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Integral Post-metaphysical Spirituality

What paths lie ahead for religion and spirituality in the 21st Century?  How might the insights of modernity and post-modernity impact and inform humanity's ancient wisdom traditions?  How are we to enact, together, new spiritual visions – independently, or within our respective traditions – that can respond adequately to the challenges of our times?

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Discuss the works of visionary thinkers and practitioners who have contributed, or who are contributing, to the emergence of authentic integral / post-metaphysical spirituality.
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  Balder : Kosmonaut

David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 16, 9:25 AM:

 

I recently have begun reading The Opening of Vision, by David Michael Levin.  I am finding his work very relevant to my own explorations of post-metaphysical spirituality, touching on many of the themes we have explored in this group.  I first learned of his name from an essay in a TSK book; in it, he did an inter-textual study of TSK and Merleau-Ponty, juxtaposing various excerpts from both traditions to allow them to illuminate each other. 

In The Opening of Vision, which seems to me to advocate an open-ended visionary approach that is similar to the one Tarthang Tulku develops in TSK, Levin describes his method as phenomenological hermeneutics – a visionary wedding of both postmodern hermeneutical sensibility and phenomenological engagement with the emergent experiential field.  I appreciate this, and I was inspired by it to go out and find his book to give his ideas a fuller 'test drive.' 

In this thread, I will copy passages from this book, and others, that I think relate to our themes here, and will welcome any discussion.


~*~

“In the Seminar on Herakleitos, which he gave with Heidegger, Fink asserts that 'There is a constitutive distance between seeing and what is seen', and adds that this distance is 'in the unity of the overarching light that illuminates and makes visible'.  In the lighting and clearing of being, in the field of our visionary being, seer and seen are disclosed, not in any mystical union that would dissolve their individual identity, but rather in the integrity of an intertwining, deepening their original contact and expanding the existential meaning of their receiprocal presence.  This is, to be sure, a vision.  But a vision is always a task, a task of promise.

This task, as I conceive it, is, and must be, a radical one.  Now, 'radicality' is a term which, according to its etymology, designates a 'return' to the roots, the origin, the beginning.  But our method of reflection, a hermeneutical phenomology, ensures that this return will be doubly radical, because in attempting a 'return' to 'the' primordial ground, 'the' primordial unity (arche, nomos, logos) of subject and object, our thinking is radicalized even further, in that its phenomenological and hermeneutical character makes it unavoidably self-referential.  Thus, the return turns critical, deconstructive, like Foucault's archeology of knowledge and his genealogy of power: the return ends up undermining and subverting the necessity, the authority, the metaphysical legitimation of all perceptual structures – including the construct, or projection, of an absolute, and absolutely graspable, primordial unity.  The radicality of a hermeneutical return consists in the fact that the move by which we break out of the structure of subject and object situates us in the 'unity' of a field whose very nature compels us to recognize our relative positionality and acknowledge the elusiveness of any absolute unity.

The 'unity' of 'the ground' is the unity of a dynamic field of intertwining presences and absences: a field of luminous presences endlessly pointing beyond themselves into the invisible.  The 'unity' with which we are concerned, here, is only 'primordial' in a relative sense: it is a function of our present capacity to disentangle ourselves from an excessive and unnecessary identification with the prevailing construction of reality, the historical structure of ego and object.  The goal of our return is not a state of total fusion, or the attainment of the 'original' unity, in any case inconceivable, but rather our release from virtual confinement within the prevailing epistemological and ontological structures of experience: a release, by grace of the bountiful matrix of vision, the gift of the lighting, which consists in an expanded sense of visionary possibilities, and an opportunity to pursue the luminous interconnections already laid down for the rooting of perception by grace of the intertwining dimensions of the field.”

~*~

“Anwesenheit, the sense of 'presence' demonstrated in Gelassenheit, does not fall under the spell of the 'metaphysics of presence'.  Gelassenheit, a third mode of presence, is in fact Heidegger's answer to the history of this metaphysics.  It manifests an historically new way of being-with,a nd therefore also, a new epistemology, a new ontology.

Of decisive importance for this argument is the difference between the 'presence' involved in Gelassenheit and the 'presence' involved in Vorhandensein.  The latter is described (in our second passage from Sallis' text) as involving a 'self-contained positivity.'  Thus, when Sallis argues against the possibility of 'presence' in this sense, he observes – accurately and appropriately – that the hammer, like all other things, is 'extended beyond itself into the referential totality.'  In other words, his argument against the 'presence' of Vorhandensein is that everything we encounter belongs to a referential field: nothing exists as a 'self-contained positivity', or as an isolated substance entirely independent of its situation within the world.  But this sense of 'presence' which is manifest in the attitude of Gelassenheit is not at all a sense defined in terms of traditional substantiality and field-independence. On the contrary, Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger's work on Gelassenheit, makes it very clear, through an abundance of descriptive formulations, that the being-with of Gelassenheit constitutes a 'presence' which always takes place in – and with an awareness of – a referential field, a field or region of Being.

