity because it is present and clear in 
 terms of being many.
(On the other hand) it is not created as a multiplicity of things
 because it is inseparable and of a single flavor.
This inherent self-awareness does not derive from anything outside
 itself.
This is the real introduction to the actual condition of things.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Thanks Bruce, a wonderful list.

That made think once again of the slightly different connotations each name contain. It reveals a specific angle, a notion of aspect. Describing the Ultimate will be flavored with ones mindset, ones mode of thinking, ones own specific situation of realization and its context. It does not limit it at all, it just gives us a nuance of, an emphases, of how the Absolute yields limitless aspects. As our mind open yet another door or window into a hitherto unknown unseen vista, yet another mode of the Absolute is revealed into our consciousness and our experience is enriched and enlarged.

Imagine all world religions, all thought that has gone into it, all ideas about the absolute nature of this life and see what a mass of scattered pieces of glass abounds, all reflecting the light of one indivisible Nature. And still we can not exhaust it. Regardless of what we come up with, there it will be, reflecting the glory of true nature. All expressions carrying their own distinct quality, to be recognized as only pertaining to that alone, but in no way hindering a true seeing of the underlying essence.

God's clay if you like.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce: “I was asking some very specific people.  :-D  Namely, you, e, Hokai, Lol, and theurj (though I'm not sure theurj identifies as a Buddhist).”

Then yes.

When I said it depends on the person, I meant that Buddhism has past the post-modern in the minds of these people, and Hokai stated, the Dharma's source is only this very mind.

As far as the practice itself, i.e., the two truths doctrine that stems from dependence origination, and the 4 noble truths that arises from this understanding. These state nothing. There is nothing to state other than a recognition of the way things are moment to moment, which are no way in particular. Therefore the core of the Dharma has always been post-postmodern. Actually to even say this misses the mark.
Like Hokai also stated, it's comparing two things that really shouldn't be compared. That which is based upon relative truth and that which is simply an understanding of the true nature of all things; no mystical language intended.
It is really a category mistake. As I noted in another thread when Pelle said that Buddhism has yet to pass through the fire of post-modernism, and I replied, in a very real sense, that there was nothing to pass through any fire.
Of course, I speak from a Zen lineage, the Chung Tai Chan lineage, so it would be interesting to see what others from other lineages have to say.
The post-modern gaze requires something to gaze upon, so what is there that the Dharma is saying that can be gazed upon. Once you gaze at this moment it is another moment. Or as the Dalai Lama says, “There is no finger pointing place.”


As when a student asked a Zen master, “what is the teaching that goes beyond Buddhas?” He replied, “A piece of cake.”
If you get it then you get it, if not then not. Zen seems irrational, but it is in fact transrational.
So if you'd like to think that a transrational wisdom tradition has yet to achieve post-modernism, well I don't know what to say. Not all Buddhists are Zen practitioners though.

From your list it seems that we are merely in a semantic debate.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

So pomo only deals with relative truth? And is “sick” because it equates emptiness with differance? No goal of liberation? As to the latter, I would suggest it not only seeks to liberate the individual from faulty “consciousness” (like Buddhism) but also to change social and political structures to empower individuals to have such opportunity (one of the critiques above on Healing Deconstruction).

From  Postmetaphyical Thinking 4 at Open Integral:

No Views is Good Views: A Comparative Study of Nagarjuna's Sunyata and Derrida's Différance by Lara Braitstein, McGill University 

Consciousness, Literature and the Arts, Archive, Volume 5 Number 2, August 2004, Special Issue: Jacques Derrida's Indian Philosophical Subtext

To recapitulate, there do appear to be numerous obvious points of comparison between Derrida and Nagarjuna: sunyata and différance; pratitya-samutpada and the ‘weave of differences'; the method of reducing all views to absurdity; and the intention of undermining the dualities which underlie all kind of debate or argumentation - which underlie, in fact, all views.

Something else that Nagarjuna and Derrida share, is the desire, the intent, of putting forward no view.  Both are grappling with the slippery issue of trying to put into words the end of discursive thought, and both take as their method not only the destruction of the views of their opponents, but also the rereading of those thinkers who may be said to be on the ‘same side' (other Buddhists trying to understand emptiness, for Nagarjuna; and thinkers like Heidegger and Freud for Derrida).  By demonstrating how all views, just by virtue of their being views, necessarily contradict the ‘truth' of sunyata /différance, both Nagarjuna and Derrida understand that a reader taking their work as a solid view will have made a grave error in understanding.

To hold emptiness as a view - to reify it or think of it as the essence of things - is to misunderstand it entirely.  As the goal of the MMK is to show how absurd it is to hold any view whatsoever, one may with confidence conflate sunyata with Nagarjuna's position.  Therefore, whoever takes Nagarjuna's work as proposing a view has done something wrong.  Derrida writes with more words and less drama: 

“What differs?  Who differs?  What is différance?  If we answered these questions before examining them as questions, before turning them back on themselves, and before suspecting their very form, including what seems most natural and necessary about them, we would immediately fall back into what we just disengaged ourselves from.  In effect, if we accepted the form of the question, in its meaning and its syntax (“what is?” “who is?” “who is it that?”), we would have to conclude that différance has been derived, has happened, is to be mastered and governed on the basis of the point a present being…a what, or a present being as a subject, a who.”  (Derrida 14-15) 

In other words, asking questions of différance as though it were a concept or view like any other, immediately situates the query in precisely the conceptual context différance is meant to undermine.  Put simply, ”différance,” writes Derrida, “is not” (Derrida 21);  “It governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises any authority” (Derrida 22)[i][v] .

Excerpts from ”Derrida's (Ir)religion: A Theology (of Différance)” by
Ian Edwards, Duquesne University

It would be easy to confuse différance, and its nameless place, for what is commonly understood to be God. God, unlike différance, signifies a metaphysical ground, or an “upon which” the eternal is placed. Yet, différance is neither eternal (nor sequential). There is no “upon which” anything can be placed. For the place is always shifting (moreover, the place is its shifting and vice versa). Since its indeconstructability is not due to a metaphysics of presence, it must emerge in the very spacing of what can be deconstructed.

What is necessary is to go back “behind” and “below” the origin: “toward a necessity which is neither generative nor engendered and which carries philosophy, “precedes” (prior to the time that passes or the eternal time before history) and “receives” the effect, here the image of opposites (intelligible and sensible): philosophy. This necessity (khora is its sur-name) seems so virginal that it does not even have the name of virgin any longer.” (Derrida, 1993, p.126)

Without form and name, différance is meaning-less. It is meaningless because it does not have any prescribed fixed boundaries; hence, what can happen within a boundary-less space is unlimited. It is here where Derrida finds a kinship with negative theology. Both deconstruction and negative theology, especially in the sermons of Meister Eckhart, attempt to assert what can not be asserted. They also, along with the thought of Georges Bataille, have a “passion” for what is “impossible.”

Despite their similarities, there are also a few notable differences. First, negative theology posits a godly-being who resides in a space prior to the purely existential mode of being. Deconstruction would not necessarily, in the conventional sense, pose an argument against the notion of a space that precedes the existential. However, it would have difficulty accepting a godly-Being. In the indeconstructable space, there is neither a being nor a non-being, but, according to Derrida/Caputo (1997), a certain “quasi-condition” within which both are inscribed (p.103). Second, negative theology takes on a certain view that directs its gaze toward that which is above, i.e., it is always looking toward the transcendental, or mystical. Deconstruction has nothing to do with mysticism. (Yet, both mysticism and deconstruction exceed the boundaries of philosophy). They differ in that deconstruction does not to speak of anything that is transcendent (It could be argued that the khora is somewhat of a transcendent function). It prefers to speak of différance, the possibility and impossibility of whether or not the indeconstructable space, the khora, can be avoided.

The witness has no conceptual identity, it pre-exists name and form. There is really no Western parallel that explicates what is meant by a “deconstructive witness.” Hence, we have to turn to the East. In Indian Philosophy, the “witness” becomes “Witness” (saksin). It is the “pure” awareness which is not itself an object of thought (Coward, 1992, p.205). Since it is not an object of thought, it can never, at any time, under any circumstances, be seen, heard, known or perceived. It is the seer that is not seen. It is the hearer that is not heard. It is the knower that is not known. And, it is the perceiver that is not perceived.

If the witness has no nature, what is being witnessed? A deconstructive witness witnesses deconstruction. One does not simply witness deconstruction; one becomes deconstruction, i.e., without vision, hearing, or speech a witness notes the arising and falling of phenomena, the play of differences in the indeconstructable space. In witnessing, there is a capacity to deploy attention: a tiny root tension underlies all attention, for it is a subtle contraction in the field of nondual, or choiceless awareness. But how can there be any attention in deconstructive witnessing, for there is no focus on one thing in exclu1sion to the other? There is simply everything that is arising and falling, and you are that, through all changes of state. Thus, with deconstructive witnessing, the tension that is witnessed uncoils in the vast expanse of the indeconstructable space, the khora. There is nothing to look at because you are blind. There is nothing to hear because you are deaf. There is nothing to speak of because you are mute. You are simply everything and no-thing, dispersing to no-end. This is pure freedom, radical liberation. With constant (deconstructive) witnessing, there is release, release-from-the-world because you are no longer its victim but its witness; therefore, there is no need to witness to anybody.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Edward,

“no view is good views” only if you're gone crazy. Do all the hours of sitting and typing words come from no views? I presume you uphold what you post.

The views of Derrida and Nagarjuna (with many other Mahayana Buddhist masters of significance) have several important points in common. Buddhist masters of old did use several conceptual techniques in clarifying their views, and similar techniques were used by postmodernism in the West. However, those moves do not exhaust or even delimit their view, they only allow the confused ones to put aside another obstacle. However, unlike Derrida “play (or game) of the world”, which is the endless process of differance multiplying itself without creating anything else, the esoteric Buddhist play is Dharmakaya's cosmic speech that proliferates its own intentionality of saving beings.

Braitstein is not the first to recognize similarities (and ignore fundamental differences). Quite a few pomos have done that, publish their books, got their tenures, but haven't come forth to report on their newfound unconditional freedom and share with us the treasury they have discovered.

As your post says (the Braitstein part, that is): “deconstruction does not to speak of anything that is transcendent “. That was exactly my point before. Hence, incommensurability with the two-truths system of mind-training.

Later however, it says, “You are simply everything and no-thing, dispersing to no-end. This is pure freedom, radical liberation. With constant (deconstructive) witnessing, there is release, release-from-the-world because you are no longer its victim but its witness; therefore, there is no need to witness to anybody.”

I'd like to see someone mastering deconstruction and claiming this pure freedom, this radical liberation. Did Derrida ever claim it? I don't think so, to his credit.

Competence through referential experience is required to talk about anything. That makes people trustworthy. Worthy of reading what they write. All else is BS, whether Buddhist or pomo.

Godspeed,

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hey Edward,
 

Edward:
Is post-postmodernism aperspectival, i.e., not enacting any one (meta)perspective?

Aperspectival does not mean not enacting a perspective but the capability to enact multiple perspectives. It means not (stuck in one) perspective i.e. yours. The mind can switch perspectives the way a person can channel surf. Post-postmodernism balances the skepticism of postmodernism. Postmodernism feels that truth cannot be found because the context is culturally bound and so myth bound. Post-postmodernism puts ‘culture' thru the fire of postmodernism and shows that perspectives arise ‘with' and not ‘in' a culture.



It seems that it is enacting/performing, so can enactment arise without a perspective? 

Let's stick that relation into Buddhist Conditionality. And see if we can find any understanding.

When enacting, perspectives. With the arising of enacting, perspectives arise. When enacting is not, perspectives are not. With the cessation of enacting, perspectives cease.

Which of course circles around to one of Bruce's points: Is there a “direct” perception that is not a perspective?

Is there an ‘indirect' perception? ‘Direct' is superfluous. With perspectives comes perceptions. With perceptions comes perspectives.



Now I understand that there isn't  a “given thing in itself.” But it seems that the very defintion of  dependent origination is that every thing is related to every other thing, hence embedded in relative perspectives. There is no “outside” apersepctival point of reference. One might even say that such a perception that is not a perspective is a fine example of the myth of the given.

Excellent, I was hoping someone would pick up on that so we can go further. So, the cause of our suffering is the reification (embedding into) of this ‘process' of shifting relative perspectives that is uncontrollable and upon closer investigation not subject to reification. Seeing this is all there ‘is', there is no place outside of this procedural process of perspectives. Do you see though that this shifting process of perspectives can cease? (See the last part of the sutra I posted) What then of perspectives? What then of e or Edward? The root of the myth of the given is ‘I'.


love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hey Bruce,

Bruce:
I think that's nicely stated. 

Thanks

For a number of years, my default position was, Buddhism does not subscribe to the myth of the given and clearly demonstrates knowledge of the contextuality and constructedness of phenomena through its doctrine of dependent origination (and therefore was “ahead of its time,” from a postmodernist's point of view).  With Wilber's recent writings, though, I've been looking back at Buddhism afresh, looking for areas where perhaps (historically, if not doctrinally) it has unconsciously preserved some presuppositions as “givens.”  What do you think?

Sure, I think that is great. What could we potentially find? One language that is Dharma (truth) oriented and one language that is people (myth) oriented. One pointing directly to the Dharma and one pointing to the pointer. Perhaps we would find somethig else.


