Gaia: The Integral Pod - Chapel Perspicacious - Is Ken right on Derrida?

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://t4om.gaia.com — Tue, 24 Jul 2007 04:07:04 GMT

Gary and all,

You might enjoy watching Heidegger in this two-minute video in which, according to the accompanying translation, he discusses "thinking [that] is, compared to metaphysical thinking, much simpler than philosophy, but precisely because of its simplicity it is much more difficult to carry out."

http://videos.zaadz.com/228854/heidegger_and_the_task_of_thinking

Cheers!
~ Tom

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://gary-ph.gaia.com — Sat, 21 Jul 2007 23:26:54 GMT

theurj

Hi Edward,

Let me respond to your engaging request. Your post starts,

“See what Ken says below regarding Derrida and Buddhist Emptiness. Then see following that an inquiry in another Zaadz/II thread, Indigo Buddhism. Could you respond to this in light of your reference to Benedikter on how Derrida might indeed touch on more than just ‘the limitation of language in the waking state?’ And do you have any insights into my other questions at the end?”

The Way of Deconstruction (by way of deconstruction)

Wilber appears, on the face of it, to make a pertinent point regarding the different gross realms in distinguishing between the two deconstructions. He also appears not to apprehend the import or potential of deconstruction: He says, “the basic aim of deconstruction is to work with language” and to “attempt to come to a certain type of understanding about the ambiguity, instability, and paradoxicality of signifiers.” My reading here is that both these phrases infer a substantively nontransforming Cartesian subject—one which engages in a process of “work” upon the object of “language” (and I note that Wilber appears to be decidedly but unnecessarily literalist with regard to the concept of “language”), and one which “attempts to come to a certain type of understanding” upon the following object(s): the “ambiguity, instability and paradoxicality of signifiers” (I say “substantively” rather than “absolutely” because there is surely a simple type of transformation involved in the process of a Cartesian subject “understanding”); and that neither of these phrases directly allows for deconstruction as cognitive mode (or “part” of a cognitive mode) beyond formal operations—deconstruction as a jnana yoga, perhaps? aligned to a Way of Logos-Sophia or ((philosophy)) or ((poetry)) (to use Ashok Gangadean’s awakening syntax)… Realization toward the latter could be facilitated for some, I would suggest, by way of Cook-Greuter’s “construct-awareness” and/or by way of engaging in an exploratory intimacy toward trusting—and resonating with—“All As Text.” I don’t see why this shouldn’t include the qualities of “text” of the various gross realms. So I think the statement that “deconstruction is something the ego does in the waking state in order to hold onto the ego” misses the mark and the opportunity. And, indeed, to say that deconstruction has a “basic” aim at all is, I think, a tell-tale sign that Wilber does not fully understand Derrida’s deconstruction. As Derrida says: Deconstruction in a nutshell? Why, the very idea!

Paths in spirit

With regard to nonduality, I think there are as many paths to Spirit as there are paths in Spirit. Bon voyage now-here!

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://gary-ph.gaia.com — Sat, 21 Jul 2007 23:23:32 GMT

Kessels

Peter, thanks for appreciating my presence in this forum, and for the pleasant tone of discussion.

Postmodern features of AQAL

Firstly, let me address your following comment:

“If you want to point out the strengths of postmodernism to an integral audience, I think you'd be building a much stronger case by pointing out that AQAL already contains a number of postmodern truths…”

Actually, in a significant sense, I agree with you here. If my main intention was to point out the strengths of postmodernism to an integral audience, then the article would have benefited from a comprehensive analysis of AQAL with regard to the modes of cognition (eg. postformal and formal ways of engaging) it employs (noting here the important distinction between objects of theoretic concern and the enactment of theorizing). But, to do such a thing well is a huge task. My article was already something of a small book—at over 30,000 words—and I felt that its configuration was sufficient to inspire useful dialogue at this particular juncture. I did, however, make reference to this larger task in footnote 15, where I say,

“My tentative use of postformal operations in this article does not imply that Wilber does not enact particular postformal operations in particular ways with regards to AQAL. For instance, the breadth of territory covered in AQAL could be associated with postformal vision; the value of its mission potentially legitimized with reference to fuzzy logic and its “transcendent” relations, fuzziology and social fuzziology; its systematization can be viewed in relation to Michael Commons and Francis Richards’ Model of Hierarchical Complexity; the eight native perspectives can be seen to be a dialectical development of the four quadrants; Wilber’s purported methodology of orienting generalisations could be fruitfully linked to grounded theory, intuitive inquiry and other emerging academic methodologies; his style could be viewed in relation to certain postmodern affectivities; whilst the incorporations of holarchy via Hegel’s dialectical principle of sublation (Wilber’s “transcend-and-include”) can also be seen to emanate from a postformal perspective. In a similar way, both formal and pre-formal operations could also be identified.”

I note, however, that this perspective is not one that Wilber has substantively identified himself - he has not been postmodernly reflexive in this regard.

Wilber's stance on postmodernism

You comment, “you paint a picture in your article in which Wilber's stance to postmodernism is mostly negative. I don't think this is a fair representation of his position” and, “you do these kind of things consistently in your article, you're making Wilber look like the arch enemy of postmodernism, which he isn't.” In support of your position, you quote Wilber’s description of the Green “altitude,” in which a range of both positive and negative features of various kinds are given. You then say, “to me, this is in contrast to the quotes you use in your article, which are almost exclusively negative towards Green. I wonder why you did this?” Let me separate out some things here.

