Aestheticized Buddhism

Insomnia again led me to seek out and find an unexpected jewel in the internether. This excerpt contains so many of the themes we’ve explored as to be uncanny, even a metaphysical message directly from Buddha in the astral plane. Yes, I’m still half-asleep and delirious, but check this out. Despite the free Google book preview that stopped at a key point that I’m just dying to know how it finishes. Guess I’ll have to buy the book. But Google knew that, insidious bastards. From Buddhist Theology by John J. Makransky and Roger Jackson (Routledge,2000):

At this point, nine years after taking refuge, my belief in the basics of the Buddhist worldview—of those metaphysical doctrines I had first imbibed at Kopan, and sought for a decade to comprehend—had almost completed evaporated. Logically, I should have stopped being a Buddhist. But I did not. I reached the end of my long skeptical inquiry and found that my sense of “being Buddhist” was nearly as strong as ever. How could this be? Shouldn’t my painful awakening from religious dogmaticism spelled the end of my relation to Buddhism? That it did not is due, I believe, to at least three separate factors, which may not be entirely idiosyncratic to my own personal history.

First, while over the course of time my confidence in the literal accuracy of metaphysical Buddhist claims weakened, other aspects of Buddhist doctrine and practice continued to seem irrefutable. In particular, I still found utterly compelling, and endlessly fruitful, (a) the central Mahayana philosophical claim that all entities and concepts are empty of self-existence because they are dependently originated; (b) the basic Mahayana ethical injunction, that one ought to be a compassionate bodhisattva, working as much as possible for the benefit of others, and; (c) the basic Buddhist claim that meditation—whether concentrative or analytical, complex or formless—is the best tool yet developed for disciplining one’s mind, hence of altering one’s way of seeing the world and living within it. All three of these perspectives, it seemed to me, were valuable quite independently of whether there are or are not multiple lives, does or does not exist a universal karmic law, is or is not a transcendent perfection like that ascribed to buddhas. In certain respects, to focus of emptiness, compassion and meditation, while letting Buddhist metaphysics go, is to make a move very much like that chosen by many Christians in the last two centuries: demythologizing one’s tradition, and selecting from it certain doctrines that, whether or not they can be upheld in a traditional manner, seemed existentially meaningful and useful, regardless of one’s historical or cultural situation. The advantages of such a demythologized, bare-bones Buddhism is that is allows one to preserve a core set of Buddhist beliefs and practices without having to subject oneself to the cognitive dissonance involved in trying to subscribe to “medieval” beliefs while living in a world shape by modernity; its disadvantage is that it threatens to deprive Buddhism of the majesty of its vision, the mystery of its great narratives, the resonance of its art and rituals. Indeed, bare-bones Buddhism has little to differentiate it from secular humanism; one may as well read Camus as the Dhammapada.

There was, however, a second, crucial dimension to my sense of being Buddhist in a post-metaphysical mode, which put some flesh back on those bare doctrinal bones. Not only had my confidence in certain key perspectives survived my skeptical inquiry, but so too had my “feel” for the myths, symbols and metaphors, the sights, sounds and sensations of Buddhism. Subtly, inexorably, years of exposure to and internalization of these “aesthetic” aspects of the tradition had brought me to a point where they became the most powerful, single lens though which I viewed the world, a paradigm to which I had grown so accustomed that it seemed to form an a priori condition for much of my experience. So, my confidence in emptiness, compassion and meditation was not deprived of its rich, surrounding context; indeed, such doctrines and practices were for me quite inseparable from the scent of juniper incense on a cold morning, the sense or rightness I felt when prostrating to an image or circumambulating a stupa, the shiver sent through me by the very word shunyata, the sweet possibilities conjured by certain ritual songs, the mystery contained in the smile of a Buddha statue from Borobudur. Nor, despite my skepticism, did I separate those basic doctrines from the rich vision and language of traditional Buddhist metaphysics: I still could recite the Buddha’s life-story, Mara and all, though I knew it bore little relation to what historians accept; could praise enlightened beings for qualities I doubted they, or anyone, literally could possess; could vow to liberate sentient beings in future lives I was not certain they would experience; could contemplate as primordially pure a mind I was not convinced was more than a byproduct of the brain. This “aestheticized” but non-metaphysical Buddhism has an advantage over the demythologized version of thoroughly engaging not just the intellect but all of one’s imaginative and sensory powers, thereby providing a fuller context and greater incentives for belief and practice. It is possible, on the other hand, to interpret such an aestheticized Buddhism as a mere exercise in nostalgia and self-delusion, a predictable by-product of the perpetual human need to create a vision, with reinforcing experiences, that will help make sense of a chaotic world. On such a view, an aestheticized and non-metaphysical Buddhism is the result of a cowardly compromise, in which one has the courage neither to accept traditional metaphysics in the face of modern doubts, nor to rest satisfied merely with those doctrines that stand up to the rigorous empirical and logical tests to which they, like all truth-claims, must be subjected.