As I just suggested above, a helpful approach might be to consider ways in which Buddhist culture defends certain given myths, even if doctrinally there is no clear support for taking them as “given.”  Some obvious examples:  the notion that women cannot obtain enlightenment (until the reincarnate as men), or even the suspicion that Westerners are not capable of understanding the Dharma.  These are obviously rather Amber perspectives, and you do find some support for them in scripture (at least for the spiritual inferiority of women), but I don't think you can actually defend the “givenness” or absoluteness of these conclusions based on Buddhist principles.

For me personaly, I have tried to find the first language above within the yanas. The sutras/stories/practices touched with emptiness or suchness. The others although 'fun', I have no issue with jettisoning. Although, it seems we have to find our way thru the jungle, so why not everyone else? :-)


So, Buddhism quite effectively deconstructs the (ultimate) inherent self-existence of worldly phenomena, but historically, it has not lent its powers of insight and analysis to deconstructing relative (social, cultural) presuppositions and prejudices.  To the degree that it doesn't address these things, allowing practices to be taken as “given” if only because they lie outside of its traditional scope of concern, Buddhism is prone on these fronts at least to (justifiable) postmodern critcism.

I see the Buddha deconstructing relative (social, cultural) presuppositions and prejudices of his time quite well actually. He helped to dislodge long held archaic tradtitions, tried to abandon animal sacrifice and saw equality in all beings long before modern sensibilities enacted at least human rights into law.

Again, maybe we should look at Buddhism as 2 things. Buddhayana i.e. those teachings/practices/stories, etc. touched with emptiness and suchness and cultural Buddhism. The meeting and meshing of Buddhayana with cultures.

love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Edward:
I have a few “postmodern” questions. What is our motivation for even discussing this topic? Are we really trying to get at the “truth?” If we accept the pomo assertion that there is no ultimate, foundational truth (as Ken stated above), that there are only relative perspectives in relation to each other, then is not some form of unconditioned, primordial pure awarenss that claims to steps outside of that relativity an assertion of the very metaphysical ground which Ken just deconstructed?

Looks like we may be getting no-where. Edward, look at the end of the sutra I posted. What do you think is at the end of the raindbow of perspectives?

love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Cessation of stress and suffering. Sounds like the end of life itself. It seems that such a pure, immediate,  mirror awareness would take on stress and suffering with equal aplomb as bliss and liberation, given its lack of preference for perspective.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

e, all,

I have nothing to add to the discussion topic - I don’t have the background for that, but this line of e’s struck me:

“The root of the myth of the given is ‘I’.”

Isn’t it that:

The root of all myth, of all confusion is ‘I’; the way of all liberation is realizing this.

Frans

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

e: ”Excellent, I was hoping someone would pick up on that so we can go further. So, the cause of our suffering is the reification (embedding into) of this ‘process' of shifting relative perspectives that is uncontrollable and upon closer investigation not subject to reification. Seeing this is all there ‘is', there is no place outside of this procedural process of perspectives. ”

There is a good Zen story that points at this.

A student at a Zen monastary could no longer take the structured, hard and concentrated life at the hall, so he goes to see the abott and asks him if he can leave. The master says, “of course, you are always free to try to leave.”
So the student respectfully bows and starts for the door, the master says, “That is not your door.”
So the student looking around, sees another door to the courtyard and walks to it. The master says louder, “That is not your door.”
So the student looks around and sees a small entrance to another room behind the masters desk, and starts for it, and the master yells, “That is not your door!”
The student is confused and begins to cry, “You said I could leave, but how can I if none of these is my door!”
The master grabs him and says, “Well then, if you cannot leave then sit.”

If you want to leave, there is no way out, nowhere to go. It is this need to leave that suffering arises from. The story is saying what e said, but I would never have thought to put it in that language. That is really interesting.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai, what teachers do you know of that are fully enlightened in the twofold sense?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I know a dozen of people who are pretty awake in any good sense, not all Buddhist. Some of them are sitting at the ISC conferences, some of them are not even teachers. I will avoid names here, since this seems to be the best way to start a stupid controversy (if this is not a sign of our times, what is?).

I'm not sure yet about the twofold sense myself. The matter is discussed by Ken in principle, not in details. I'm still working on conceptualizing it in a way that makes full sense to me. Of course, the basic meaning is clear, and seems indisputable.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

e: “Again, maybe we should look at Buddhism as 2 things. Buddhayana i.e. those teachings/practices/stories, etc. touched with emptiness and suchness and cultural Buddhism. The meeting and meshing of Buddhayana with cultures.”

This is a good idea. I'm also all for decontructing the cultural baggage of thousands of years. I think that the new American Buddhism that is emerging with masters like, Steve Hagan, Steven Bachelor, etc… are doing just that. What's interesting is most of them were taught these culturally stripped versions from Asian masters in Asia.
As far as women being not as spiritual advanced as men, or not being able to touch money, etc… these are rare in todays world. I haven't actually seen anything like this and have only heard stories in a socially stigmatizing way. That is, “those sects actually still practice those things, how sad.”

Bruce, I would suggest you look into the Chung Tai Chan monestary in Taiwan. The Grandmaster has built the largest monestary in the world there and is supporting dozens of Zen halls all over the world. In reality, he is more active in the modern Buddhist world than the Dalai Lama, and he's considered to be an enlightened master that is helping to bring forth the true Dharma, without any of the 1st tier stuff you mention.

David, I know your question was to Hokai, but I could give you a few names.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hi, Rick,

Actually, I was looking at the Chung Tai Chan websites this morning.  I read a few lectures and Zen stories, as well as an interesting line-by-line commentary on the Prajna Paramita Sutra.  I don't know anything about this particular sect of Ch'an, other than what I read this morning, but I do know of Buddhist teachers that I think are presenting Dharma in a way that is suitable for our postmodern worldview (without themselves being Green or limited to Green).  While I have found many profound teachings in Nyingma and Bon Dzogchen and believe they are sublime vehicles of the Dharma (and I have similar respect for other traditions, such as Zen, Mahamudra, and Shingon), I have focused in recent years on TSK (a new vision created by a contemporary Nyingma master) because of the way it directly addresses, without being defined by, many postmodern Western perspectives.

However, as Hokai also points out (and as I've been trying to stress in my letters), there are very few Buddhist movements that have actually digested, culturally and institutionally, the full scope of postmodern or Integral insight and practice.  The reason I said I believe it is irresponsible to claim that Buddhism is beyond postmodernism is because that claim, by ignoring the full AQAL presence of Buddhism in the world, insulates the many institutions that go by that name from critical reflection or potential Integral reform.  I have no beef at all with the claim that certain essential Buddhist teachings and texts issue from a place that is beyond current postmodern thinking, but I do not want to hide behind that claim and thereby insulate Buddhism as a whole from a pomo/Integral critique.  As I said in a previous post in this thread, “I think it is irresponsible to say that Buddhism has completely left postmodernism behind, because there are too many things Buddhism (as a culture, as multiple streams of tradition) simply hasn't addressed yet.  But I also think it is naive to claim that Buddhism still has the whole of postmodernism ahead of it, or that its insights are classically Amber or Orange.  In a number of ways, it is fully capable of meeting the challenge of postmodernism, and also of pointing a way forward for (interested) postmodern theorists.  ”

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Yeah, I would definitely like to hear some names, Rick. And the same goes for everyone else. There are probably others who would like to know as well. Do you know anything about Sheng-yen?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I spent some time with this Ch'an master (though he's getting very old so hurry up). If you're looking for reliable meditation instruction, his group is quite kosher. If you're looking for some real post/modern clarity, you will be disappointed. A monk is still worth two dozen lay people.

By the way, Stuart Lachs spent 20 years with Sheng-yen, and here are his conclusions:

Stuart Lachs - “Comign Down from the Zen Clouds”

Stuart Lachs - “Establishing Hierarchy in Ch'an/Zen Buddhism in America”

Stuart Lachs - “Richard Baker and the Myth of the Zen Roshi”
 

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Edward: ”If we accept the pomo assertion that there is no ultimate, foundational truth (as Ken stated above), that there are only relative perspectives in relation to each other, then is not some form of unconditioned, primordial pure awarenss that claims to steps outside of that relativity an assertion of the very metaphysical ground which Ken just deconstructed?”

Stuck in italics, can't help it.

Some unconditioned pure awareness doesn't claim anything. When you place an object in front of a mirror, does that mirror claim anything? Does it posit anything? Does it hold onto an object longer than it is before it or favor some objects more than others.
Read Hokai's statements again, because he's pointing at this. This pure awareness can only be experience, it can't be claimed or posited. To speak of it in relative terms to another person and have them understand what you're saying, you have to already have some driect understanding.
KW said this when he said that we cannot confuse the map for the territory. It is like seeing a sunset and trying to describe it to someone that hasn't seen a sunset. There is an impossibility to the task. The only real way to do it is to have the other person see the same sunset. This is all metaphorical language, lest you think I was falling into the myth of the given myself. Because while a sunset is different to two people depending upon these relative positions, this pure awareness is the same for all people. Mine is no different from yours. If there is no difference, then how can I say “mine” or “yours.” There is only this pure awareness.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Thank you, Rick. Let me qualify those points somewhat. You say, ”This  pure awareness can only be experienced, it can't be claimed or posited.” I wouldn't go that  far. I would say it cannot be posited ultimately, but it surely can be expressed in many good and many bad ways, and we're doing our best to recognized which is which.

When Edward says, “If we accept the pomo assertion that there is no ultimate, foundational truth etc.” , who has ever accepted that assertion on this discussion thread?  Buddhism is clear on the fact that a relative truth (even when it's truth) cannot be an ultimate truth, and that in addition the ultimate truth is beyond all dualistic concepts, including the notion of relative vs. absolute. However, while the ultimate truth cannot be pronounced, it's realization not only can be freely expressed in a myriad ways, but has been expressed so by many realizers, and is being expressed nowadays by many realizers.

(Also, Ken Wilber has NEVER said what Edward makes him say. Edward has quoted on this thread from “Integral Spirituality” (draft), pp. 295-6, but the crucial sentence is the following: “…in the manifest world, there are no perceptions, only perspectives.” And I would now emphasize, in the manifest world there are only perspectives. Hence, there is no ultimate, foundational truth in the manifest world. Good morning! The shunyata (eng. “emptiness”) teachings  have been saying that all along. Now, shall we witness this turned into “no foundational truth anywhere”? As the Black Knight sang in Monty Python's Holy grail: “None shall pass!”)

Further on,  once we establish this “no truth anywhere” as mere nonsense, we should have no problems with several givens, so far as we don't accept them blindly. One of them is awareness (one cannot question the existence of that which is and/or does the questioning) and also the potential for awakening to it's own nature. Having givens is not necessarily a metaphysical move. Having unnecessary givens is. Let us trust the Ockham's razor in all matters relative and Manjushri's Sword in all matters of prajna. Both of these cutting actions seem to live us with only the bare essentials, or as Einstein is often paraphrased, “Theories should be as simple as possible, but no simpler.” Well, so should are practices be.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I am well aware of Ken's qualification “in the material world.” I then quoted in another post how he differentiates the absolute and relative. And a point I've made here, and elsewhere, is that it depends on the Buddhist school as to how one relates the “two truths.” It seems you're in agreement with Ken's interpretation, as it seems it is supported by your particular Buddhist school's interpretation. But it is the THE Buddhist interpretation, and it is questionable that it is Nagarjuna's.

I see you also share Ken's penchant for degrading pomo and those individuals that question you're cherished positions. So I capitulate; you win. Since I'm obviously a crazy idiot full of nonsense it seems pointless to add my commentary.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

@ Edward:    The qualification is not “in the material world”, but “in the manifest world”. Further, “no truth anywhere” is hopefully neither your position, not a typical pomo interpretation to be “degraded”. Anyway, such a position is self-degrading, right? No need to degrade anything there, right?

The two truths are not something to play around and relate. They're still called “truths”, right?, being something to establish and verify and attain and realize. Yes you need to adopt this or that way of practice, which is what the different schools are about - they're not salon discussions. But anyway, since I'm left with what I cherish, and you don't seem in the mood to share, I can only hope you're glad with everything else - a perfect pomo way out! Nagarjuna is surely wiping his tears…

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Irmeli: ”Had the teacher really been able of post modern level of thinking, my questions would have been relatively easy to answer. Actually I knew already, when I asked my questions, how they could be answered without making any sacrifices in the essential teaching.”

I don't think it's fair to just jump past the earlier posts without comment.
Irmeli, what you did can be likened to visiting a Catholic sermon having never read any part of the Bible, and with no experience in the Church or Christianity, and expect to make some sense of it.
Your confusion comes with not understanding the two truths of Buddhism, that while there appears to be a relative “I” that is advancing up the spiral, in an absolute sense, there is no I to be found. This is due to the law of dependence arising of all things. If one is subject to being dependently arisen, then there can't be something that can be said to have an inherent “I” or self nature. In an everyday sense though, there is this “me” that is typing these words. Remember, the Dharma is not nihilistic. I think that the posts that have proceed your have explained this well.
As Katagiri Roshi said, “How can we live in a contradictory world, yet here we are.”

As far as your above statement, there are many Zen stories about students who do this. The most famous is the overflowing tea cup story, but I'll retell one my teacher told to me when I asked him how I could know if I've found a good teacher.

One day an accomplished student visits a renouned master and asks him what he feels is a simple question, “What is Buddha-nature?”
The master refuses to say, as he says the student wouldn't believe him. The student insists and the master says, “Ok then. The Buddha-nature is a monster, a crazy looking monster, with long sharp teeth, and freaky looking face. He has many arms, etc…”
The student is shocked and immediately says, “No, that's not Buddha-nature, it is this….”
The master then looks at the student and says, “See, I told you you wouldn't believe me.”