Firstly, a central theme in my article is not so much that Wilber is an “arch enemy” of postmodernism but rather that his interpretation of postmodernism is skewed and partial—he misses crucial details, and, although some postmodern characteristics could be seen as I have indicated above, he nevertheless neglects to sufficiently identify or reflexively embody many significant postmodern features. If we look closely at Wilber’s description of the “Green altitude” you provided, we can see that it consists of nine sentences; five of these foreground the concept of pluralism (noting that even where he mentions “compassion,” “idealism” and “involvement,” he says they spring from multiperspectivality), one lists Green political movements, one lists Green organizations, one identifies a list of negative Green traits, and one a consequence of these negative traits. On the face of it, it appears balanced. But where are the “many postmodern truths”? There is only one, elaborated upon five times: pluralism / mutiperspectivality. Where are the postmodern features of: abjection, alterity, body-without-organs, bricolage, chaos theory, complexity theory, conceptual ecology, critical theory, desiring-machine, dialectics (including negative dialectics), différance, discourse analysis, eventism, fractals, fuzzy logic, genealogy, hegemony, intertextuality, jouissance, the libidinal economy, logocentricity, magic realism, paganism, post-colonialism, post-feminism, quantum mechanics, queer theory, schizoanalysis, semanalysis, semiotics, simulacra, singularity, string theory, subaltern theory, territoriality, or trace? This ecology cannot be reduced to pluralism or its elaborations. Is not neglect a form of antipathy?

A particular discourse analysis of my article

Secondly, you make a claim about the quotes I use in my article. To investigate the validity of this claim, I will do a discourse analysis of my article.

In terms of long quotes denoted by indentation, I note the following:

By Derrida (4)

In proactive support of discussing Spirit
On the unconditionality of forgiveness
Derrida’s languaging as complex
On deconstruction-as-not-negative

By Gebser (4)

On integral x2
As exhibiting postformal paradox
On linguistic awareness

By Wilber (9)

On vision-logic x2
In friendly support of endless contexts
Unscholarliness regarding Gebser
Identification of deconstruction-as-a-cultural-movement as a solely American phenomenon
Associating Green with nihilism, deconstruction, boomeritis x2
On constructive postmodernism
As exhibiting dualistic thinking

By Others (14)

On the soul as endlessly deep x2
Problematisation of a unified view of postformal thought
On the complexity of Derrida’s deconstruction
Identifying Green and deconstruction as ethical
American’s interpretation of postmodernism as not based on the French poststructuralists
Complexity theory
Poetic cognition
Linguistic awareness
The need for new linguistic abstractions
The holonomic paradigm
The holonomic paradigm’s promise of reconstructing the fabric of the theorizing of postformal developmental levels
On Wilber’s statements as too extreme / linear
On Gebser’s integral

From this analysis, I would not say that the quotes I use in my article are “almost exclusively” negative towards Green. Nor would I say that the quotes I use in my article by Wilber are “almost exclusively” negative toward Green. In terms of the nine by Wilber, one could say that two regard Green as negative, two Green as neutral (describing vision-logic), one as positive (endless contexts), whilst four do not address Green directly.

A postmodern eye upon AQAL

My article does not seek merely to reflect AQAL theory in which all vMemes or altitudes are identified as having various positive and negative attributes in an apparently balanced fashion, but to engage independent critical thinking and inquire into the totality of engaging with Wilber’s text. One might say this is a hermeneutic quest—one in which various analyses of discourse might be undertaken—including the kind of quantitative analysis that MrTeacup took exception to above.

For instance, when you say “you make it look like Wilber equates Green and MGM, which is clearly not the case. The MGM is a pathological form of Green, and not all of Green is pathological” it appears that you are referring to the purported / explicated details of AQAL theory (namely, that all developmental levels have healthy and pathological modes of expression) rather than addressing the more encompassing situation, the overall or net message from Wilber, the totality arising from engagement with his text. One could say perpahs that this is an exploration of a particular “context” of AQAL. This larger context cannot be entirely seen simply by expressing a passive reflection of AQAL theory. It requires a proactive hermeneutic analysis which takes AQAL theory as its object of inquiry. Of course, hermeneutics can be mapped by AQAL, but this is not the point here. The point is for AQAL to temporarily change roles and become an object of inquiry rather than the enquirer. Wilber refers to the need for such methodologies which look beyond appearances in his Integral Methodological Pluralism.

Regarding your comment “I don’t think this is a fair representation of his position,” I could simply counter this by saying “I disagree with you,” but to what avail? One person says one thing and another person says another. A standoff. Surely the common interest here would be to attempt to ascertain how a shared understanding could be achieved. So evidence can be used. Although it cannot be an “exact science,” attempts toward mutual understanding can nevertheless be made. In this particular instance, it is impossible to scout through every word Wilber has said, but particular orienting generalizations and also particular “gap diving” into some textual detail would prove useful. I’ve already engaged in a little gap diving above. Here are some orienting generalizations.

1. If one looks at the “altitude”-related neologisms he has constructed, I note the following: (a) “flatland” is negative toward Orange and Green (b) “vision-logic” is positive toward Green and above (c) “meme green meme” is negative solely toward Green (d) “boomeritis” is negative solely toward Green (e) “integral” is positive toward Yellow and above. There is thus a significant relative preponderance of neologisms concerning negative Green.
2. Although The Marriage and Sense and Soul might have a balanced view of postmodernism (I don't know: I haven't read it), my experience has been that other texts by Wilber do not generally display such a balance; and when they don’t, the tendency is toward viewing Green as negative.
3. An entire book concerns negative Green: “Boomeritis.” This is not the case for any other altitude; nor is there an entire book dedicated to positive Green to counterbalance this.

Dialectical operations and AQAL

Your next two questions: firstly, “What is particularly postmodern (Green) about dialectics?

As I indicate in my article, dialectical operations is a form of postformal operations as identified by various developmental psychologists. Wilber maps postformal thinking at Green and beyond.

Secondly, “And why do you think that AQAL isn't dialectic?”

I’m not making a totalizing claim that AQAL isn’t dialectical. I am indicating that a central feature (de/construction) of AQAL is not substantively dialectical; I have also indicated areas where AQAL might be using dialectical operations—see footnote 15 above.

Your helpful reference

In terms of The Marriage of Sense and Soul, thank you for pointing out that this would be an excellent reference to further my consideration of Wilber’s relationship to postmodernism. It happens to be one of the few Wilber books that I have not read, and it looks as though this is a somewhat unfortunate given my interest.