The inadequacy of this critique of an aestheticized Buddhism lies, I believe, in a third factor of which I had become aware by the time I had finished my dissertation: the postmodernist discovery of (a) the impossibility of determining finally the “truth” of any particular worldview or vision, whether traditional or modern and (b) the inadequacy of defining religion on the basis of primarily core metaphysical doctrines, or determining the meaningfulness of a religion on the basis of the “correspondence to reality” of those metaphysical doctrines (223 – 5).

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Hi theurj,

Thanks for coming up with this. Yes, it is rather uncanny… reading the excerpt was like reading someone else articulating half-formed thoughts of my own. I'm also looking forward to finding out how he continues on page 226 (I'm afraid my thoughts on how it might continue are not even 1/4 formed) so I do hope you get the book ;-)

Lol

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Hi, Edward, this is an excellent find.  I'm interested in reading it too.  (I just checked the JFK library, but they don't have it.)

I did notice, in your (bleary-eyed?) transcription of the above passage, you left out a parenthetical reference by the author.  When he referred to the advantages of an aestheticized Buddhism over one that is simply de-mythologized, he said, “see Guenther, Trungpa.”  Given our recent conversations, I wanted to highlight that.  :-)

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Yes, this is a good find.

I think we can distinguish between modern Buddhists who subscribe to “an aetheticized and non-metaphysical Buddhism” and those who do not. There are modern Buddhists who make truth claims that they clearly intend to “correspond to reality” (e.g., Alan Wallace).

I also think we can distinguish between critiques of the truth claims of the latter and critiques that are rooted in misunderstanding of the religious discourse of the former.

There is a slippery move I've become wary of that goes something like this: Someone makes a religious or spiritual truth claim and it's obvious that they intend for the claim to “correspond to reality.” In other words, it's obvious that they are speaking factually rather than grammatically in a Wittgensteinian sense which I'll elaborate on below with a quote.

But when their truth claim is challenged, they assert “the impossibility of determining finally the 'truth' of any particular worldview or vision, whether traditional or modern.”

Here's a passage from an essay by Robert Arrington in the book Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion that addresses the confusing of “grammatical” religious statements with “factual” ones.


If believers try to prove the existence of God by appeal to the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, this would seem to imply that they think the belief in God's existence needs proof–and indeed that such proof can be provided.


In response, I think it is fair to say that most of the believers who do appeal to these arguments are of a philosophical bent, and this rules out most believers. Wittgentstein would not be impressed with the reactions of the philosophers and would-be philosophers, since he would see their philosophy as a source of disctraction and confusion. With regard to religious discourse, the philosophers themselves, or at least Anselm and Aquinas, would be held responsible by Wittgenstein for much of the confusion that surrounds the question of the existence of God. These 'metaphysical' theologians would be guilty in his eyes of the same confusion he attributes to metaphysicians in general, namely that of confusing conceptual and factual inquiries. Indeed, these two medieval thinkers might stand as paradigm cases of metaphysicians who confuse grammatical statements with factual ones. 'God exists,' which should be construed as a grammatical remark, might be confusedly taken (and is so taken by these medievals) as asserting a matter of fact–and then one wants some support for it, some proof that it is true. Anselm and Aquinas oblige and offer their proofs. But the very project is wrong-headed if 'God exists and is the creator of the world' is a grammatical rather than a factual claim.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Jim, that's a good point.  I'm curious to see where Jackson goes with his discussion of the “third factor.”  I would hope he avoids the problem you are highlighting, but we'll have to see…

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

I just checked amazon.com and the book is $55 new and about $47 used! So much for that purchase. I did the next best thing and emailed Dr. Jackson, the author of that chapter, to see if it was online somewhere. He said it wasn't but that he'd scan and send it to me in the next few days. When I get it I'll let y'all know and you can email me for a copy.