What my teacher had told me was that I would judge a teacher, not on some objective criteria, but upon a predetermined concept of what a good teacher was and would consider a teacher that fullfilled these conceptual requirement to be a good teacher, regardless of the ability or competance of the teacher. It is like this with all things. Once we see the illusion of dealing with mental objects, instead of the objects that present themselves too us, only then would be even begin to start to deal with anything one could call reality.
All answers are found within the question.
So whatever my teacher would have told me, or whatever answer the master would have given the student in the story would be irrelavent and a waste of time, because by asking the question I had already shown that I didn't understand. So I would only have accepted an answer that aligned to what I felt I already knew.

This is actually rather post-modern in scope.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce: “However, as Hokai also points out (and as I've been trying to stress in my letters), there are very few Buddhist movements that have actually digested, culturally and institutionally, the full scope of postmodern or Integral insight and practice.  The reason I said I believe it is irresponsible to claim that Buddhism is beyond postmodernism is because that claim, by ignoring the full AQAL presence of Buddhism in the world, insulates the many institutions that go by that name from critical reflection or potential Integral reform. ”

I agree. I see your point.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Balder asked earlier if I identified as a Buddhist. I don't and I'm not sure with what I identify anymore. Hokai asked me: “I presume you uphold what you post.” Not so much any more. For some time I've tired of defending positions or perspectives, even so-called integral ones. I'm not completely free of such attachment yet but I'm working on it. Now I often tend to voice a position to 1) try it on and 2) see how others will defend their positions in response to it. If nonattachment to positions is a Buddhist goal then Buddhists really do seem quite attached to theirs.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Edward,

you can keep your attachment to the non-attachment. I don't mind. It's just that non-attachment to positions was never a Buddhist goal. Actual Buddhists don't care so much about positions to have a goal defined with any sort of relationship to them. As far as we are really Buddhists, we are already free enough of positions to not mind being attached to those we find being actually true in guiding our practice to absolute certainty. On a more personal note, I am always more intersted in your realization than either your positions or no-positions.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai: “Thank you, Rick. Let me qualify those points somewhat. You say, ”This  pure awareness can only be experienced, it can't be claimed or posited.” I wouldn't go that  far. I would say it cannot be posited ultimately, but it surely can be expressed in many good and many bad ways, and we're doing our best to recognized which is which.”

Yes, thank you for qualifying that. I was speaking from the view of this absolute, uncondioned awareness and not the relative “I” that tries to express it. Thanx for filling in the the gap.

I think another great physicist, Neils Bohr, has something to say about this as well, “There are great truths and small truths. The opposite of a small truth is clearly false. The opposite of a great truth is also true.”

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai said: “Having givens is not necessarily a metaphysical move. Having unnecessary givens is.”
 
Could you explain this? I get a sense of what you mean and have no problem with the givens Ken seems to, ah, give us, but I can't articulate it right now.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

David, you're familiar with Wilber's “involutionary givens,” aren't you?  He includes eros, agape, the 20 tenets, and several other things among them.  He regards them as “involutionary givens,” in part, because they do not appear to be evolutionarily emergent patterns (evolutionary inheritances, a number of which have been mistaken as timelessly given archetypes or laws), but rather ordering principles present right from the start (of the unfolding universe).  More generally, in keeping with his “Kosmic IOU” principle, he says that no model or View or philosophical system can get going without accepting a few givens at the outset, as Godel has demonstrated.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

@ David,

all the traditional categories of metaphysical thinking cannot stand up to the scrutiny of critical thinking in their pre-critical, ontological forms. Ken Wilber, from IS:  “In the modern and postmodern world, they are simply obsolete notions that are .. embarassing to religion…” The suggestion is to update and revise - that is the task of lineage holders.

But everyone should be able to understand that all claims need to have some objective evidence (to answer the modern critique) and intersubjective grounding (to answer the postmodern critique). This whole problem refers to the manifest realm, the whole manifest realm and it's levels of being and knowing. In post-metaphysical thinking, quote from KW,

“they have to be conceived as forms that have developed in time, evolution and history. This is not to say that spiritual philosophy can do completely without any a priori forms (no philosophy can); but the fewer, the better.”

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce, thank you. That helps a lot. Yes, I'm fairly familiar with those things, but I hadn't been categorizing them as involutionary givens. Now that you put it that way, it makes perfect sense. It also reminds of that article you posted not long ago about a system based on a process view. I was imagining the 20 tenets and wondering how one could base a system on the process, on the dynamic aspect of the thing. I didn't get too far, but it's a really interesting idea. It helps a lot to look back at these basic ideas. Looking again into eros, agape, agency, communion, transendance, dissolution–such profound concepts, especially in the way he frames them, they have immediate relevance. The more I look into them the more it seems that it's proper the balance of these things that really yeilds the best results.

Thanks, Hokai. Yes, that also helps a lot. It's the few a priori forms that we need, or as Bruce put it, the few givens that any system needs to get along, that makes things interesting and tricky seeming. You say, “They have to be conceived as forms that have developed in time, evolution and history,” and I understand that if we can do this we will escape the wrath of the modernists, but how do we do all this, lay out all these involutionary givens such as the twenty tenets, without positing some given before time, before evolution and history? I suppose there's a way, but I can't quite see it. The moment you do that, would you then be characterized as metaphysical? Is there a way of doing that and escaping the metaphysical brand at the same time? Or does Ken just escape a large part of the metaphysical branding by saying that this Spirit hadn't yet developed any structures, that it had a creative nature and unlimited power but was, in a way, very limited in what it could do since it hadn't yet evolved any structures to work with and couldn't even be aware of itself?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

@ David,

there is no time “before time”, no evolution before evolution. A priori is an ontological, not a chronological priority. What we're positing as a given needs to be understood as simultaneous to everything else. Spirit is prior, but not antecedent, because involution occures not in time.

So, when you formulate this as follows, ”this Spirit hadn't yet developed any structures, that it had a creative nature and unlimited power but was, in a way, very limited in what it could do since it hadn't yet evolved any structures to work with and couldn't even be aware of itself?” that's just one side of the street, because at that same time there's the vast openness never entering the flow of time, AND there's the non-duality of That and every little thing arising in time, evolution and history.

That is, most of the metaphysical categories have to be recognized in time, but if we cannot conceive somethign arising in time, it will have to remain a given, with us being aware of it, not embarassed by it.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I asked Hokai by PM if he would give me a list of teachers he thought were enlightened in the twofold sense, and he responded with this great letter, which he gave me permission to post if I thought it would be useful. I do, so here it is:

Hi David

I can tell I consider some people “awake in any good sense” (my words), which does not necessarily entail “full enlightenment in ALL states and ALL structures” (the integral formula), the latter being in itself a hyperbole used by KW to drive the point more emphatically.

I will still not give you names, not because I consider you public,:-) but because I cannot know what meaning would this have for you (or anyone else for that matter, unless I have known you for quite a while, in person). Realized individuals self-identify or they don't. Both options have merit. I will however give a more detailed explanation here.

There are no perfect human beings out there, but there are definitely people who have attained to very high levels of realization, awakening, enlightement. This whole point depends on the model of awakening you use. Hinayana, Mahayana and Vajrayana use slightly different models, and in each of those models some details are incredible and impossible, while some other details (like the magical powers acquired by the bodhisattva before even the first awakening) have nothing to do with spiritual realization in either realm, absolute or relative. Parts of some models are really crazy, and here I'm talking just about the Buddhist ones.

Then there's the question of this twofold problem, freedom and fullness. As my friend Daniel Ingram said, “I have met a lot of walking saints that were not enlightened in the
technical sense, both male and female, poor and rich, and from many
cultures and religions. I have met enlightened beings whose
personalities I really didn't care for that much, though I had to
respect their achievements.” (By the way, please have a look at his paper “An Essay about Arahats” (link here) - if you like that, you can read his whole book.)

If someone is one's teacher, one obviously considers that person to be
realized in some way to some degree. Otherwise, why would one waste
this precious time? Of course, people often get comfortable in a
situation where they won't be pushed too hard, but that has nothing to
do with waking up.

In short, there quite a few people out there with both components activated and stabilized to a truly impressive degree, and that all serves as a bright mirror to the seeker. Ultimately, the choice of teacher is something one does, so one needs to take full responsibility for that. It's not a simple thing, nor an objectifiable issue (“Alright, tell me already, who's enlightened out there?!?”) but it can be reduced to several clear guidelines, the main of which is clear instruction confirmed by real results. It's not a foggy business, not until we make it so. I hope this helps.

*Feel free to post this if you think it's useful.

Cordially,

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

To that I'd add what my teacher told me when I asked him about picking a teacher in an above post, and also add a very important point he also stated. If a method or advice is not practical then it is useless.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Nonattachment is not one of Buddhism's goals? I'm sure this is news to many Buddhists.

From Buddhism, Major Differences 

13. The importance of Non-attachment. Buddhism goes beyond doing good and being good. One must not be attached to good deeds or the idea of doing good; otherwise it is just another form of craving.

Non Attachment by Ven. Thich Thien An:

One of the most important teachings of Zen Buddhism is non-attachment. The teaching of non-attachment may be easy to understand, but it is not easy to practice. Nevertheless, it is very essential to cultivate non-attachment if we are to live a serene and happy life in a world of constant change; for this reason it is introduced here.

The Buddha taught the following to his son Rahula (from ”Old path white clouds” by Thich Nhat Hahn) at

Practice non-attachment to overcome prejudice. Non-attachment is the way of looking at all things openly and equally. This is because that is. Myself and others are not separate. Do not reject one thing only to chase after another.

And this on Mahamudra translated and edited by Zasep Tulku Rinpoche:

As a dharma practitioner it is very important for us to develop realization of renunciation. We have to develop true renunciation, cultivate the mind of true renunciation, which means non-clinging, and non-attachment. This is very important. Once we have cultivated that then the other realizations will happen.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Thanks for that, Edward, which is exactly my point. Non-attachment, as described by all these quotes, is an important step in Buddhist practice. But there are also good attachments, like sticking to your vows and pursuing your practice and yearning for realization and not giving up until you got it. It's the meaning that counts, right? Again, non-attachment is not the goal of Buddhist practice, or even one of goals. Goals are things like nirvana, liberation, awakening, and then working for the benefit of all beings until the cows come home.

Let's not turn this thread into Buddhism 101.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I think I'm getting it. So the answer to the question, “What was before the Big Bang?” is “There is no such thing as before the Big Bang.” Right?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Yes and no.:-) If you google “before the big bang” you'll get 227,000 references, so it's obviously a $60,000 question. (see example here) it's something to be unveiled by the scientific method. The Buddhist way of saying is quite different, and gives us somethign to work with anyway, “What is your original face, the face before your parents were born?” This points not to something “before” the Big Bang, but something irrefutable before even the question was asked. It's a paradox, alright, and there's no way around it. Ultimately, it all comes down to the “who shot the arrow” question, i.e. are you more interested in awakening or in finding out a conceptual model to what happened before time? Awakening may offer both answered in One, though the answer itself remains a mystery obvious only to itself.

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai:
Ultimately, it all comes down to the “who shot the arrow” question, i.e. are you more interested in awakening or in finding out a conceptual model to what happened before time?

Well put. IOW do you want to taste it or do you want to explain it?


This thread has some very good stuff in it. Thanks everyone, especially  Bruce and Hokai for sharing your insights and David for your questions.


Pelle

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Kind of. The Big Bang is a relative concept. It is the best current approximation we have to explain vaious data. There were two competing theories, then the red shift was shown to be fact and the Big Bang won out.
Now there are inconsistences with the BB as well, like the appearance of both hot and cool spots in the universe that aren't accounted for in the BB model. Most scientists weren't really happy with the idea of a time before time either.
So an emerging theory is multiverse moving along next to each other in membranes. Every few billion years or so two of them collide causing the destruction of all that is in them. They don't touch or separate at the same places at the same time, which helps account for these hot and cool spots.
So if I asked you what was before my typing of This word Now, would you say nothing?
Within Buddhism there are no beginnings or ends, just what is conditioned and what arises from what is conditioned, all the way up and all the way down. To ask what the first condition that all other conditions sprung forth from is to negate dependence origination.
Or as Hokai was writing at the same time I was writing this, this is just a mystery that you will never know.

There is actually a scientist who is working on the theoretical basis of when the universal laws were being formed from an inchoate universe, and I posted a link to an interview with him about a month ago.

Edward: “Nonattachment is not one of Buddhism's goals? I'm sure this is news to many Buddhists.”

Read what Hokai wrote and you will see that he qualified his answer about non-attachment.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Interesting stuff about Big Bang and alternative theories. Thanks.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

He Edward,

“As a dharma practitioner it is very important for us to develop realization of renunciation. We have to develop true renunciation, cultivate the mind of true renunciation, which means non-clinging, and non-attachment. This is very important. Once we have cultivated that then the other realizations will happen.”

Doesn’t this”importance” completely deny the non-attachment..?

Frans

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

If time began with the Big Bang, then there was simply nothing at all within time before the Big Bang. There was just now, but “now” not referring to anything in time.

As to the question would you rather have awakening or explain the Big Bang and evolution, of course the answer is the former, but the answer to the latter could have all sorts of implications on the way we live our lives. Also, the fullness of our awakening will depend to some degree on how well we understand the latter, so it's not exactly one or the other.

Not many people really understand the importance of evolution in spirituality. It has to do with aligning ourselves with those givens, putting ourselves right at the center of them rather than treating them as concepts, and living them consciously, that is aligning ourselves with the energy and intelligence that created the universe, and in a nonmetaphysical, nondual way actually letting it call the shots. 