Thanks once again for your engagement, Peter.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://brucealderman.gaia.com — Sat, 21 Jul 2007 23:13:23 GMT

Hi, Gary,

Yes, I know Sean quite well; he was a teacher of a number of my courses as well as my thesis advisor, and I believe his "good word" was also instrumental in my getting the position at JFKU. I'll be sure to give him your regards.

I have still been intending to respond in more depth to your article. In time ... I promise!

Warm wishes,

Bruce

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://gary-ph.gaia.com — Sat, 21 Jul 2007 23:10:17 GMT

Balder

Wow! I’m thoroughly delighted that I might have helped you get a teaching position! Thanks for letting me know, Bruce. I assume at JFK? I met the Holistic/Integral faculty there 2 years ago—a lovely bunch of people. If you bump into Sean Hargens, please pass on my warm regards. I’m pretty sure you’ll have a good time in that position. And thanks very much for passing my article on. Much appreciated.

:-) Gary

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://gary-ph.gaia.com — Sat, 21 Jul 2007 23:08:14 GMT

MrTeacup

Thanks for your positive feedback, Mike.

Attending postmodernism

You rightly point out that many approaches have not fully taken on board the insights of postmodernism. You mention systems theory, for instance. I agree with you that such approaches could benefit from a better engagement with postmodernism. And I would add that it especially behoves integral theory to do so, as—unlike some other approaches—one of its objects of interest is postmodernism itself. It thus has a special calling (over and above other approaches which could benefit from postmodernism but whose objects of interest do not include postmodernism) to ensure that it is internally congruent with respect to the feature of postmodernism.

Dialectic of de/construction

You say, “The AQAL framework has sharply limited the ability for various methodologies to claim ultimate truth. The very issue we are discussing is that Ken has deconstructed deconstruction and whether it is legitimate or not. AQAL is only useful because it is deconstructive.” Let me address the four parts of your statement.

1. “The AQAL framework has sharply limited the ability for various methodologies to claim ultimate truth.” Yes, this is what it claims it is doing, and in a particular and important way, this is what it does. However, one of my points is that Wilber has not adequately reflected upon AQAL itself as a theoretic entity. In other words, the objects of concern within AQAL indeed include various methodologies, and that indeed part of AQAL’s theoretic narrative concerns an imperative to limit the ability of various methodologies to claim ultimate truth. But what does it say about itself or about other approaches which espouse methodological pluralisms? If we zoom out one level of analysis, then what comes into focus is AQAL as a single conceptual entity—one theory. And at this level, there is, I believe, an assumption that such an approach, compared to other—less pluralistically methodological—approaches, is less partial, better, or nearer ultimate truth. What limits does it acknowledge for itself? Indeed, in what way does it reflect upon itself? Well, one of my points is that it does not sufficiently address such questions as this. So, in lieu of an internal discourse around such matters, I identify an overarching bias toward the concept of construction, as is suggested by the term, “integral.”
2. “The very issue we are discussing is that Ken has deconstructed deconstruction.” One of the points I am attempting to make in my article is that Wilber hasn’t grokked Derrida’s deconstruction. From this, I would therefore say that he has not “deconstructed” anything (including the object of deconstruction), as he has not enacted the operational process of deconstruction. He has, however, “mapped” the object of deconstruction in a particular way. And my article provides a particular critique of this mapping.
3. “Whether [deconstruction] is legitimate or not.” “Legitimate” by what standards? “Legitimate” by whose standards?
4. “AQAL is only useful because it is deconstructive.” This is an interesting viewpoint. Maybe you could elaborate?

Allergy to Green

I think it’s interesting you note that, “Ken identified ‘Green allergy’ as the major shadow of integral people at II.” If there is an “allergy” to the Green vMeme among people who have internalized Wilber’s model, then it would be a valid—indeed critical—perspective to consider such an allergy in relation to the ways and extent in which the construction and particular usage of “mean green meme” and “boomeritis” is ill-considered. If Wilber has unduly focused on the negative aspects of the Green vMeme, then it would not be surprising that an internalisation of such a bias would manifest as a corresponding “allergy.”

Shadow Theory

You comment, “my impression of many ‘pure’ Spiral Dynamics people is that they simply don't accept the existence of the Shadow.”

This comment opens up a very fruitful area of potential research—namely, a systematic inquiry into possible relationships between vMeme-theory, AQAL, and Shadow-theory. In particular, there would seem to be a call to cohere the theorizing of Shadow—(i) explicitly building upon its Jungian, archetypal roots, and (ii) embedding reflexive understanding & languaging according to its realizations. From this base, what identifications could be given of the shadows of other vMemes, notably those in relation to Amber/Blue and Orange? How might each of these influence a discussion of the concept of the “mean green meme”?

I do not yet know of such post/Jungian research.

Discourse analysis

“I hope you will acknowledge that the “count Ken's words” is extremely suspect. No-one should be subject to this kind of calculus to prove that you hold a viewpoint that you have actually repudiated – it's borders on an ad hominem attack.”

I’m afraid I do not agree with you that counting words in a text is necessarily “suspect.” My understanding is that it can form part of discourse analysis—the Upper Right Quadrant part of hermeneutics, one might say. In particular, it can be used as a way of collecting quantifiable data to evidence claims. In this way, it has something of a scientific quality. Of course, like all qualitative approaches, one needs to contextualise the findings with care (balance Upper Right with other considerations). And perhaps I did not adequately do so? But, used well, it is capable of dispelling myth and/or helping clarify particular structural features of the text. A structural feature that my particular analysis points to is a significant correlation—in the text of Wilber’s I chose—between postmodernism and pluralism. It is my general understanding that this is indicative. But, of course, such general understanding is up for debate. Rather than just make a “claim,” however—a claim which someone else could simply counterclaim if they wanted—I wanted to conduct a little experiment to see if my idea was in the right ball park. I didn’t know what the results were going to be, and I wanted to share my experiment and its results with others.