As to grammatical v. factual statements, given the article's points so far, and using pomo as the 3rd point, I don't see how he'd end up confusing an aesthetic  with a factual approach. We'll see.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Hi Edward,


As to grammatical v. factual statements, given the article's points so far, and using pomo as the 3rd point, I don't see how he'd end up confusing an aesthetic  with a factual approach. We'll see.


I wasn't thinking that Dr. Jackson might end up confusing aesthetic language with factual language.


He says: This “aestheticized” but non-metaphysical Buddhism has an advantage over the demythologized version of thoroughly engaging not just the intellect but all of one’s imaginative and sensory powers, thereby providing a fuller context and greater incentives for belief and practice.


The advantage to which Dr. Jackson refers is relative to the practitioner. Stephen Batchelor's version of Buddhism is demythologized, but it certainly doesn't follow that it engages “just the intellect” and not imaginative and sensory powers. And maybe Dr. Jackson would agree. As you say, we'll see.

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True, it probably depends more on one's preferences and prejudices. And it would seem those for Jackson are to keep the traditional forms. And of course his prejudice might come across as promoting his version as advantageous to the “simply” demythologized version. We all subtly make such judgments about our preferences.

I'm reminded of trying out a Unitarian Church years ago because I was fed up with the bullshit metaphysical mumbo jumbo of traditional Christian religion. But when I sat in the church the decor was bland and practically bare: no crosses, no icons, no drapery, no stained glass, hardly anything. And I remember thinking it just didn't feel like a church without all the mumbo jumbo. Then I went to the Catholic Apostolic Church of Antioch and there were all the symbols, robes, crosses, rituals, etc. But it was all interpreted figuratively and not literally. That was my church until I left Santa Fe.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Dr. Jackson emailed me the article, so if you want a copy email me at Gaia with your non-Gaia email address. 

Here’s another excerpt from pp. 225-7 that directly follows the previous one: 

If all worldviews or religious visions are understood to be complex human constructs, relative to particular cultural and historical circumstances and to people’s interactions with other people and the world around them, such views or visions begin less to resemble science, in the traditional sense of an objective description…and more to resemble art, as a selective and creative interpretation of human experience…. Thus, to be a Buddhist may be as reasonable as to be Christian or a secular humanist, for each of these is simply an aesthetic, an imaginative and effective way of organizing one’s life and thought. One may tell the stories one enjoys, sing the songs that move one, perform the acts that seem required, and even proclaim the doctrines that seem to reflect one’s sense of the true. One may, in fact, do, think, ans say all the things that traditionally religious people have done…as long as one does not fall into the trap of believing that one’s commitment is anything more than a strong aesthetic preference: a celebration of possibility, perhaps even probability, but never of absolute certainty. 

The advantage of this approach to “being Buddhist” is that it permits a contemporary person to participate unapologetically and conscientiously in the full range of the tradition’s dimensions…. The disadvantages…are that it (a) denies the very essence of religiousness, which is an absolute conviction in a total explanation of the cosmos and (b) succumbs too readily to a postmodern relativism that is philosophically self-contradictory and subversive of all notions of progress in the attainment of truth. These are serious concerns, which do not admit of simple replies. The essence of religiousness is quite difficult to separate from a sense of absolute conviction…yet I would argue that such a definition is quite limited, shaped as it is by  post-Enlightenment Western philosophical concerns with the rationality in all matters, and failing as it does to account for the richer, more complex and “aesthetic” ways in which humans…actually experience and express religiousness. The eschewal of absolute truth…does open the door to a certain degree of relativism, but I would urge that the relativism is not thoroughgoing, precisely because various religious and ideological communities…create a natural system of “checks and balances” whereby their assertions are counterpoised both to one another and to the powerfully consensual assertions of both science and common sense—a process that leads to the provisional acceptance of certain truth claims as…”relatively adequate.” Can I, or any Buddhist, live comfortably with the sense that his or her tradition may be “only” relatively adequate?… The question is not easily answered, but I want to suggest, through the following exploration of the Buddhist metaphor of the middle, that the tradition itself provides grounds for thinking so.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