Rick said: “So if I asked you what was before my typing of This word Now, would you say nothing?”
 
That's often how it seems to me.

Rick said: “Within Buddhism there are no beginnings or ends, just what is conditioned and what arises from what is conditioned, all the way up and all the way down.”

Are you sure this is Buddhism in an evolutionary context, evolutionary Buddhism?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I don't think I'm going to be able to catch up in my responses to all of the great posts that have been made in the past few days, but I'm still enjoying what's unfolding here!

Hokai wrote: It's one thing to observe personal experience dissolve into shared contexts of signifiers and signifieds (i.e. meaning is never “personal”, and neither is the meaning of meaninglessness), and it's quite another thing dissolving personal experience into the primordial purity, i.e. non-conceptuality in the sense of dharmakaya (reached at any structural level through training in state stages or even spontaneously through an inherent propensity of awareness). That is, such purity necessarily involves a structurally unbounded cognition, bliss/feelingness and compassion/responsiveness. And then, how such unboundedness becomes framed and contextualized and expressed IS a structural matter. But even so, it is impossible to find anything as a “postmodern” formulation in any Buddhist lineage. There are tricky linguistic overlaps that need not confuse one. To understand the meaning of anything, one needs to view the larger context wherein the meaning is found, and the larger context is not postmodern in Buddhist case, due to a lot of premodern baggage. Should we find that baggage dispensable? Only if it's correctly understood as a relatively valid form-expression in historical and cultural and worldview dynamics. So far, a clear formulation of a postmodern Buddhism IN ALL FOUR QUADRANTS has yet to emerge, including a reformation of institutions and models of instruction and transmission.

I think this is well-stated and I agree with everything you've said.  I have been attempting to make similar arguments – in my comments to Lol about the contextualization of unbounded experience necessarily involving “structure” and address, and in my comments to e and Holden about the import of postmodernism for Buddhism as a whole (as an AQAL presence in the world, acting on the stage of history) – and I believe this is essentially the task before modern, Integrally informed and engaged Buddhists.  As you stress elsewhere, though, rootedness in practice and authentic insight is essential; if a (post)-pomo Buddhism is to emerge, it must be tetra-enacted, as an outflowing of living vision and realization, and not merely intellectually constructed based on a handy map.

Hokai wrote:  “Engaged Buddhism” offered by several Buddhist leaders is a modern step (e.g. Nhat Hanh or Sulak Sivaraksa), as is a sharp critique of Buddhist history offered by “Zen at War” (review here) and static institutions (e.g. in Zen/Ch'an Buddhism by Lachs here, here and here). Both of these steps offer only an entry into the postmodern formulation, which itself must take into account the crucial postmodern contribution applied to Buddhist path: meditation does not take place in a semantic vacuum, and all meanings are embedded in collective and socio-economic conditions, not just cosmic universal characteristics (we need to reconsider some Buddhist universalities to start with, such as e.g. precise modalities of rebirth and the arising of environmental effects of karma etc., not to say we are still unable to internationalize the core-institutions due to strong ethnocentric bias of many awakened beings even though their cultures were also recipients of a generous Dharma-sasana not so long ago; in practice, these things tend to encounter strong AQAL resistance, as it should be).

These are just examples, but I think you get my drift. Please add your thoughts on this.

I would add the related, socially engaged work of Ariyaratne and Joanna Macy as further examples of the kind of developments you're describing.  And there are other examples as well.

Concerning the need to reconsider certain core Buddhist ideas in light of modern knowledge, I agree that this is important, for a number of reasons.  One reason is simply for Buddhism to be able to engage more effectively with postmodern culture.  For instance, how do we square the Buddhist claim that humans (and other sentient beings) have been reincarnating in an ongoing cycle since beginningless time with the findings of evolutionary science, which suggests that there were vast stretches of time in which no sentient beings existed at all?  I do believe that there are effective responses available (the discussion of which could make for its own thread), but my point here is simply that many traditional Buddhist explanations will strike modern scientists and philosophers as mythological and therefore not very compelling.

I am aware of the Mind and Life conferences, and regard them as helpful steps in the right direction.  An Integral Buddhism, I hope, will actively encourage these sorts of cross-disciplinary encounters and inquiries.  (With regard to evolution and alternatives to the singular Big Bang theory, I recall the Dalai Lama mentioning the Kalachakra theory of multiple universes, with “space particles” continuing to exist in those historical gaps between the death of one universe and the birth of another…)

Lastly, I simply want to say I appreciate your pointing out that “meditation does not take place in a semantic vacuum, and all meanings are embedded in collective and socio-economic conditions, not just cosmic universal characteristics.”  This is an important point, and it is one of the illuminating and potentially transformative perspectives that postmodernism highlights.

Related to this, e wrote:  I see the Buddha deconstructing relative (social, cultural) presuppositions and prejudices of his time quite well actually. He helped to dislodge long held archaic tradtitions, tried to abandon animal sacrifice and saw equality in all beings long before modern sensibilities enacted at least human rights into law.

I agree that the Buddha challenged a number of social institutions in his age and ushered in several socially relevant transformations in perspective and practice.  And no doubt Buddhism also helped catalyze sociocultural transformation in whatever cultures it entered over its 2500-year history.  However, I do not see much indication that Buddhism, historically, has been very cognizant of Zone 2 stages, or that it engaged in the self-reflective LL/LR inquiry and critical analysis (into the social construction and intersubjective enactment of knowledge, etc) that postmodernism encourages.

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce: “As you stress elsewhere, though, rootedness in practice and authentic insight is essential; if a (post)-pomo Buddhism is to emerge, it must be tetra-enacted, as an outflowing of living vision and realization, and not merely intellectually constructed based on a handy map.”

There's a lot ot add to many post here, but before bed, this one is short.
Exactly right Bruce. And it is already happening globally within many Sanghas. There's nothing really to add, as the Dharma already contains everything necessary for post-post modernism, as we've shown the core of the Dharma, without the cultural baggage is already there. So it is really a matter of stripping than adding.

The core of the Dharma is really not an ordinary teaching and is not like anything else; it isn't just another -ism.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I'm chekin' out. Thanks to Bruce and everyone for contributing to this discussion. Practice diligently!:-) See you 'round!

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Sure, Hokai.  Thanks for joining in.  You've added a lot to this discussion.

Best wishes,

B.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce:

In the meantime, if any of my fellow Buddhists here want to share what, if anything, you believe postmodernism may “add” to the Buddhadharma, I'm interested in hearing your opinions.  Whatever we may believe, I don't think Ken would accept the idea that Buddhism is already postmodern (or beyond) in every way that matters.  Do you?

In the Buddhayana way, yes. In the cultural way, no. But that is only because there are not enough folks at that level to have a ‘culture' of the awakened. You have already stated that Cook-Greuter uses Buddhism to show the highest levels in her schema. Ken too. I think postmodernism adds by subtraction. It can help Buddhism by lessening attachment to views. To see the relative nature of all views. To show that even Buddhism is a view. Albeit one that we love.

Hokai: “no view is good views” only if you're gone crazy.

:-) Hey Hokai, you think you are leaving this place with 3 suitcases full of views labeled by kaya?

Frans

The root of all myth, of all confusion is ‘I'; the way of all liberation is realizing this.

:-)

—-

Rick : If you want to leave, there is no way out, nowhere to go. It is this need to leave that suffering arises from. The story is saying what e said, but I would never have thought to put it in that language. That is really interesting.

Yeah, I was just trying to meet Edward from where he was talking from within his ‘language'. I don't see any problem with Buddhism interfacing with pomo. Pomo already has a nice way of approaching language and ‘truth'. It leans a bit towards nihilism but that is easily corrected, nothing to shy away from or fear. Actually it is good that they show this, so we can avoid the pitfall as we do/did go thru this stage. And pomo deconstruction is a nice addition to the arsenal of tools in the tool belt.

Hokai : …that's just one side of the street, because at that same time there's the vast openness never entering the flow of time, AND there's the non-duality of That and every little thing arising in time, evolution and history.

Is this vast openness 3D space?


love


e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

You got me, e!:-)) And to think that I was on my way out…

*as to the first one: yeah, I'm leaving with three suitcases, but they're empty.:-( Promise to be back with full ones.

**as to vast openness, it's not the coarse physical space, nor the subtle mental space, nor even the very subtle infinitely abstract space of formlessness, but the pristine space of dharmata, undisturbed by appearances.

Hope that helps.

As always,

Hokai

PS. and now I'm out.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

There's a really good site, which is just an online version of a thesis paper that a philosophy student wrote about Nagarjuna's philosophical base; that of dependence arising. This is good for both Buddhists and non. I think it will help clear up any remaining confusion.
It is here: http://bahai-library.org/personal/jw/other.pubs/nagarjuna/

Here is a section:

The Meaning of Dependent arising

•  
  • one general (i)
  • and the other specific (ii).

• In its most abstract form (i), the theory holds that

•  
  “That being, this comes to be;
  from the arising of that, this arises;
  that being absent, this is not;
  from the cessation of that, this ceases.”

FOOTNOTE: Samyutta-nikaya, quoted in Harvey, 54

• The more specific formulation (ii) details the process by which links in the chain arise, one after the other, and which links directly influence which others. The most common of these specific formulations is the twelve-link one described in chapter two, but there are minor variations on this.

(SHORT RESUME : NO EXTERNAL LAW, NO SELF-NATURE)

• The crux of all formulations of the theory is the mutual interdependence of all things.
• Every element is both conditioned and is a conditioner, so every element is both an effect and a cause.
• There is no transcendent law of cause-and-effect ruling the process, for there is only a relative “before” and “after,” only a relative causal sequence.
• On the one hand no element is individually autonomous, and on the other hand neither is there a higher force ruling the process.
• Since no thing exists on its own, no thing is real in itself.
• A thing is dependent on another, then, not just for its identification, as “tallness” is dependent on “shortness,” but for its very existence, as the piece of clothing is dependent upon the threads which constitute it.

(DON'T GET FOOLED BY ITS SUPERFICIAL LOOK)

Thus far, the doctrine of dependent arising may seem clear and obvious. If so, it is only because one does not yet understand it in all of its implications. The Buddha's attendant, ananda, once said to his master, “It is surprising, sir, it is wonderful, sir, how profound this dependent arising is and how profound is its illumination. Yet it seems to me as if very simple.” “Say not so, ananda, say not so,” admonished the Buddha in reply.

FOOTNOTE: Mahanidana Sutra, quoted in Warder, 108 The theory is abstruse and its ramifications vast.

In the eyes of Buddhism, the doctrine of dependent arising solves all metaphysical philosophical problems.

• Etiology is solved because there is, not an absolute beginning, but an temporally indeterminate welling up of mutually-conditioned factors. Since no factor is temporally prior, as such, the discussions of genesis manage to avoid positing an absolute beginning without recourse either to a metaphysical entity like a transcendent God or to causal priority ad infinitum.

• Eschatology is solved because, since the ultimate end of existence is merely the appeasement of arising through appeasement of ignorant dispositions, there is no need to predict apocalypses or nihilistic destruction of existence. Things arose, but there was no ultimate cause, and things will cease, but there is no ultimate fate.

• Soteriology is likewise solved; one need not face either a final Judgment Day nor mere annihilation, but rather one will just face the self-caused abandonment of equally self-caused afflicted existence. When ignorance ceases, birth ceases, and death ceases.

• Karma, metempsychosis, and the nature of the soul are also all solved without recourse to abstract soul-theories.
• Karma is neither an adventitious elemental defilement, like it is for the Jains, nor a subtle and transcendental deterministic fate, like for certain schools of Hinduism. Karma is simply the correlation between cause and effect. Karma is determined by one's actions and dispositions, and when one appeases one's dispositions then, when eventually the lingering effects of prior causes have come to fruition, existence will be no more. The simple conditioning of one link by another link enables the Buddhist karma to be determined without being deterministic, and subtle without being transcendental.
• Reincarnation is similarly solved with no recourse to atman-theories. Death is conditioned by birth, which is in turn conditioned by ignorance.
• This contiguous contingency obviates the need to posit a substantial and transcendently-enduring soul. The perceived existence and continuity of the individual is likewise explained without recourse to atman: since the aggregates of the individual arise together, and these aggregates account for the entire nature of the individual, there is no need to posit an extraneous metaphysical entity like the self.

• The debate of free will versus determinism is also solved. There can be no “free” will, for no element of existence is independent. All things are dependent upon other things, and so is the will. This does not mean that the universe is bound by inexorable determinism: the Buddha declared himself to be an upholder of “free action,”

FOOTNOTE: Malalasekera in Moore, 80

for it is one's will in the form of volitional dispositions which both caused existence in the first place and will ultimately bring about appeasement and freedom.

FOOTNOTE: That both free will and determinism are operative in Buddhism's dependent arising is not to be confused with the compatibility of the two in Jainism. In the former, neither is ultimately real, but in the latter, both are real.

Two more theories repugnant to the Buddha, the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism, are obviated by dependent arising. Nothing is eternal, for, when a thing's conditioning factors cease, then it will cease. Neither is anything destined to face destruction in non-existence for, as contingent upon other things, it was never independently real in the first place.