Actually, I have conducted a similar type of qualitative analysis of my own text—see my response to Kessels below—so if I am “attacking” a “human person” then I am at least giving myself the same treatment! But, frankly, I do not understand how such an analysis could be adequately regarded as an “attack”—it is surely a neutral inquiry (that can assist, for instance, in Point 1 in Dialectic of De/Construction above)…indeed why could it not even be a delight to have a respectful analytical light shone upon one’s text? Nor do I understand in what way it “borders on an ad hominem attack”: it is clearly directed and contextualized as referring to Wilber’s text, not to his person as a whole. If you do not think so, please quote me back at myself (or conduct a discourse analysis of the text of my article!) to indicate my shadow in this regard.

Thanks for your interest and engagement.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://gary-ph.gaia.com — Sat, 21 Jul 2007 23:01:38 GMT

David

Thanks for your appreciation of my article, David.

In relation to a discussion regarding the construct, “mean green meme,” you raise several pertinent points.

Method

You say that the primary problem you see with Todorovic’s article concerns the method she used: namely, an inquiry into the self through multiple choice questions and sentence completion. Your point therefore concerns the appropriateness of methods in developmental psychological / socio-psychological / sociological research, and you are using this case as an example of plausible problematisation. From this, a field of questions can be seen to arise, questions which might assist in obtaining a balanced understanding of the context of your concern.

1. Is her method a generally accepted method in her field, or is it a departure from the norm?
2. Even if it is a generally accepted method, is there something about the particular data or context that requires an alternative method?
3. Even if it is a generally accepted method, are such generally accepted methods adequate?

With regard to Q2, a point you raise is that there might well be something about inquiring into the Green vMeme through use of this method which skews the data. This appears to be a good point. If your hypothesis is true, then this would not only affect this particular study, but all studies which involve the Green vMeme (or similar) in this way.

As Spiral Dynamics is based on Clare Graves’ work, the immediate question would be to inquire into Graves’ methodology. Perhaps, in relation to the Green vMeme, his methodology is faulty, too? Interestingly, he altered his understanding of the Green vMeme over time—to view it as less differentiated from Yellow than he originally identified (hence his deprioritisation of the idea of first and second tier). Perhaps he took heed of the kind of problematisation you are making, and this was the result?

As AQAL uses developmental psychological research, then a similar question should be posed to the other researchers Wilber draws upon with regard to the Green vMeme. For example, Cook-Greuter has used sentence completion as part of her methodology inquiring into this and other developmental levels. Perhaps her research is faulty or partial, too, in this regard?

Your point seems to be even broader than the Green vMeme as your hypothesis states that such tests do not adequately identify our shadows—which, of course, would affect all vMemes or developmental levels.

An alternative method you refer to which might help rectify such bias involves qualified researchers observing “a group of people interacting over a long period of time.” This sounds like a sensible idea—a necessary complement (socio-psychological and more longitudinal). And this, of course, aligns with notions of methodological pluralism such as Wilber’s integral methodological pluralism.

I don’t know the answers to the questions (1, 2, 3) above: they would require quite a bit of research. Perhaps you might like to explore this further? I am certainly in sympathy with your inquiry into the sufficiency of traditional methodologies. My point equally is that such problematisation, if found valid, would affect not only Todorovic’s work but also other developmental psychological research—including identifications of vMemes and developmental levels in the first place—and therefore could not be used in isolation from this broader context without substantive bias.

Labelling Green as mean

Regarding your next point, you say, “It wouldn't make sense that Yellow would “highly” or “extremely” reject Green or any of the first-tier structures, at least not as much as Blue or Orange, because Yellow sees that they are all necessary and that it has all these structures within itself.” And you also indicate that Todorovic confirms such an idea through her analysis. So I am unclear what point you are trying to make here.

You also say that Todorovic indicates that “Yellow rejects Green 7% of the time”, and you have the following query: “I'm not really sure why she brings this up, but what would seem to matter to establish yellow is whether the person could sufficiently differentiate from Green rather than having a visceral rejection of it.” The issue at hand is the conceptual construction, “Mean Green Meme.” I would suggest that the issue of “differentiation” between Green and Yellow is adequately addressed through the fact that they have been given different terms—namely, Green and Yellow. The prefix “mean,” on the other hand, has a strong emotive quality which is in the same ball park as “visceral rejection.”

Regarding your comment, “And then, as you note, she questions whether yellow even exists”—to what exactly are you referring here? As with the rest of your paragraph here, it is difficult to engage with what you’re saying if you don’t reference with clarity.

Regarding your next point—“But maybe the MGM propone[n]ts are beyond even Yellow, where the mission to uplift others arises again”—this would appear to be a plausible hypothesis. Could you refer to specific research which might support such an idea?

Green and Red

Regarding your next point, you refer to Green and Red being found together. You mention the contexts of (a) protests, and (b) meetings between Ken Kesey and The Grateful Dead. I note or inquire into the following:

1. There seems to be an implication in your comments that the Red vMeme is necessarily destructive. In what way would this be giving a balanced view of the Red value-Meme?
2. Both contexts you cite are occasions where different individuals come together rather than references to that which may be identified as operating within individuals.
3. Your anecdotes begin to describe characteristics of these contexts (such as Red and Green vMemes being attractors here). The anecdotes do not, however, directly address the identification of vMemes themselves. In other words, your object of inquiry is “protest.” A discussion could then explore characterisations of protests, such as whether protests were “mean.” But why should such a situation directly alter the identification of the values of a vMeme, such as is indicated by the MGM tag?
4. If you can justify altering the identification of a vMeme, then why should such contexts affect the identification of only the Green vMeme, and not the other vMemes that operate as attractors here or in other contexts?
5. How might such contexts be adequately differentiated from analogous contexts where two or more vMemes might be identified as attractors—such as (a) Green and Orange together in the context of environmentally-friendly businesses? (b) Green and Blue together in occasions of environmental law enforcement?