I think Dr. Jackson hits the nail on the head here:


Thus, to be a Buddhist may be as reasonable as to be Christian or a secular humanist, for each of these is simply an aesthetic, an imaginative and effective way of organizing one’s life and thought. One may tell the stories one enjoys, sing the songs that move one, perform the acts that seem required, and even proclaim the doctrines that seem to reflect one’s sense of the true. One may, in fact, do, think, ans [sic] say all the things that traditionally religious people have done…as long as one does not fall into the trap of believing that one’s commitment is anything more than a strong aesthetic preference: a celebration of possibility, perhaps even probability, but never of absolute certainty.



There's something here I'm confused about. When Dr. Jackson refers to assertions and commitments about which we can be absolutely certain about. It's pretty basic that the only assertions we can be absolutely certain about are the conclusions of deductive arguments and reasoning. Most of the arguments and most of the reasoning we encounter in everyday life is inductive, and induction at best gives gives us probable rather than conclusive support for the conclusions it leads to.


To say that a conclusion or assertion is probably true does not entail a commitment to relativism, does it? Dr. Jackson refers to “the provisional acceptance of certain truth claims as…relatively adequate.” Because the conclusions of inductive arguments are at best probably true, we cannot do other than to accept them provisionally.

Maybe this is all Dr. Jackson means by “a certain degree of relativism.” But what I'm confused about is why he calls it relativism at all.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Jim, would you like a copy of the complete article? It might answer your questions. I've yet to read it all myself so cannot speculate on how he might answer, or how I'd interpret his response. I will post more when I've read it.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

In the section following the last excerpt Jackson shows how different the various Buddhist schools were on even the most fundamental Buddhist concept, that of the middle. It exemplifies all over again the two truths debate, but there was not just Gorampa and Tsongkhapa but a plethora of views on what constituted the middle. Hence the various Buddhist schools were relative to each other and to particular times and circumstances, and this relativism is inescapable, something that pomo has come to accept. Hence each view is itself empty of a “true” essence and dependently originated. One view is only more relatively adequate to one's particular context and never more ultimately true.

How then does this equate to a progressive view that places one view as more relatively true than another in all contexts? To be continued…

Jackson:

“From a historical perspective, then, it becomes evident that the Buddhist middle is a constantly shifting locale, defined by the different ways in which theoreticians and practitioners have felt compelled to articulate the extremes that must be avoided or the qualities that must be combined. In short, the Buddhist middle turns out to [be] unfixed: it is simply the compromise between extremes or dualities as they have been defined in one circumstance or the other. This pattern would seem to suggest that, whatever the situation, a middle is always available, but that no particular version enjoys completely definitive status. How can we judge the tantric ethical middle superior or inferior to, more or less “truly Buddhist” that the middle evoked in the Buddha’s first sermon, or Nagarjuna’s definition of a philosophical middle better or worse than that of a Personalist or Yogacara? Each responded to a particular set of conditions and was based on idiosyncratic perceptions, which can perhaps be understood, evaluated to some degree, but never ultimately validated or invalidated, except in relation to our own contingent, conventional perspectives and purposes” (236).

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Hmmm. What happens to the distinction between “truly transformative” practices (like the yogic meditations of Tantra) and “merely translative” practices (like the analytic contemplation of Madhyamika)?

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Ah yes, there is a progression to all this relativism after all. Jackson says:

“This awareness of plurality does not, of course, always entail an acceptance of ambiguity—it is entirely possible to declare that, in spite of the plurality of cultures and perspectives around us, there still remain absolute truths, and that our own religion, or field of inquiry, or ideology provides the standard against which all others may be measured and judged” (216).
 