• Finally, dependent arising solves ontology. Things are empirically real, for they were arisen. However, they are not ultimately real, for there is no substance on which they are founded. There is Becoming, but no Being. Since things are not ultimately real, the affliction of suffering can be vanquished; if suffering were ultimately real, then it could never be abolished.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I'm all about killing two birds with one stone. This excerpt covers both the answer to Frans's following question, as well as my former dispute with Hokai about the teaching of relative concepts and theories simply for the sake of teaching them, and not for the sole purpose of pointing at Reality. It also helps to cover David's need to include evolution into the mix, but not completely so I'll go into that with more detail later.
This is another excerpt from the PhD thesis mentioned above:

Emptiness is a Theory of No-Theory

“you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness.
As such, you are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness.”

FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.7

•  
  • One, there is a meaning of emptiness besides the obvious one of lack of self- nature.
  • Two, the concept has a pragmatic value as well as a logical one.

• The former, the fact that emptiness has a greater meaning, was already discussed. This meaning is that, besides referring merely to the lack of essential reality in things, emptiness also betokens the potential of things to interact and change, to arise and cease. Reality is not “nothingness,” but an indefinable mix of being and nonbeing and both and neither.

•  
  FOOTNOTE: The reader's patience is requested in this improper and perhaps misleading continual use of the term “reality.” No alternatives were found.

• The latter, the pragmatic value of emptiness, is that it prescribes a method by which unpleasantries can be appeased.
  • Suffering is caused by dispositions, desires, expectations, and graspings, all of which in turn are caused by an improper understanding of the world and the way things are.
  • If one comprehends emptiness, one ceases to cling to desires, for the things one would desire are shown to be empty and thus not desirable;
  • one would cease to grasp and cling, for the pleasant things which one would want to hold on to are seen as unreal;
  • one would cease to form false theories and concepts about reality, for the theory of emptiness precludes the tendency to theorize;
  • one would not entertain false hopes for a concrete afterlife and a real Savior-figure, for the Buddha and his teachings are both seen as provisional;
  • and, finally, one would have an incentive to appease suffering, for, being empty, suffering is susceptible to change and, hence, can be vanquished.

•  
  • From the standpoint of conventional truth, emptiness is the declaration that dependently arisen things have no independent identity. They are “the empty.”
  • From the standpoint of ultimate truth, emptiness is the description of all things, events, processes, and life-forms as having no real existence. All is “emptiness.” Both “the empty” and “emptiness” are descriptions, not attributes. A thing or event does not partake of emptiness, but rather, since it assuredly does not partake of self-nature, it is described as empty. “'Empty,' 'non-empty,' 'both,' or 'neither'—these should not be declared,” Nagarjuna explains. They “are expressed only for the purpose of communication.”
The pragmatic function of emptiness is intimately tied to its non-theoretical nature. Part of the nature of nirvana is the appeasement of the tendency to theorize excessively and grasp onto theories. It is thus crucial to make as clear as possible, before examining nirvana, the anti-theoretical character of emptiness. 

FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.11

Conceptualizing it imposes artificial divisions and distinctions on that which is undivided . Notions like existence or nonexistence, self-nature or other- nature, emptiness or fullness, are wholly improper. There are times, however, when one would wish to refer to this “suchness.” No manner of speaking or means of cognizing is proper, but, in light of the inveterate tendency of humans to seek and grasp onto supposed positive notions like “soul” and “existence,” the most proper designation is a negative one.

Nagarjuna therefore uses such a notion as a means of communication only. This is referred to, in the Buddhist tradition, as “skillful means” (upaya), the ability of a teacher to tailor his or her speech and philosophical system to the ears and understanding of his or her audience.

FOOTNOTE: Williams, 143

The teacher communicates thoughts and formulates theories only insofar as they would be helpful to the student. This was Nagarjuna's intent in expounding the idea of emptiness; it is a useful way of speaking, for it is less misleading than ideas like “God” or “permanency,” but it still has no ultimate applicability.

One of the chief causes of bondage is, not so much the faculty of conceptualization, but rather the propensity to grasp onto the products of that faculty. The rational nature, like the dispositions Nagarjuna discussed in section seven of the karika, has a value. Concepts are an important and necessary tool to be used in ordering one's world and acting within it. The problem is that rational creatures, be they humans or Gods, tend to ascribe excessive validity to these concepts.

•  
  • One is ignorance: the rational creature does not know or ignores the fact that his or her mental nature is only a tool and has limited applicability.
  • The other, and perhaps foundational, reason that sentient creatures cling to the mental processes is desire. Desiring pleasure, the mind reifies the apparently pleasurable things in the hope of thereby possessing them and preventing them from ceasing. Fearing death, the individual reifies the apparent existence of life itself and thereby acts with excessive and unjustified selfishness.
This is done for two reasons .

FOOTNOTE: The Buddha did uphold the importance of self-preservation, not because the self is real, but only out of compassion—compassion for oneself as well as compassion for others. Self-preservation must be tempered by “other-preservation.”

The Buddha taught that these two tendencies, desire and the faith in the results of mentation, are, indirectly, the cause of bondage.

•  
  “Desire, know I thy root,” he is reported to have said.
  “From conception thou springest;
  No more shall I indulge in conception;
  I will have no desire any more.”

•  
  FOOTNOTE: quoted in Candrakirti's Prasannapada, quoted in Murti 1960, 223 (samkalpa translated as “conception.” Cf. Monier- Williams, 1126)

• One is simply that, when one is enlightened, one sees things as empty. It is not a concept, but an observation.

• The other significance is the pragmaticone.

As a “skillful means,” emptiness is an antidote to an excessive emphasis on mentation. Having demonstrated that all things are empty, Nagarjuna explains that it is pointless to hypostatize anything. “When all things are empty, why [speculate on] the finite, the infinite, both…, and neither…? Why [speculate on] the identical, the different, the eternal, the non-eternal, both, or neither?” FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.22-23

Emptiness, as a concept, acts as an antidote to this misuse of the rational faculty in two ways.

•  
  • One, if all things are empty, then no speculation is worthwhile. Excessive belief in concepts is misguided and, ultimately, debilitating, for it distracts one from the proper path, which is tranquillity and appeasement of desires.

•  
  • The other use of the concept of emptiness is a positive one. The neophyte who has not developed the Perfect Wisdom which allows him or her to see all things as empty may need to use concepts as a temporary guide. The mind, by its very nature, needs to think. The trained mind can dwell in peaceful wisdom (prajna), but the untrained one needs a system to direct its thoughts properly. The theory of emptiness can act as an object for contemplation, an abstraction on which meditation can be focused. Once the mind in training achieves perfect wisdom, then even the notion of emptiness itself must be abandoned. In this context, the notion has pragmatic value only; it is like, in Streng's words, “a phantom destroying another phantom.”

•  
  FOOTNOTE: Streng, 92 Once the phantom of real existence has been appeased, then the phantom of empty existence
  
  must also be released.
• 
  
• That Nagarjuna's philosophy is a middle path must be kept in mind to understand properly the function of emptiness as a concept. Madhyamika is, obviously, not a philosophy that declares there to be a real structure in the universe which can be defined in rational formulas, so emptiness is clearly not a positive theory. Neither is Madhyamika a nihilism, so
• Nagarjuna is not advocating the destruction of concepts or the stifling of ratiocination.
• The middle path rather advocates the appeasement of conceptualization.
• Thoughts have a certain function—they are useful and necessary in relation to the mundane world—but they must not be applied to ultimate truth; they must be appeased.
• The point of the idea of emptiness, Nagarjuna says, is “the relinquishing of all views.” FOOTNOTE: karika XIII.8

This pragmatic function of emptiness for Nagarjuna is indicated by the fact that he did not devote a section of his karika to it; if emptiness were a description of Ultimate Reality, or if it were an absolute concept, then he certainly would have explained it more fully. What he does devote a section to (section XXIV, “On Truth”) is an explanation that emptiness is, not a nihilism or an Ultimate Reality, but only the principle of relativity and the best description of conditioned things.

FOOTNOTE: Sprung, in translating the Prasannapada, wrote that the term sunyata should be read as “the absence of both being and non-being in things.” Sprung, 13 (italics mine)

Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness, no matter how clear and precise, still could never prevent all misunderstanding. C. W. Huntington points out the dangers of misconceiving it with the following example: Buddhist teachers often remind their students that while mistaken beliefs concerning the mundane are relatively easy to correct, like dousing a fire with water, if one reifies the notion of emptiness, then it is as if the water intended to extinguish the blaze has itself caught fire. FOOTNOTE: Huntington, 22

To reify the concept of emptiness is a blatant error, for it is an idea whose function is to prevent reification of concepts. “Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness [as a theory] are said to be incorrigible,” Nagarjuna wrote. FOOTNOTE: karika XIII.8

To hypostatize emptiness would be both ridiculous and an insult to the Buddha's doctrine. It would be ridiculous because emptiness is not a thought but the absence of thoughts, not a theory but a criticism of theorizing. Candrakirti demonstrates the absurdity of reifying emptiness by saying that it would be like one person saying to another “I have no wares to sell you,” and the other person responding “give me what you call those 'no wares.'”

FOOTNOTE: Prasannapada, in Sprung, 150

Since emptiness is not a thing, it cannot be thought of in positive terms. It is nothing more than a lack of theories, not a theory itself.

FOOTNOTE: In the Vigrahavyavartani, verse 29, Nagarjuna writes: “If I were to advance any proposition whatsoever, from that I would incur error. On the contrary, I advance no proposition. Therefore, I incur no error. ” (pratijna translated as “proposition.” Cf. Monier-Williams 664)

• 
  

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Wow! When I was catching up with this thread last night, reading it up to where Hokai bows out, I thought to myself, a little ruefully, “Looks like I've missed out on a great party … ”

Rick, it's like you've just put on some great new sounds and turned the volume up a bit, with these two posts! I find these excerpts quite awesome in how clear, concise and comprehensive they are – I thoroughly enjoyed reading them. Thank you, really, for finding them and bringing them here to help inform this conversation / discussion we're all having – they provide really useful and important reference points.

Bruce, I'm aware I haven't yet responded to questions you put to me in your opening post, never mind further developments. My earlier wish was to try and get clear about why Buddhism might need to pass thrrough the fire of post-modernism, as I voiced in the Dual MandalaI thread in response to something Pelle had written:

Pelle: ”[Buddhism] can potentially fool people that it has passed through post-modernism, but letting go of concepts in the relative realm does not mean that those concepts have been deconstructed ..”

Lol: ”I am here in this forum more than anything else to learn and to develop. I do not understand why concepts (which?) need to be deconstructed …. to what end, for whose benefit. Could you please explain?”

Today I'm going to re-read this amazing thread and refresh my memory concerning the territory yourself and Hokai (mainly) have already covered: namely the context and areas in which pomo can justifiably critique Buddhism, as well as what pomo thought might have to offer Buddhism – then try and pick things up with this in mind. But first, as ever, there are other things that need to be done : )

All best,

Lol

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

From Holden’s quotes above:

“The point of the idea of emptiness, Nagarjuna says, is the relinquishing of all views.”

“If I were to advance any proposition whatsoever, from that I would incur error. On the contrary, I advance no proposition. Therefore, I incur no error. ”

Compare with Hokai above: “no view is good views only if you’re gone crazy.”

Hmm, let’s see, Nagarjuana or Hokai…

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

And yet the first step (which also considered the last step) of the eight-fold path is Right View.

So…Nagarjuna or Buddha?

In the end, it isn't an either/or choice, and grasping why is part of Right View.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I agree it's not either/or. I was just making the point that Hokai refused to have any part of what I was saying, of which one point was that it is an accepted “view” of Nagarjuna and Madhyamika that it offers “no view.” He said that was crazy, and he was wrong.

Another point is that not all Buddhists accept the interpretation of the two truths the way he or Dgogchen does, i.e. an “ultimate” truth. Or rather, one legitimate interpretation is that the “ultimate” truth is that there is no ultimate truth. This is also an accepted interpretation by “authorities,” most notably Garfield and Priest provided in either the Dual Mandala or the Indigo Buddhism thread. But again Hokai dismissed this as mere pomo nonsense. And again, he was wrong.

Hokai tried to characterize most of what I said as irrelevant and lacking any merit, given my lack of “practice.” I'll leave that for the rest of you to decide for yourselves, but he was obviously reactive and defensive toward me and threw out legimate material with my personal bathwater. Not without provocation, I might add, as I deliberately pushed his buttons.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Theurj,

I don't mean any disrespect but just listening to the way you go about this dialogue I find that you hesitate to draw alongside of much of Hokai's views. He sounds as he really goes out on a limb to try to explain and meet others in an understanding that is, by its own nature, difficult to grasp. You seem determined to stick to your view or non-view no matter what. This is where I think you fail to appreciate a common ground from where we can engage in fruitful dialogue. Can I venture to say that maybe you still can learn something new, regardless of past years of practice? Oh maybe I'm pushing it. Sorry, don't mean to offend, but there is this difficulty of coming to clear seeing amongst eachother.

Personally, much of this detailed discussion is very difficult for me to follow, but I in no way loose perspective and I happy to say I don't know when I don't.

I do feel that Hokai speaks clearly and is not trying to upset you. Maybe he has a point, and you might find it interesting to see with different eyes?

Best regards,
Bjorn

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Sure Bjorn, I'll consider what you say. Will you consider applying the same to Hokai?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I was summoned from my summer palace to reply yet another time. The beast of relativism is indeed resilient, but fortunately also empty of inherent existence.

Not having an absolute realization to begin with, the relativist takes the Noble Nagarjuna's exposition of absolute truth as a claim pertaining to the realm of relative propositions and wields it on everything and everyone without any discrimination whatsoever. As I said previosly - gone crazy, also known as “breakdown of knowledge”.