I hope you find the above relevant to your inquiry and useful food for thought.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://gary-ph.gaia.com — Sat, 21 Jul 2007 22:53:57 GMT

Thank you those who have furthered discussion of my article. Let me respond to you individually in the following string of posts.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://brucealderman.gaia.com — Thu, 12 Jul 2007 19:42:12 GMT

Gary, I have been intending to respond to you and got sidetracked in several other discussions. I'm writing to you today just to let you know that I've passed your article on to faculty members at JFKU. I was speaking with several the other day and we were talking about the need for a positive approach to the gifts of postmodernism within the Integral and Holistic studies programs there, and I mentioned your article to them. They were interested, so I have passed on the link.

Best wishes,

Bruce

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://ma-rig-pa.gaia.com — Mon, 09 Jul 2007 22:22:15 GMT

Hi theurj,

I’m enjoying your line of enquiry, with the questions you’re asking and the suggestions you’re advancing, and I’m appreciating the insights I’m gaining into pomo thought – just reading up on khora on this Wiki page was illuminating enough in itself. I can see that khora as a concept has much in common with the concept of the ‘openness’ of Emptiness that allows any ‘object’ to arise within it. (I’m giving Emptiness aka Voidness a capital letter to signify I’m referring to that as distinguished in Madhyamaka Prasangika philosophy. For a comprehensive explanation of the differences between non-Prasangika and Prasangika logic read here, and for an extremely comprehensive analysis of "Mind and Reality" within Tibetan Buddhism have a look here.)

But one thing’s been missing so far in this discussion, and that's an acknowledgment that distinguishing conceptually what khora or Emptiness may be is one thing, but ‘realising’ Emptiness is another thing. So what does it mean, to ‘realise’ Emptiness?

First, the lack of inherent existence of an object, or the 'self' (and I would need to be persuaded that this wouldn't also apply to any perspective of the self, regardless of structural level), is negated using "the Five Great Madhyamaka Lines of Reasoning". The end result of employing these lines of reasoning is to produce what is called "a mere vacuity", (an absence of any conceptual image or idea of said object, or self), which is itself a conceptual image of emptiness or voidness. Only then does one enter into equipoise meditation on this conceptual image, resting on this during the meditation session. This process is repeated session after session after session, maybe year after year, until at some point it is possible for what is described as " the wisdom mind of Emptiness" to develop and arise. Acquiring this 'wisdom mind' that has direct knowledge of Emptiness, (there is no longer a conceptual image of emptiness) is what is meant by 'realising' Emptiness, and the significance of this is that ones mental consciousness no longer 'grasps' at objects or self as existing inherently. As might be allowed, this is quite different from having a conceptual understanding of khora or emptiness.

As regards the "new reason of “positive”, avantgardistic post-modernity [saying]: “Think and observe your thinking at the same time.”", this seems, on the surface at least, to be no different to what Bruce has already referred to, namely the presence of mindfulness as in vipassana. And yes, one can have a very clear, calm, relaxed mindfulness of ones thinking, of what one is thinking as one is thinking it, and this can be experienced as a kind of 'witness' (I'm not using the capital letter here because I don't want to confuse the issue).

However, being in the presence of, or present to, mindfulness regardless of how calm or clear is very different to being in the presence of "primordial awareness" or rigpa -- at least according to the Dzogchen teaching, which not only distinguishes clearly between 'ordinary' mind (sems) and 'nature of mind' (rigpa), but offers many different ru shan practices that very precisely separate 'nature of mind' from mind, in such a way that one can practice relaxing into the presence of this 'nature of mind'. One name in the Dzogchen teaching for this latter practice is 'contemplation'.

You might choose to argue that this so called 'nature of mind' is nothing other than the basic awareness of the "conscious self (aka ego)" as you described it, but a careful examination of the Dzogchen teaching could persuade you otherwise. There are three main series in the Dzogchen teaching, one of which is Semde, which simply put uses the 'ordinary' mind to discover 'nature of mind'; and then through the practice of contemplation one not only develops ones capacity to deepen into 'nature of mind', but in the between-meditation-session period one practices 'integrating' ones "three existences" into ones presence of 'nature of mind' -- in other words, one practices bodily movement, speaking and thinking in such a way and to the extent that one isn't distracted from this presence of 'nature of mind'. 'Integrating' bodily movement is the least difficult of the three, while 'integrating' ones thought processes (in other words not being distracted from ones presence of 'nature of mind' whilst thinking) is the most difficult to accomplish.

Again, as regards whether this 'nature of mind' is anything other than the basic awareness of the "conscious self (aka ego)", readily available to all (and I'm not trying, let alone expecting, to persuade you that it is different) clearly this is open to debate -- as is evidenced by the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism disputing that 'nature of mind' (rigpa) is anything other than ordinary consciousness, defined as being "clear, formless and cognizing". However, I would point to the fact that the Dzogchen teaching is primarily practice-based, that there is a huge wealth of guidance and advice on how to practice and how to ascertain whether one is practising and/or developing correctly. That aside, I'm aware that even if one asserts that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, someone else could just as easily assert that said proof is potentially fallacious or deluded. I just wanted to offer my thoughts.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://theurj.gaia.com — Sat, 07 Jul 2007 19:59:26 GMT