How then do we measure/judge this? Jackson notes that religious communities “create a natural system of checks and balances whereby their assertions are counterposed both to one another and to the powerfully consensual assertions of both science and common sense” (227). It seems that Jackson counterposes science and art here and elsewhere, where he says that religious “views or visions begin less the resemble science, in the traditional sense of an objective description of the human and natural world, and more to resemble art, as a selective and creative interpretation” (226). As if science, a much more “objective” endeavor, can anchor the aesthetic from being merely relative and idiosyncratic, when the insights of pomo call into question the very objectivity of science itself. Granted science, like art, might provide is with something that is relatively adequate and “works.” But it does not reveal a separate, objective and given world; it is itself a contextual enactment. And of course we all know that “powerfully consensual assertions” within any tradition does not “make it so” or make any definitive and ultimate statement beyond it’s own context, so I fail to see how either aspect of the “check and balances” grounds relativism.
 
Jackson then moves on to the Madhyamika v. tantra on p. 238 where he uses the notion of the “three turnings” to argue for a progressive or more relatively adequate view, each turn superseding yet incorporating the previous. Nonetheless, the earlier turning are appropriate to those not ready for the later turnings, and each is a necessary base to the next. Hence transformative tantra really is “higher” than merely translative Madhyamaka.
 
Then there is the argument that pomo can be accused of a performative contradiction by the traditionalists:
 
“What is more, the traditionalist might add ironically, to be postmodern one must be hermeneutically self- conscious enough to recognize that such modes in inquiry as cultural analysis, autobiography and historical survey are themselves historically conditioned developments, hence possibly subject to correction by other, more ‘relatively adequate” approaches to understanding and conducting human affairs—some of which, like trust in the sustaining and communicative power of ultimate reality or absorption in non-conceptual introspective states, might turn out to be deeply rooted in pre-modern traditions” (238). 
 
But the same argument Jackson uses in the 3 turnings can be applied here as well, in that pomo, in its transparancy and contingency, indeed sees itself as more relatively adequate and that its own view will be again replaced by one more so down the line. Hence pomo might be considered the 4th turning that supersedes the 3rd, knowing full well that it will be replaced by the 5th, etc. At least Jackson admits that ultimate reality identified with non-conceptual states is “deeply rooted in pre-modern traditions” and must be released.
 

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

I, personally, think that the “three turnings” structure is simply another lense for organizing history, that the latter turnings are “more adequate” only from the point of view of the latter turnings. The notion of “progress” here is relative. From the Madhyamika point of view, the latter turnings are regressions.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

I'd agree that the way tantra interprets the turnings is a way to serve its own meditative agenda. I'd also agree that it is a regression from the highly rational-analytic Madhyamikan deconstructive methodology. Yet tantra is also progressive in its regression, though not in the way it intends; it is progressive more along the lines I've been discussing in numerous threads, i.e., in going back to pre-rational, non-conceptual levels of being and integrating them within a rational framework. However the traditional rational framework is still pre-modern in many ways, still highly mixed with mythology. Hence there is still confusion on what the non-conceptual states mean, and even Jackson criticizes Buddhism for such interpretations. But the 4th turning of pomo, which aesthetizes the tradition, reinterprets such state-stages within our current culture and frame sans the ultimate certainties.

Now I don't think Jackson's version of an aesthetic Buddhism works either because it appears he thinks we can just continue to perform the rituals is the exact same formulas in which they were created but just reinterpret them. I doubt this works and to the contrary probably rather continues to reinforce and reenact the very mythical-rational belief structures that created them. Sure, keep ritual, song and meditation but in new forms that support a more pomo aesthetic. That will likely entail a radical upgrade and traditionalists might feel that it is no longer Buddhism, but it seems that's what needed for it to grow into this particular time and place.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

i'll have to read the article. i'll send my email address. interesting stuff, though.

Re: Aestheticized Buddhism

Thanks for offering to send the article; I just emailed you my non-Gaia email address so you can send me a copy.

I'm reminded of Stephen Batchelor's approach to Buddhism by some of what Jackson says. Also of Huntington in The Emptiness of Emptiness. But I'll wait till I read the article.