Again, ad nauseam, in the relative realm, we have right views, which we are advised to adhere to, and wrong views, which we are advised to avoid. Mistaking relative for absolute is the wrong view of confused, and mistaking absolute for relative is the wrong view of twice confused. Let me interpolate those quotes:

“The point of the idea of emptiness, Nagarjuna says, is the relinquishing of all views (as being absolute truth).”

“If I were to advance any proposition whatsoever (as absolute truth), from that I would incur error (of reification). On the contrary, I advance no proposition (as absolute truth). Therefore, I incur no error (of reification). ”

119.     This teaching when grasped incorrectly
             Ruines the unwise, whereby they
             Sink into the dirty pit of
             Nihilistic views.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Here's the whole text of Ratnavali, the Precious Garland (link to text) with many, many views and black-and-white qualifications pertaining to virtue and wisdom collections. The same website also has a nice page on Nagarjuna (link here) if you're into this sort of study.

Take care,

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce: “And yet the first step (which also considered the last step) of the eight-fold path is Right View.

So…Nagarjuna or Buddha?

In the end, it isn't an either/or choice, and grasping why is part of Right View.”

Right view, as clearly explained in my last two posts isn't a grasping view, it is a Right View, which isn't grasping. It is contains no conceptions, nor is fooled by the myth of the given.
When one sees clearly with Right View, then one sees that Ulitmate realtiy is empty of any self, because it is conditioned by present conditions and impermanent. This is a description or direct perception and not a mental concept, nor even a view really. As the author notes, Emptiness is a theory of No-theory. unless someone cares to come forward and let me know, other than awareness itself, has any kind of permanence in one's life?
Ya'll are getting hung up on the semantics and ignoring the meaning. I don't think it can be explained any clearer than in those two posts.
So I think I'm gonna have to bow to the Buddha and Ken Wilber and say to understand this, your gonna have to do your own work. Because to understand it conceptual is even a far cry from really having a direct understanding of it.

Hokai: Actually the student was a Buddhist I believe, and the two small sections are taken from the middle and the end of her doctoral thesis. My mistake must have been that the two truths that Nagarjuna is pointing at are clear in the posts. They are to me.
After all it is explained many times even in these two posts, let alone the thesis as a whole. I realy think this is a semantics issue. As you've expressed earlier, to understand the picture that the words are trying to describe one really needs to have some knowledge of the picture. I'll go back over the posts to find where this is made clear.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Here you go:

• From the standpoint of conventional truth, emptiness is the declaration that dependently arisen things have no independent identity. They are “the empty.”
• From the standpoint of ultimate truth, emptiness is the description of all things, events, processes, and life-forms as having no real existence. All is “emptiness.” Both “the empty” and “emptiness” are descriptions, not attributes. A thing or event does not partake of emptiness, but rather, since it assuredly does not partake of self-nature, it is described as empty. “'Empty,' 'non-empty,' 'both,' or 'neither'—these should not be declared,” Nagarjuna explains. They “are expressed only for the purpose of communication.”

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I believe we will have to try to rise our thoughts, our intention and our understanding to a higher ideal. I have no need to consolidate my view if a bigger, more encompassing is presented. I must reach. That is what all spiritual teaching does; makes us aspire to a grander vision, a deeper wisdom. No need to have one owns view validated or “accepted”, even if it is relatively correct.

Having said that, theurj, I might totally have missed your point, but I sincerely don't think so. I just think you missed the key element in what Hokai explained. But that's ok as long as we can admit no understanding. I think you stated your view clearly but it seems it kind of fall short of a more broader understanding.

Respectfully,

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Actually, Rick, the student of philosophy is not a Buddhist at all. Jonah Winters, the author: “A study of Madhyamika philosophy has not forced me to abandon my belief in concepts like God, the soul, and the afterlife.” From what is obvious in the essay you posted, his connection is to the Islamic/Baha'i religion. But never mind, I used that just as tangent to make a different point.

Best,

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Bruce reposted Pelle: ”Pelle: ”[Buddhism] can potentially fool people that it has passed through post-modernism, but letting go of concepts in the relative realm does not mean that those concepts have been deconstructed ..””

Again in an absolute sense all concepts are relative and equally empty, and therefore are equally already deconstructed via Right View. In a relative sense, concepts are useful and needed to get around in the world. So we deconstruct or judge them not according to any inherent worth, but how useful they are in describing reality or pointing at truth. So if one concept states that things in the Universe are permanent, and another states that they aren't; the latter is a better relative concept. I don't have to go into why, right?
So AQAL is a very useful relative concept, but it's utility is only there so long as one doesn't grasp too tightly to it and confuse it for Absolute Truth, which again, is unknowable through concepts. As the actual “things” or “parts” of the AQAL map aren't really things in and of themselves, but are equally empty of any self nature. So if we look rightly, the AQAL map describes nothing, as how can one describe flux in any absolute sense. It is like trying to construct a foundation for a house on top of the surface of a white water river.
That doesn't mean, however, that one shouldn't construct a map or write down a way to decribe the nature of suffering and how to end suffering.
As Katagiri Roshi said, “You have to say something, or people won't understand anything.”

So from now on, when you read Nagarjuna or other Buddhists texts, just assume these two truths are always there in the texts. This isn't true of all the texts, but if they aren't then that is a good clue that they probably aren't genuine.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai: “no view is good views” only if you're gone crazy.

e: :-) Hey Hokai, you think you are leaving this place with 3 suitcases full of views labeled by kaya?

H: *as to the first one: yeah, I'm leaving with three suitcases, but they're empty.:-( Promise to be back with full ones.

:-) I did not mean this forum, but this world.

H: as to vast openness, it's not the coarse physical space, nor the subtle mental space, nor even the very subtle infinitely abstract space of formlessness, but the pristine space of dharmata, undisturbed by appearances.

Right so this is one reason I don't use ‘vast openness' for emptiness. As there are at least 3 other things that folks will have varying experience with and conceptual understanding of and so more than likely misunderstand what you are trying to convey.

Hokai is teaching and so when his ‘buttons are pushed' he will more than likely fall back to the lineage view. This is quite understandable, right? Plus since he is teaching, he knows that he needs an abundance of relative teachings in order to help his students. And you Edward have stated that you are in some cases playing devils advocate. The ‘best use' of each other here is to try and explain from a point of view of our own (mis)understanding. In that way, others will help to clarify our (mis)understandings and hopefully in this way we are all pulling on an oar in this boat. If you don't want to pull your oar (express your view) then we go in circles and people get testy and leave.

Nargarjuna's treatise can also be seen as debate notes. This is an old tradition going back to the Buddha. He basically has terse sayings that would have allowed him to debate with anyone at Nalanda. His notes cover most of the early teachings and using the sutra that I posted as the ‘fallback' POV, he could easily have dispensed with anyone fixated (assuming ultimate truth) on any one aspect of the dharma (teachings).

Edward:
“Or rather, one legitimate interpretation is that the “ultimate” truth is that there is no ultimate truth.”

Lets modify this so it at least means something and helps us along the path.

”Or rather, one legitimate interpretation is that the “ultimate” truth is that there is no ultimate truth expressible in words.”

love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Perhaps, we should change the name of this thread to “holden: beating a dead horse some more.”
Ok, before the post of emptiness in the thesis there was this to explain the concerns that arised in some minds. Oh, it was a Bacchelor's and not a PhD thesis too.

Emptiness is Perceived, not Invented

FOOTNOTE: (source not noted) quoted in Conze 1975, 162

The Diamond Sutra expressed this by having the Buddha say that nothing has ever been taught by him. “If a man should say that the Law [Dharma] has been taught by the Tathatagata, he would say what is not true.”

FOOTNOTE: Vajracchedika, quoted in Zimmer, 522

Nagarjuna echoed this in saying that “the Buddha did not teach… some thing to some one at some place.”

FOOTNOTE: karika XV.24

What the Buddha and Nagarjuna did was to show that concepts are false and distort the true nature of reality. They did not offer thoughts of their own to replace false ones, but taught that all ideas, including even the philosophy of Buddhism, must be appeased, or not grasped on to. When notions like self-nature, the soul, or permanency are “blown out” (nir - vana), the true nature of reality, emptiness, is seen.

FOOTNOTE: Kohn, 245

The Visuddhimagga, the most important post-canonical work of the Older School, delineated seven stages of purification and the development of insight. Each stage is one of greater perception of the soullessness of reality culminating in, in the seventh and final stage, perception of the “signless,” the “wishless,” and “emptiness,” which are three qualitative descriptions of the unconditioned nature of reality. This insight is the Perfect Wisdom of pre-Madhyamika Buddhism, which insight Nagarjuna found to be the supreme expression of Buddhist knowledge. The heart of this Perfect Wisdom is nothing more than a perception of emptiness.

• Both the Perfection of Wisdom school and Nagarjuna agree that a proper understanding of the Buddha's philosophy as reported by the original discourses inevitably leads to seeing all things as empty.
• This was in contrast to the Abhidharma attitude that a study of the scriptures can allow one to formulate a neat set of concepts to define and describe the nature of reality.
• It must be admitted, though, that Nagarjuna's idea that emptiness is seen, not invented, is only implicit in the karika, for he never expressly describes the nature or the importance of this insight. What he does make clear is that emptiness is empirically evident. That emptiness is perceptible is only a manner of speaking, for it is explained that emptiness is not a “thing” which can be defined and perceived. Rather, it is a lack, as, for example, one can speak of the concept of darkness even though it is nothing more than a lack of light. The term Nagarjuna uses most frequently is pasyati, “perceives.”

FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 82

What is perceived is the non- existence of self-nature in things, and an awareness of this non-existence is referred to as the perception of emptiness.

On the basis of ignorance,
concepts and consciousness arise. 

Concepts by their very nature and function create artificial divisions in the otherwise undivided, seamless reality, and thus obscure its true nature. Existence and essence, though seemingly ultimate concepts, are nonetheless themselves artificial divisions which thus distort the “self-luminous pool of clear water.” The Madhyamika stress on emptiness is one way to demonstrate the unreality and falseness of concepts.

FOOTNOTE: Williams, 62

Some schools of Buddhism, especially Zen, would offer the above explanation and then stop. The mind cannot possess anything, a modern Zen teacher says, and if one continues questioning, the teacher has nothing to say but “in Japan in the spring we eat cucumbers.”

FOOTNOTE: Shunryu Suzuki, 138

Nagarjuna's philosophy supports the same conclusions, but arrives at them by a quite different way.

One way to counteract the conceptualizing tendency is by offering alternative concepts. Notions of self-nature and the soul are root causes of suffering. As a means of “fighting fire with fire,” Nagarjuna offers a systematic philosophy of emptiness as a conceptual antidote to these notions. 

Dependent Arising + Emptiness = tattva (The Union of Both Truths)

The crux of the Madhyamika philosophy of emptiness is a reinterpretation of dependent arising by a distinction between conventional and ultimate truths.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hey, Rick,

can you pleeeaaase give us your input without bombing this thread with huge chunks of pasted text? Please use short quotes, your own words, and preferably normal size text (no wonder some guys are not reading the whole thing).

Thanks,

Hokai

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

The position I've taken is not “mine”; it is well established by “authorities” within Buddhist scholasticism and practice. So one point of agreement with Hokai (and there are several, but one for now one will do) is the reference to the wonderful plethora of articles on Nagarjuna at The Zen Site . So part of the debate that Hokai and I are having has been around for a long time, even going back to Nagarjuna's time. One can decide for themselves which “view” is better or best, but to characterize the view I've described as “relativism” is questionable, given the many authorities that also espouse it. One will discover that Nagarjuna was accused of relativism and nihilism by the opponents of his time.

And who died and made Hokai the master expert? It seems some here bow down to him almost like Ken himself showed up. Perhaps a bit of looking into our own projections might be in order with both of them.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Rick:

So I think I'm gonna have to bow to the Buddha and Ken Wilber and say to understand this, your gonna have to do your own work. Because to understand it conceptual is even a far cry from really having a direct understanding of it.

Right, but let's not lean towards being anti-intellectual (not saying you are but you seem to be getting close). The best approach would be to use both. Get your view as honed as possible and from there investigate mind and go back and forth in a continual enquiring fashion. Maybe stopping to sleep, work, eat, chat with friends, volunteer your time, etc. So, how much conceptual Right View do you need in order to practice. Depends, right?

So if we look rightly, the AQAL map describes nothing, as how can one describe flux in any absolute sense. It is like trying to construct a foundation for a house on top of the surface of a white water river.

It explains how ‘things' appear. It does not explain ‘nothing'. For on the whitewater you still have to avoid rocks, holes, strainers, undercuts, novice paddlers, etc. Re: the river. Ken states this in IS. The lines are streams or currents and the structural points are not really static.

love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

e, I know you understand the point I'm trying to make. So your either trying to make sure that everyone else understands it, or are you now playing devil's advocate? In this image there is only white water. No rocks. Youuu knowww this mannnn….  Besides my crit'ic was of the all concept and no practice kind.

Oh, and here's an excerpt which also says the same thing that e just wrote, but also backs up Hokai's statement about having no-view is something a crazy person does.

” Instead of saying simply that dependent arising is empty or that only empty things dependently arise, Madhyamika declares that the formula dependent arising = emptiness is an affirmative equation . The Perfection of Wisdom formula that matter is emptiness and emptiness is (matter rupa = sunyata) had a similar purpose, but its meaning was slightly different. There, the equation was made to demonstrate the paradoxical non-dual nature of intuitive wisdom. For Nagarjuna, the formula dependent arising = emptiness was meant to be taken literally. One must not lean to either side of the equation; over-emphasizing dependent arising or being would lead to a sort of positivism, and too much stress on emptiness or non-being could engender nihilism. This equation must be carefully explained. If the declaration that dependent arising is identical with emptiness or that being is identical with non-being is not properly understood, then it would seem to be, in Nagao's words, “the raving of a madman.””