So all I'm suggesting is that the modern psychological understanding of the personal, constructed, vertical self is something new, and this lack of understanding flavored the Buddhist deconstruction of a horizontal self, because the "self" means two different things here. In the former case it is essential to normal, healthy functioning; in the latter it is an impediment to "enlightenment." Perhaps it is, as you say, not so simple as a dichotomy of horizontal/vertical, state/stage. They obviously have to be related and why Ken ties to do so with his lattice, but as to how they are related still leaves a lot of open questions. In any event, the advantage the pomoers have is an embeddedness, sometimes unconscious but more often conscious, of this cultural ego dynamics and hence interpreted such things as emptiness or nonduality differently than the traditions. (E.g., they didn't even call them by such terms.) Plus I'm wondering if it is not so much a higher vertical level interpreting just a gross state but also a reinterpretation of the subtle and causal states as well. (But again they are not called as such.) The latter of which seems to include some of the more "transpersonal" notions I've mentioned elsewhere that see the "trans" personal as a U-turn into experiencing the sub- and unconsciouss from the vertical vantage-point of a "conscious self (aka ego)." In that sense it is akin to saying that we remain conscious in dream and deep sleep, but again in different terminology in a different context. Again I must emphasize that I don't have this worked out in a general theory of everything. These are just questions that arise for me in studying such theories.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://brucealderman.gaia.com — Sat, 07 Jul 2007 16:59:35 GMT

That's a big subject, but one distinction I might draw is between the horizontal deconstruction of the self and the vertical construction of the self. That's really simplistic, and I'm not sure I'm comfortable with it, but what I mean is this: Buddhism demonstrates that the self has no inherent existence and is a dependently arisen phenomenon in a field of equally empty "objects." The self is mere appearance upon which we impute inherent existence. Freud (and those after him) have made it clear that the self is a product of time -- a temporal unfolding of structures, all of which are "constructed," yes, but not all of which are equal. The psychoanalytic (and larger psychological) tradition has demonstrated that the "appearance" of the self has an order to it -- one which is essential to a certain level of healthy functioning (without which the liberative project would not get off the ground), and which can be compromised at various stages of its development.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://theurj.gaia.com — Sat, 07 Jul 2007 16:37:15 GMT

I'd agree Bruce that Buddhism generally deconstructs any metaphysical pretention to a "self." But perhaps to get at the distinction I'm trying to make I need to ask a few questions. Would you agree that Freud et al made some discoveries that were not included in the Buddhist canon? I seem to recall Ken saying something to the effect that we must integrate Freud and Buddha, that the former was clearer on the personal developmental leg of the journey (aka "the self") and the latter the transpersonal. (Sorry, can't find a citation at the moment.) So what did the former elucidate that the latter did not?

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://brucealderman.gaia.com — Sat, 07 Jul 2007 15:41:20 GMT

I don't regard it as heresy to argue that Buddhism is not the be-all and end-all of enlightenment projects, nor to suggest that there are ways to come to liberating insights and transformation of the self outside of traditional Buddhist/contemplative contexts. But not knowing the sources you're drawing from well enough (I haven't read Benedikter, nor am I familiar with the pomo sources he draws on), I am really not able to follow what you're saying. I would suggest, however, that your characterization of the Buddhist understanding of ego and "buddhanature," by contrast to the pomo one, is not accurate. Buddhists have explored the question of the "inherent self-existence" of any abiding entity or "thing" or "mind" with great subtlety and detail, and have dismissed notions such as a timeless "Witness" or an eternally abiding metaphysical entity such as the atman or Self.

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://theurj.gaia.com — Sat, 07 Jul 2007 14:59:59 GMT

Bruce said: "I'm not sure how many postmodernists actually aim at this..."

Perhaps they don't aim at it at all. Perhaps that's one of the points, that to even frame pomo discoveries in these terms assumes an "eastern, meditative" bias. As if the latter is THE answer to the issue of "states." It's akin to claiming that Derrida is limited to a linguistic analysis in the gross state, assuming the meditative-state context as the fnal word on the issue. Whereas such states of consciousness might, indeed do, have very different contextual meanings in pomo. And that such states are "not it," it being what many pomoers like Derrida aptly call khora or emptiness. States apparently have nothing to do with the latter, or even what many Madhyamikans call the nondual.

Also note how Benedikter calles what the pomos are doing a "psychoanalysis of the ego." This leads to my earlier contention (maybe in the Indigo Buddhist thread?) that pomo reframes what might be termed the Witness as simply the very nature of the ego as a self-reflexive "being." Perhaps it's not a "double-I" at all. Perhaps that's the only way Benedickter can frame it within his "meditative" bias. Perhaps it's just the ego itself, by its very nature, that can reflect on mind and body but not see itself. And perhaps modern and pomo conceptions of it via the relatively recent discovery of psychodynamics frame it in a developmentally more accurate way than the "traditional" meditative disciplines? And the kicker: perhaps it doesn't take any training at all to have this "realization." Perhaps it is inherent in the structure of the ego to begin with, thus appearing like a mysterious, metaphysical "given" to a pre-psychdynamics worldview.

Heresy, I know. Please forgive me Father for I know not what I do...

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://brucealderman.gaia.com — Sat, 07 Jul 2007 01:49:43 GMT

Hi, Edward,

This is interesting. I'm not sure how many postmodernists actually aim at this, but I wouldn't be surprised if some do. But while this differs from the West's "first" Enlightenment, it doesn't (appear to) differ from, say, the Buddhist approach, which emphasizes mindfulness of the system of body, emotion, and thought.

The WC lattice may give the impression that contemplative traditions are mainly about "state training," but that's too simplistic a view, in my opinion (and I am sure Wilber would agree). For instance, while the Buddha trained deeply in accessing ever-deeper states, one of his discoveries (as you will learn in most vipassana retreats) is that a moderate level of "absorption" -- a state in which the mind is concentrated, calm, and clear, but not so deep that contact with the world of ordinary phenomena is lost -- is more useful on the path to "enlightenment" than the deep, formless states (the higher jhanas). Buddhist training involves accessing and familiarizing yourself with both, but vipassana -- insight meditation -- depends on turning one's concentrated awareness on the arising of thought from moment to moment.

So, if some postmodernists are doing this in their own way, then no, they do not necessarily need to engage in the traditional Buddhist or Hindu (or whatever) methods of state training. But they will nevertheless be doing something quite similar to what these schools also do in their programs of awakening. With an important difference being that Buddhists recognize state training as useful in being able to stabilize and deepen awareness of thinking while thinking.