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Rick:
e, I know you understand the point I'm trying to make. So your either trying to make sure that everyone else understands it, or are you now playing devil's advocate?


I am adding my $.02 and just nudging you in how you are sounding.

love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Rick, I think you're debating strawmen here.  It's clear what you think has been misunderstood, but I'm not sure how you've gotten that impression.  In my letter to you, I said “grasping why,” yes, but I was using a conventional expression for “understanding why,” not referring to the Buddhist concept of “grasping” (e.g., I was not advocating grasping onto views as having inherent self-existence).  Also, I think most participants in this thread are long-time practitioners of Buddhism, so I'm not sure who your “no practice, all concept” critic is supposed to be.

Maybe just take a breath and read things again.

Best wishes,

Bruce

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hey Edward,

I dont know if you are talking to me as you did not reply with my text or mention me specifically?

Edward:
The position I've taken is not “mine”; it is well established by “authorities” within Buddhist scholasticism and practice.

Anyone can search the internet and find these things. Why are *you* posting here?

And who died and made Hokai the master expert? It seems some here bow down to him almost like Ken himself showed up. Perhaps a bit of looking into our own projections might be in order with both of them.

I bow to the Buddha (I) Dhamma (It) and the Sangha (We) i.e. my life. Since you, Hokai and everyone else here is part of We, I bow to all of you.

love

e

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

e asked: “Anyone can search the internet and find these things. Why are *you* posting here?”
 
Because I've been rather attached to pomo insights, and Buddhist insights, and their confluence and relation. So I'm here to challenge not only others but myself and hopefully learn something. And despite my best intentions I'm still rather attached to some of my own cherished positions and hoping to loosen them up a bit. It seems to some that I may not be doing that good a job of it.

Why are *you* posting here?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Rick said: “For Nagarjuna, the formula dependent arising = emptiness was meant to be taken literally. One must not lean to either side of the equation; over-emphasizing dependent arising or being would lead to a sort of positivism, and too much stress on emptiness or non-being could engender nihilism.”

This is not just to Rick, but everyone. First of all, by dependant arising do we mean anything different than or additional to the law of karma, “this happens because of that”? That's a fairly new term to me. Also, would this balance between dependant arising and emptiness, positivism and nihilism, change at all in an evolutionary context? Would Roshi Bernie Glassman's Zen Peacemakers be termed positivistic by some? Using this terminology, how would things change moving into a post-post modern (and I would understand that to mean evolutionary) Buddhism? Sorry if that's too off topic, but if this thread goes on long enough, that's where we're headed, right? :)

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I've posted something similar in other threads but it bears repeating here to support that this isn't “my” view, but it certainly is one that I've been attached to. And it's one accepted interpretation of the two truths, which I understand is different from other interpretations within Buddhism. One point being that there is no one “right (Buddhist) view” on this.
 
Also, to reiterate from the first paragraph that follows, Ken's version of the two truths above (and below*) seems to have this dichotomy exemplified by the Murti reference. I am in no way the first to notice this, but again, I've been rather attached to this critique. And perhaps I and my sources are wrong.

Garfield & Priest, ”Nagarjuna and the limits of thought” at The Zen Site:

For Western philosophers it is very tempting to adopt a Kantian understanding of

Nagarjuna (as is offered, e.g., in Murti 1955). Identify conventional reality with the

phenomenal realm, and ultimate reality with the noumenal, and there you have it.

But this is not Nagarjuna's view. The emptiness of emptiness means that ultimate

reality cannot be thought of as a Kantian noumenal realm. For ultimate reality is just

as empty as conventional reality. Ultimate reality is hence only conventionally real!

The distinct realities are therefore identical.

We are now in a position to examine Nagarjuna's first limit contradiction. The centerpiece

of his Madhyamaka or ‘‘middle way'' philosophy is the thesis that everything

is empty. This thesis has a profound consequence. Ultimate truths are those

about ultimate reality. But since everything is empty, there is no ultimate reality.

There are, therefore, no ultimate truths. We can get at the same conclusion another

way. To express anything in language is to express truth that depends on language,

and so this cannot be an expression of the way things are ultimately. All truths, then,

Well, this relates to the way we understand spirituality and meditation. For example, we often tend to understand meditation-in Zen especially-as getting rid of thoughts. We think that if we can just get rid of thought, then we can see the world as it is, clearly, without any interference from conceptuality. We view thinking as something negative that has to be eliminated in order to realize the emptiness of the mind. But this reflects the delusion of duality, rather than the solution to duality. As Dogen put it, the point isn't to get rid of thought, but to liberate thought. Form is emptiness, yet emptiness is also form, and our emptiness always takes form. We don't realize our emptiness apart from form, we realize it in form, as non-attached form. One of the very powerful and creative ways that our emptiness takes form is as thought. The point isn't to have some pure mind, untainted by thought, like a blue, completely empty sky with no clouds. After a while that gets a little boring! Rather, one should be able to engage or play with the thought processes that arise in a creative, non-attached, nondualistic way. To put it in another way, the idea isn't to get rid of all language, it's to be free within language, so that one is non-attached to any particular kind of conceptual system, realizing that there are many possible ways of thinking and expressing oneself. The freedom from conceptualizing that we seek does not happen when we wipe away all thoughts; instead, it happens when we're not clinging to, or stuck in, any particular thought system. The kind of transformation we seek in our spiritual practices is a mind that's flexible, supple. Not a mind that clings to the empty blue sky. It's a mind that's able to dance with thoughts, to adapt itself according to the situation, the needs of the situation. It's not an empty mind which can't think. It's an ability to talk with the kind of vocabulary or engage in the way that's going to be most helpful in that situation.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I'm also in agreement with Hokai that the topic of this discussion is not only made difficult by comparing Buddhism and pomo but also because ”…there are siginificant differences within the Buddhist tradition itself, depending on whether the two-truths are strongly related (Hinayana), indivisible (Madhyamaka), or convertible (Yogacara).” Plus there are differences and variations within each that contend with one another. This certainly also applies to “naked awareness,” as when Balder quoted from “Self-liberation through seeing with naked awareness,” which seems to suggest that all those different Buddhist schools or sects mean the same thing by “naked awareness.” Do they? Are emptiness and ultimate truth and naked awareness even commensurable within Buddhism?

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Edward, I have no idea actually. All I know is that my sect of Buddhism is obviously the right one… right? ;^0

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Hokai: “Actually, Rick, the student of philosophy is not a Buddhist at all. Jonah Winters, the author: “A study of Madhyamika philosophy has not forced me to abandon my belief in concepts like God, the soul, and the afterlife.” From what is obvious in the essay you posted, his connection is to the Islamic/Baha'i religion.”

I stand corrected. Thanx for pointing that out. I guess it amazes me that someone can have a firm understanding of such things, and not be a practitioner. Then again, it may be a lot of copy and pasting from source commentary. Either way, it is a really good resource.

“can you pleeeaaase give us your input without bombing this thread with huge chunks of pasted text? Please use short quotes, your own words, and preferably normal size text (no wonder some guys are not reading the whole thing).”

No, I'm getting lazy. Actually, the last quoted post got cut off half way through. It answers the question that David later asks. I think those posts are extremely readable compared to some of the dense and jargon filled aritcles that often get posted around here. This thread feels like its getting away from us. Like there are 6 people talking at once. Kind of interesting, because it seems that there's real understanding that's coming from it.

rick

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

David: “This is not just to Rick, but everyone. First of all, by dependant arising do we mean anything different than or additional to the law of karma, “this happens because of that”? That's a fairly new term to me. Also, would this balance between dependant arising and emptiness, positivism and nihilism, change at all in an evolutionary context?”

No. It wouldn't.
Why? What is evoltution? The answer is in the question.  Evolution would not be possible if not for the fact that all things were empty of a self nature.

What is your idea of evolution? I think we have to slow down a bit and get all of our definitions right, so see if we are on the same page. I've been trained in all of the latest biological and cultural evolutionary theories and data, so I may have a different conception of the word. I think we will probably be getting into issues of scale in this discussion.   Also, are you talking about biological, cultural or individual cognitive evolution?

Hokai, your just gonna have to forgive me, because I'm gonna repost the second half of that last quote to help make things even clearer, before we go off talking about the evolutionary context of dependent arising. I will, however, correct the font size.

“This equal status of each half of the dependent arising/emptiness equation is reflected in the status of the two truths. Ultimate truth is no more real than conventional truth, but is just a different way of looking at the same thing. They are each truth, even though their verdicts conflict, and neither level of truth could exist alone. Without relying upon conventional truth, ultimate truth is not taught, Nagarjuna said, and without the existence of a higher truth, there could be no such thing as Perfect Wisdom and knowledge of emptiness. Conventional truth is that things arise, endure, and cease, and are thus real. Ultimate truth is that, as transitory phenomena, things are empty of self-nature, and are thus unreal. Each one of these statements is true, and neither should be asserted to the exclusion of the other, else either positivism or nihilism would result. a

A final reason that the formula dependent arising = emptiness must be clearly understood is that it may seem, prima facie, to evidence a contradiction in Madhyamika philosophy. The relation between things has been demonstrated to be neither one of identity nor one of difference. A is not B, nor is A not not B. Yet, Nagarjuna here appears to be declaring an identity relation. The resolution of this discrepancy is that the equation is not one of simple identity. Neither dependent arising nor emptiness has a nature which can relate to something else; neither has any form of real existence. Thus, their relation, as well as their own nature, is empty and indefinable. They are equal only in the fact that neither has self- nature. The formula is a practical guide, not a dictum of logic.”

(WE SHOULD LOOK AT THEM AS ONE IMPLYING THE OTHER (as with any duality) : 
DEPENDENT ARISING <==> EMPTINESS)

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Edward, I like that David Loy quote, but we can't also remember that the practice is also about have the ability to control what happens in your mind to some extent. From thoughts come actions. The kind and quality of thought in this paradigm matters in a way. After practicing for a while, you should be able to clear you mind of all thought, even while moving. I used to think that it was just about ignoring or non-attaching to thoughts, but my teacher set me straight. It is also about taming the monkey mind. Of course it's the ability to not attach to your thoughts, that ceases thought. How do your fingers and toes move after all? What moves them? So what ceases thought?

So everyone. Let's see where we are in this discussion.

Can we say that it is agreed that the Dharma-body is post-post modern at least, even while the myriad forms of Buddhism out there are all not, and there's a great deal of Buddhist culture that is still 1st tier? Is that where we are at?
Can we even separate the two? After all one doesn't arise without the other.

From this POV, however, it would seem that AQAL has not yet passed through the fire of post-modernism. If I was a cultural anthropologist studying AQAL with an etic (outsiders) perspective and used the post-modern gaze as a tool to deconstruct it. One of the first things that would come to me is the fact that the AQAL map is itself a product of what it proports to represent.
The map is a product of a space on the map, and I would also conclude that without a culture theory, it is only a spot on a map within a specific cultural territory.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Yes, Rick, I think that is where a number of us stand.  In my view, Buddhism has texts and essential (pith) teachings which are, indeed, post-postmodern.  At least, if we are mapping altitude, they exceed the “watermark” of postmodernism (whether we place that at Green, or in the case of some theorists, even at Teal or Turquoise) in one or more lines of development.  At the same time, many institutions, cultural beliefs and practices, and even many prominent modern teachers have not passed through the fire of postmodernism.  Also, there are texts in the (very sizable) Buddhist canon, and some beliefs, models, and cosmological conceptions, which are decidedly premodern or pre-postmodern, or at least which have those elements running through them. 

In a previous post, and I tend to agree, there are very few if any AQAL manifestations of Buddhism in the world (in terms of communities of belief and practice) which function at even a postmodern level in all quadrants.

Something that hasn't come up yet in this discussion is Wilber's sliding scale of enlightenment.  How do you think that fits in here, especially if we are arguing that a number of Buddhist texts and teachings have a fairly “high” altitude?  Wilber seems to suggest that a person who awakens today has a chance to be more enlightened (in terms of fullness, not freedom) than individuals had in the Buddha's day.  He seems to include Shakyamuni Buddha himself in this assessment (though he apparently hesitates to come out and say this directly in front of Traleg Rinpoche!).  Rick, e, others – what do you make of this?

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Rick said: “What is your idea of evolution?”

Well, I been tryin' to discuss it with ya, but ya never answered me.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

You might find this interesting. David Loy reviews the book The Foundational Standpoint of Maadhyamika Philosophy, found in “Buddhism Today” and taken from Philosophy East & West, Volume 42, Number 1, P.187-190. It's a bit lengthy but I’ve enclosed the entire review, as it sheds some light on our discussion. And as you probably know, Loy is a Buddhist authority from both a scholastic and practice perspective. Not to say that his view is the “correct” one, mind you!

Professor Nagao's book is an attempt to understand Maadhyamika along the lines of Tsong-kha-pa's Steps on the Way to Enlightenment (Lam-rim chen-mo), a text that Nagao (now emeritus professor of Buddhist studies at the University of Kyoto) first studied during visits to Lamaist monasteries in Mongolia. This reading is contrasted with the more familiar one (at least in East Asia) of Chi-tsang's San-Lun school, whose overemphasis on emptiness falls into a dogmatism that devalues dependent co-arising and hence the conventional world. Two main themes are interwoven. First, the fundamental standpoint of Maadhyamika is that emptiness (`suunyataa) is identical with dependent co-arising (pratiitya-samutpaada).

It is important not to elevate one over the other, for then one ends up with either a purely negative logic of emptiness or a merely organismic view of dependent-arising being. This also relates to Nagao's lifelong concern to understand the relationship between Maadhyamika and Yogaacaara as not adversarial but complementary; identifying emptiness with dependent co-arising makes other-dependence (paratantra in Yogaacaara) the key term for both, the gab between delusion and liberation.

The other-dependent pattern entails the path and plays a mediating role among the three patterns as the skillful method for entering the unmarked” (p.82). This seems to me not only right but essential, although the point goes beyond the importance of cause- effect relationships for any spiritual path: for both schools, other-dependence is the intermediate stage that dissolves our essentialist commitments and, by then refuting itself (if there are no things, there are no others) , opens up the possibility of tathataa, “thusness.” The other main theme is the absolute disjunction between the two truths.

“The only true and absolute dichotomous contradiction, which can never be resolved, is between worldly convention and ultimate meaning” a claim soon contradicted: “The actual world is not two but one, and therefore the two truth realms cannot be made so completely other as to refer to separate worlds of meaning.” Final absolute meaning is “completely other,” beyond cause and effect, ineffable and silent, yet on the other side, “the ordinary realm of worldy convention itself comprises the entire content of ultimate meaning (pp. 26, 97, 102, 110). The book becomes a series of reflections, usually erudite and often insightful, on both of these claims.

Nagao's reason for describing the two truths as unrelated is to avoid overemphasizing either: if we don't distinguish them they tend to fuse into one, and we either end up prisoners of the conventional, as the only truth we konw, or suppose ultimate meaning to govern worldly conventions. The opposite danger of dissociating them completely is to end up detesting all worldly and conventional activity (pp.100-102). Then isn't the challenge to understand the difference-in-identity or identity-in-difference of the two perspectives?

Whatever the limitations of thought, it becomes the task of Buddhist philosophy to illuminate this relation as much as possible. Although Nagao elaborates both, I can't see that these two apparently inconsistent claims are ever reconciled. However, the prose is so dense and difficult that another factor may be interfering with his argument: the quality of the translation.

The reason I can only suspect this is that nowhere in the text could I find the title of the Japanese original from which this book is translated, and my efforts to discover it in Japan have also been unsuccessful. One of the main attempts to clarify things introduces an element that is not part of the foundational standpoint of Maadhyamika. Nagao refers to another kind of “other- awareness”: the dependent co-arising manifestation of truth “comes from beyond”; it is a turning toward as of an other-power (pp.48,59) .

This Pure Land notion may be somewhere in Tsong-kha-pa, but it may also originate in Nagao's own Joodo Shinshuu background; in either case, there's no reference to this sort of “other dependence” in the Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa. Any appeal to an other power is inconsistent with the main thrust of Naagaarjuna, who works to deconstruct all dualisms such as that between other-power and self-power, and to deny what Nagao asserts, that “the light [of discernment] must be introduced from elsewhere” (p.47) .

This also applies to Nagao's concept of two-dimensional activity, the ascent to transcendence (“the divine realm”) and the descent to worldly reengagement (“the human realm”), both of which he judges necessary for authentic religious teaching. Again, these dualistic metaphors are not Naagaarjuna's and I think we remain more true to his perspective if we look at them critically, asking how much they help us and how much they hinder. That ties in with our tendency today to ask: what might these metaphysical claims mean phenomenologically? Nagao touches on the important point when he quotes the Diamond-Cutter suutra that “this understanding arises when one has no abiding point when he quotes the Diamond-Cutter Suutra that “this understanding arises when one has no abliding point.”

Emptiness cannot be “grasped” without experiencing the freedom of nonattachment, exemplified in the nonabiding cessation (aprati.s.thita- nirvaa.na) of the bodhisattva. It is clear in the other prajnaapaaramitaa suutras (as long as we are not in quest of somewhere to abide) that this is what liberates: “No wisdom can we get hold of, no highest perfection, no Bodhisattva, no thought of enlightenment either…. In form, in feeling, will, perception and awareness, nowhere in them they find a place to rest on. Without a home they wander, dharmas never hold them, nor do they grasp at them…” (The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and its Vers Summary, trans. Edward Conze (Bolinas, California: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), 1:5-6, pp. 9-10). This is not a process of ascent to some divine realm followed by return to the human realm, but a transformation in the way we experience this world: “To the extent that beings take hold of things and settle down in them, to that extent there is defilement.But no one is thereby defiled. And to the extent that one does not take hold of things and does not settle down in them, to that extent can one conceive of the absence of I-making and mine-making. In that sense can one form the concept of the purification of beings, i.e., to the extent that they do not take hold of things and do not settle down in them, to that extent there is purification . But no one is therein purified ” (ibid., no.400, pp.237-238).

When this is applied to the concept of truth, it becomes a self-reflexive critique that kicks the ladder out from beneath itself as well as all other attempts to grasp the truth including the two-truths doctrine which is why the foundational standpoint of Maadhyamika is that no foundation is to be found in anything, anywhere. That is how Maadhyamika can be, as Nagao concludes, “a standpoint that is not a standpoint; it comes into play only in regard to 'that which is admitted by the other'”(p.141) Nagao ends by observing that Maadhyamika reasoning, which he little discusses, can be studied only in connection with the split between the Svaatantrika and Praasangika schools.

Maadhyamaka Schools in India does just that. It develops an interpreation of their debate first suggested by bSod-nams Sen-ge, a fifteen-century Tibetan scholar, in The General Meaning of Maadhyamaka (dBu-ma spyi-ston) . The usual understanding of that disagreement (as in Tsong-kha-pa) locates the divergence in different attitudes toward language: the Svaatantrika spokesman Bhaavaviveka affirms that essences exist in languange, while the Praasangika defender Candrakiirti denies even those essences. bSod-nams Sen-ge saw the principal issue as more subtle, being pedagogical as well as epistemological.

Della Santina puts this in context by describing the formalization of Indian logic after Naagaarjuna, which was an inevitable response to the P.190 evolving tradition of public debate. Bhaavaviveda's independent syllogism (svatantra-anumaana) is “an obvious compromise on the part of a Maadhyamika scholar with the increased formalization of Indian logic, “but this tendency also affected the Praasangikas, including Candrakiitri (p.55). They disagreed over what is conventionally real (vyavahaara). Praasangika denies such validity even to common processes of cognition (they presuppose duality), which meant they had to rely solely on reductio ad absurdum arguments; the Svaatantrikas (epistemlolgical realists) believed it was necessary to agree to the conventional existence of a common substance in order for arguments to result in valid inferences logically compelling to one's opponent. In explaining the issues involved, Della Santina discusses in detail Naagaarjuna's Vigraha-vyaavartani, which refutes all supposedly valid forms of cognition. One argument is just as effective against all ” foundationalism ” in philosophy : ” If it is held that all entities must necessarily be established through the valid instruments of cognition themselves are established or proved” (stanza 31).

There is no escape from infinite regress. In discussing the first stanza of the Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, Della Santina reviews all of Naagaarjuna's arguments against origination and then devotes a chapter to her refutation of each of the four alternatives, refutations which are just as important today because they not only refer to Indian theories of Naagaarjuna's time but reflect the dialectical nature of reason: our tendencies to perceive (respectively) identity, permanence, and substance; difference, impernamence, and modes; syncretism; and skepticism or nihilism.

The debate over the acceptability of the independent syllogism finally came down to the nature of the logical subject ( substratum ) . The syllogism`s validity was questionable because it employed emutually opposed orders of reality : it was agreed that the predicates ( which negated origination ) belong to the level of ultimate reality, while the subjects and reasoning belong to the level of empirical reality. Their incompatibility meant such arguments could not be valid. Della Santina concludes that the Praasangikas won logically as well as historically: they were more consistent with Naagaarjuna himself and more sophisticated but that sophistication was largely a product of the debate. The Praasangika/Svaatantrika debate makes me wonder what is really at stake in all such quests to discern what is really (as opposed to conventionally) real. When we decide that something is real or unreal, as part of our search for being, what difference does that make to our lives? If our intellectual search is a sublimated attempt to ground ourselves by “grasping the concepts that grasp reality,” we have yet to feel the force of the Maadhyamika critique of philosophy.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

“Well, I been tryin' to discuss it with ya, but ya never answered me.”

That's true. So we can hash it out over there, and then talk about it here with more of an eye-to-eye understanding. Sorry about that David.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

This is from Roger Jackson’s review of The Great Debate on Emptiness:
 
Other-emptiness was declared to be the heart of a “Great Madhyamaka” philosophical system rooted in India and superior to the “self-emptiness” (rangtong) view of the Prasangika school regarded by Gelukpas (and others) as the acme of Buddhist thought. Although it originated with the Jonangpas, the otheremptiness view found adherents over the years within the other principal lineages of Tibet: the Nyingma, the Kagyu, and to a lesser extent, the Sakya. It is taught by certain masters of those traditions to this day.

The conflict between Rangtongpas and Shentongpas (as I will denote them) is perhaps the most significant philosophical debate in Tibetan history. The ground on which it was contested includes arguments about the Buddha’s intent in teaching emptiness in multiple ways, the significance of discourse about buddhanature (or the “matrix-of-one-gone-thus,” as Hopkins translates it)1 and dharmakaya, the parameters of the two truths, and the sort of negation that emptiness is. To its participants, though, the debate is not mere scholastic speculation about how many nothings can fit on the non-head of a non-pin. Rather, it impinges directly on the great question of spiritual freedom: for Mahayana Buddhists, enlightenment is contingent on a direct realization of emptiness, and emptiness cannot be directly realized if one’s philosophical understanding of it is incorrect. Thus, the stakes in the debate could not be higher.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

And the following is from the wikipedia entry on Shentong. Can any of you Dzogcheners tell me whether your rig pa is rooted in this shentong/rantgong distinction?
 

Shentong (also, zhentong; Tibetan: གཞེན་སྟོང་; Wylie: gzhen-stong), also sometimes called ”Yogacara Madhyamaka,” is a philosophical sub-school found in Tibetan Buddhism whose followers hold that the nature of mind is “empty of other” (i.e., empty of all qualities other than an inherent, ineffable nature), in contrast to the “Rangtong” view of the followers of Prasangika Madhyamaka, who hold that all phenomena are unequivocally empty of self-nature, without positing anything beyond that. According to Shentongpas, the emptiness of ultimate reality should not be characterized in the same way as the emptiness of apparent phenomena.

When speaking of the emptiness of mind's ultimate nature, Shentongpas often use terms such as “luminous clarity,” “luminous awareness,” “the clear light nature of mind,” and so forth to characterize their experiences. Such language is often employed in Dzogchen expositions as well.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

I recall the Dalai Lama mentioning that Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche (I believe) commented that there were two interpretations of Shentong, and that one was problematic (the one most commonly criticized), but that there was another interpretation which he considered valid.  I do not know the details of his argument, however.

In my understanding – Lol or Hokai may know better – the Prasangika interpretation is considered valid by a number of prominent Dzogchen teachers (both Longchenpa and Mipham, for instance, as I recall).  However, yes, there is a difference, because Dzogchen teachers will point out that, while the Prasangika understanding of emptiness is accurate, “just emptiness” is a deficient understanding of the ultimate truth.  Ultimately, things are not only empty, they are also clear, suffused by awareness.  However, you cannot consider awareness to be a monolithic mind: when looked for, mind cannot be found as a thing-in-itself; it is also empty.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Thanks you Balder. But my original point is that it is a legitimate debate, even within Tibetan Buddhism. And the interpretation I used of the two truths is recognized as part of that legitimate debate. Hokai dismissed it as “relativism.” Now perhaps within his tradition they even think that it is relativism, but it is still a long-time debate within the “traditions.” And as you noted previously, “right view” is tantamount to an understanding of “right meditation,” a point reiterated in the review cited above. And “right view” is itself strongly debated, even within the Tibetan branches, let alone Buddhism as a whole.

Which of course goes back to my previous question: Are things like the two truths, emptiness etc. even commensurable within Buddhism? And isn't that one of the pomo challenges? If they can't even agree among themselves about these things then how can it go post-postmodern? Which of course brings in the Wilber-Combs matrix and 3rd tier. This is especially relevant when 3rd tier seems intimately related to the combination of state-stages and structure-stages, with the former being a prerequisite for 3rd tier, it would seem.

Re: Buddhism and the Fire of Postmodernism

Yes, there are many schools of thought within Buddhism.  In Tibetan tradition, it IS fairly widely acknowledged that Dzogchen is the “pinnacle of all yanas,” though of course this conclusion is not unanimous.  The Dalai Lama, a Geluk (and Prasangika Madhyamika follower), holds it in high esteem, for instance.

Personally, I do not see any problem with a multiplicity of perspectives – at least not in an Integral or even pomo context.  I do not think there has to be unanimous agreement among all Buddhists before there is any possibility for the emergence of a fully Integral Buddhism to emerge.  In fact, I think an Integral approach has the potential (though it hasn't been rigorously applied yet) to make sense of and order the different interpretations of emptiness, the two truths, etc, that exist within Buddhism.  Mapping Kosmic address, developing a GigaGlossary, etc.  And actually, some schools of Tibetan Buddhism already do this, to a degree.  The Nyingma and Bon schools both describe the differing views within Buddhism in developmental terms, and both place Dzogchen at the pinnacle of Buddhist perspectives.