Best wishes,

Bruce

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://theurj.gaia.com — Sat, 07 Jul 2007 00:52:47 GMT

For example, this is from Benedikter's "Postmodern Spirituality Part IV" at Integral World, as quoted in the Open Integral thread "Postmodern/Postmetaphysical Spirituality":

II: THE HIDDEN GOAL OF LATE POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY: OBSERVING YOUR OWN THOUGHTS IN THE MOMENT THEY ARE HAPPENING

RB: Ok. Let's first resume shortly, what we saw so far. We saw: Postmodernism (or postmodern philosophy, to be more accurate) tries to teach you something that is, in many aspects, part of a second or avantgardistic wave of enlightenment. It tries to transform the traditional diachronic enlightenment into a synchronic enlightenment. The reason developed by modernity said: "First think, and then observe. Look back, what you thought, and you will see, what it really was. To see, what it was, is possible always only afterwards." With other words: The howl of Minerva is always late (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel). But the new reason of "positive", avantgardistic post-modernity says: "Think and observe your thinking at the same time." Or as Derrida put it a dialogue done from his living room in Paris at my presence: "I watch tv, and at the same time I watch myself watching tv". That synchronicity indeed is the postmodern mind at its highest level.

Question: That is deconstruction at the synchronistic level.

RB. Yes. Please keep in mind: If I speak of synchronicity in thinking and in (auto-)observing the thinking, then I speak of the ego which is observed synchronically by the witness. There are still few who can practice this. I speak, of course, of postmodernism on its potentially highest level.

Question: Yes.

RB: One of the core methodologies of postmodern didactics and paedagogics seems to be: Deconstruction wants to teach you how to observe the rising of your own reason, the origin of your own thoughts in the very moment when these thoughts are produced. (Cf. Jacques Derrida: Letter to a Japanese Friend, in: Wood & Bernasconi (ed.): Derrida and Difference. Warwick: Parousia Press 1985, pp. 1-5; Jacques Derrida: Qu'est-ce que la déconstruction?, in: Le Monde, Mardi, 12 octobre 2004, pp. III.) Even if it remains half conscious, the ultimate goal of the best parts of postmodernity is to transform the enlightenment of the first wave, as we knew it from Immanuel Kant, into an enlightenment of a second wave. Kant said: "Always first think, use our thought and when it is over, you can and must look back and see critically what it was." (Cf. Jean Francois Lyotard: Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime: Kant's Critique of Judgment, Sections 23-29. Stanford University Press 1994; cf. Jacques Lacan: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 11. W. W. Norton & Company 1998; Jacques Lacan: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. W. W. Norton & Company; Reprint edition 1997; Slavoj Zizek: Tarrying With the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Duke University Press 1993). This was the "first wave" of enlightenment. What postmodernism is trying to teach us instead, is: "Give us a second enlightenment which is synchronistic! That means: Try to observe what and how you're thinking in the very moment you're doing it. Be self-conscious in every moment of your life! Be a double ‘I', a double consciousness always - and rationally!" So this is, to a certain extent, a more evolved approach of the same basic characteristics of modernity. It is a second wave of modernity. A more evolved approach, as you can see, but also a more difficult and dangerous, of course. I agree that postmodernity was against a certain form of reason, a certain form of modernity. But this is not the main point. Because at the same time, Postmodernity had many things in common with modernity. In the end, the leading postmodern thinkers just wanted to make one step further. Beside all the provocations, besides the sometimes useless intellectual battles and the many misunderstandings. They basically wanted to proceed from diachronic to synchronic enlightenment - by the means of a "philosophical psychoanalysis of the ego".

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://theurj.gaia.com — Fri, 06 Jul 2007 22:02:39 GMT

Gary,

See what Ken says below regarding Derrida and Buddhist Emptiness. Then see following that an inquiry in another Zaadz/II thread, Indigo Buddhism. Could you respond to this in light of your reference to Benedikter on how Derrida might indeed touch on more than just "the limitation of language in the waking state?" And do you have any insights into my other questions at the end?

From On Critics etc.:

Shambhala: Okay, we'll come back to that. But what's wrong with finding parallels between, say, a certain type of Derridaean deconstruction and Buddhist Emptiness or the Madhymaka school?

KW: There's nothing wrong with it, as long as you keep certain profound differences in mind. The basic aim of deconstruction is to work with language, and while in the waking state or gross realm, attempt to come to a certain type of understanding about the ambiguity, instability, and paradoxicality of signifiers. The aim of Buddhist meditation is to strengthen consciousness so that it can give bare attention to all the phenomena that arise in the waking state AND the dream state AND the deep sleepless state, so that one awakens to an all-pervading consciousness or Buddhamind that is present in all three states--waking, dreaming, sleeping--and thus gain a great liberation from all transient states of being, high or low, sacred or profane.

Shambhala: Once you put it that way, there seems little in common.

KW: There is very little in common. All they share is a certain number of similarities about the limitations of language in the waking state. I find those similarities suggestive and useful, and I have written about that (e.g., in endnotes for SES). But if one merely stays with deconstruction, then one will not take up the arduous practice of yoga, of zen, of meditation, which will transform consciousness beyond the verbal mind altogether--in fact, beyond waking, dreaming, and sleeping, which is something deconstruction not only cannot do, but does not even imagine is possible. But until you are pursuing a yoga in which you remain conscious through the waking state, the dream state, and the deep sleep state, then you are merely identified with the superficial, surface, waking state, and you manipulate linguistic signifiers in that state and imagine that this "deconstruction" is somehow deconstructing samsara, whereas it is merely manipulating a rather surface consciousness and not getting into the deep causes of suffering, such as the attachment to the waking state itself. Deconstruction is something the ego does in the waking state in order to hold onto the ego.

Re: Indigo Buddhism?

theurj said Today, 12:28 PM:

I said above on 6/25/07 at 7:14 pm:

And one last point for now: What if the ultimate "state" of nonduality, which is not a state or a stage, has nothing whatsoever to do with subtle and causal meditation techniques or interpretations? What if the nondual is our natural condition, like primordial awareness, and that we have to "regain" it instead of develop or "practice" into it? What if the nondual is not part of the state-stage developmental scheme at all? It seems the only "research" to that effect, the one Ken quotes all the time, is from something he co-wrote with Brown* and which obviously had its own research agenda based on what? Ken's model...

Balder said 6/26 at 9:33 am

Concerning the question of whether nonduality might not be a "state" or stage at all, but a natural condition which must be regained rather than achieved or created, I actually think that IS Ken's position. It certainly is the position of Dzogchen. Dzogchen does teach practices, but it calls them non-practices precisely for the reason you point out: there is nothing to achieve. "Practicing into" primordial awareness is an exercise in recognition, not in generating some new evolutionary stage.

* * *

Given the above, is it necessary to study/practice meditation (Buddhist or otherwide) and/or go through state-stage developmental training (subtle, causal) to arrive at a stable nondual realization? Is it possible that one can "recognize" our primordial awareness and/or emptiness via other modern or postmodern study/practice? And are the latter only confined to the gross state?

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://kessels.gaia.com — Thu, 05 Jul 2007 10:29:26 GMT

Hi Gary,

It's very cool to see you joining us in this discussion. Thanks for the extended and detail reply to my concerns. Since there are many different topics, I'm going to address them over multiple posts. In order to follow the pleasant tone of discussion that you initiated, I'd like to explain what my position is here. I'm not trying to defend Wilber or AQAL, nor is it my intention to bash your article. Like I said, I sympathize with one of the main goals of the article, which is to correct an imbalanced view on postmodernism that some people are sporting.

Let's start with what you called "contrasting".

My point about you positioning yourself opposite from Wilber was indeed about specific points; you made it clear that you agree with the overall framework. The points that you are trying to make, however, don't seem to be opposite to Wilber's view at all, at least not to me. One of my problems is that you paint a picture in your article in which Wilber's stance to postmodernism is mostly negative. I don't think this is a fair representation of his position.

I want to start with the description of Wilber's Green altitude (not vMeme, but we'll get to that later):

Green (worldcentric—able to take a 4th-person perspective): Green worldviews are marked by pluralism, or the ability to see that there are multiple ways of seeing reality. If orange sees universal truths ("All men are created equal"), green sees multiple universal truths—different ones for different cultures. Green ethics continue, and radically broaden, the movement to embrace all people. A green statement might read, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all people are created equal, regardless of race, gender, class...." Green ethics have given birth to the civil rights, feminist, and gay rights movements, as well as environmentalism.

The green worldview's multiple perspectives give it room for greater compassion, idealism, and involvement, in its healthy form. Such qualities are seen by organizations such as the Sierra Club, Amnesty International, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Doctors Without Borders. In its unhealthy form green worldviews can lead to extreme relativism, where all beliefs are seen as relative and equally true, which can in turn lead to the nihilism, narcissism, irony, and meaninglessness exhibited by many of today's intellectuals, academics, and trend-setters.... Not to mention another "lost" generation in students.

To me, this is in contrast to the quotes you use in your article, which are almost exclusively negative towards Green. I wonder why you did this?

I think that The Marriage of Sense and Soul contains some of Wilber's most balanced writings on postmodernism, and he discusses both positive and negative aspects of postmodernism at length.

Maybe it was unintentional, but you make it look like Wilber equates Green and MGM, which is clearly not the case. The MGM is a pathological form of Green, and not all of Green is pathological. You also say that Wilber often refers to postmodernism as "extreme postmodernism", while he uses the term "extreme postmodernism" to denote only those parts of postmodernism he doesn't agree with: postmodernist truths taken to their extremes, which means partial truths being absolutized. Since you do these kind of things consistently in your article, you're making Wilber look like the arch enemy of postmodernism, which he isn't.

If you want to point out the strengths of postmodernism to an integral audience, I think you'd be building a much stronger case by pointing out that AQAL already contains a number of postmodern truths, and that Wilber has lots of positive things to say about it. It is absolutely true that Wilber has emphasized the MGM a lot, and that that may have contributed to a negative view some people now have of Green in general, but do you really think this is best remedied by emphasizing Wilber's points yet again?

This brings us to the next topic. You said: If Wilber has already included “lots” of postmodern truths, I contend that he has not sufficiently explicated what these might be. My analysis, instead, indicates that he tends to reflexively focus on the one “postmodern truth” of pluralism-relativism. It indicates the way Wilber has not adequately addressed the “postmodern truths” of dialectics, complex-awareness, or linguistic-awareness, for example.

What is particularly postmodern (Green) about dialectics? And why do you think that AQAL isn't dialectic?

There is a detailed discussion on the postmodern view on linguistics in The Marriage of Sense and Soul, to give just one example. Could it be that you just missed it? I really think you need to balance your article with what Wilber writes in that particular book, as it is in substantial agreement with your point of view, it seems. Awareness of complexity is also discussed there, as it is in other sources, I believe. Maybe you could have a look at it?

I'm looking forward to discuss these and other points further.

Peter

Re: Is Ken right on Derrida?

http://brucealderman.gaia.com — Thu, 05 Jul 2007 00:03:59 GMT

Gary, I want to thank you personally for your excellent article and for joining us here in this discussion. I plan to return to your post to me soon, and may have some questions for you at that time.

But for now, I just want to say that I believe your article may have helped me get a recent teaching position! In an interview for a faculty position at a local university, I mentioned your essay and one of the arguments in it when I was asked about my understanding of Integral / postmodern dynamics (and the tension between them). The interviewer was satisfied with my answer, and glad that I was not willing to just take a default position in favor of Integral over caricatures of postmodernism as the MGM (as if that were fully representative of the nature and scope of postmodernism).

Best wishes,

B.