We may therefore conclude that the 'presence' of Gelassenheit is not called into question by the critique of the 'metaphysics of presence'.  Letting-be simply constitutes a radically different relationship with beings.  In vision, for example, letting-be is certainly not a 'simple sensory presence', a meaningless, wordless abstraction, an encounter reducible to the philosopher's sense datum. Moreover, it is neither a 'cold', theoretically disinterested staring-at, nor a looking-at totally possessed by instrumental calculations.  Letting-be is an interested looking which cares; it is a being-with which cares; it is a response-ability to the presencing of Being which lets it come forth, lets it be present, without needing to master and dominate its presence.  Letting-be is a being-with which understands the Being of the ground, and therefore cares very much for the field, the ground, of our visionary life.

Far from undermining the claim that Gelassenheit exemplifies a valuable experience with 'presence' (Anwesenheit), the post-modern critique of the metaphysics of presence first makes it possible for us to conceive a gaze belonging to a new epoch of history: a gaze whose caring is what fulfills its hermeneutic capacity, its capacity to open into unconcealment.  I agree that our historical plight is connected to the dominance of a metaphysics of presence, and that we must radically deconstruct its operations in the structuring of our visionary situations.  But, beyond this negative stage, we must attempt, more positively, to think a gaze which does not position itself into opposition to Being – and does not 'posit' Being as a constant, permanent, fixed presence, an immutable substance, or a reified totality.”

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 16, 9:30 AM:

 

And here is a tapestry of excerpts from The Body's Recollection of Being, by
David Michael Levin**

(56) Metaphysical thinking takes place … in the theoretical mind,' and is … an I think (= represent to myself) …' … [But] thinking. … takes place' as much in the life of our feet and hands and eyes. … Our thinking will not find its way … without first losing itself' as a metaphysical thinking' and going very deeply into the body …

(50) As we question the body of mood, … we move closer to that field …in which …

(94) … our motility takes place … a field of many dimensions. the capacity we call motility,' is dependent upon this field. … the open being of the motility-field … the layout of a field …

(99) … the field of motility is an elemental syntax of motivations, an array or layout of possible routings, orchestrating and choreographing our bodily postures, gestures, attitudes and comportments.

(94) Our groundedness, our rootedness, out autochthony, our balance and upright stature, our bearing and carriage, our steadiness of gait, our path, and the goals on this path: …

(104) … what we need is a thinking which actually deepens our contact with the choreography of the motility-field … a thinking which can actually take us into the depths of our topological attunement … in our motility, to the grace of the field through whose clearing we move and pass.

(53) The open dimension is the … gift of vision that was given to us, at birth, … a gift to our bodily nature … The gift is our pre-ontological mode of vision, an open dimension of visionary belongingness, primordial attunement, spontaneous participation in the spectacle of light; … The gift is a bodily felt panoramic awareness, a felt sense of being well-integrated into the field of visibility …

(289) … the body of understanding, standing and walking in the support of the earth, is already a move beyond metaphysics since (I) traditional metaphysics can conceptualize only an objective body, not the body which we are and live; …

(99) … we are setting Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body in a much deeper, … dimension …

(98) … motility … appropriates the topological configuration of corporeal capacities as a local disclosedness, … inseparable from its situational field and functioning as an immediately meaningful disclosure, …

(98) … the tradition … which regards moving and being-moved as … opposites, … is shattered. … we are on the way (unterwegs) … moving in a responsiveness to the field that discloses its openness …

(103) … motility … calls us into … neither the worldly, practical … nor the present-to-hand …

(126) We need to attend to the ways we use' our hands and experience their activity'. We need to sense in a bodily way the tone … of our gestures, and become more aware of how that tone is related to our technological modes of production. … a more developed awareness … of our gestures would contribute to a … critique of technology … new historical initiatives have already been placed in our hands.

(139) … our touching, handling, pointing, and writing - hold beings open to the field of their being: … we relate to the various beings of our world in a way that maintains their contact, and our own, with the … clearing of space that let them, and us, first meet in the enchantment of presence.

(134) … I believe. that we learn how to root our gestures in the tact and contact of their proper field - that field … which has already made a clearing for their movement and already given them an initial sense of … meaning …

(233) The naturalism which begins (with Hume, for example) by grounding moral principles in forms of sensibility … needs to be supplemented by a naturalism which recognizes the antecedents of our moral intuitions, … in our bodily felt sense of … the … goodness and rightness which is truthfully felt in the experienced body of our being-in-the-world.

(233) What is called for is a gentle and caring approach that provides a truly nurturing space for the child to make good contact with … evaluative processes, and elicit from the … body of feeling a comportment …

(245) It would seem to follow from this … motility that, … our children's capacity for moral autonomy, … is really not at all possible so long as our education approach remains stubbornly abstract …

(255) … to the existing political reality, the human body …[is] a natural or wild' being, … Thinkers like Foucault concentrate on the ways in which a political regime externally appropriates the human body, … But they neglect to acknowledge the body's own intrinsic political wisdom, …

(126) …the emotional depth of the field's reserve of enchantment is … made sensible for our emerging body of emotional understanding.

(245) Since an intellectual or conceptual kind of understanding … is best kept in contact with … an implicit preunderstanding, …

(106) … we can avoid the dogmatism that invariably threatens all modes of thinking which work with concepts not actually rooted in … an emerging body of understanding, … so that at no point is a final moment … allowed to determine the work of thinking.

~*~

**  Book description from Amazon:  This is a unique study, continuing the work of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and using the techniques of phenomenology against the prevailing nihilism of our culture. It expands our understanding of the human potential for spiritual self-realization by interpreting it as the developing of a bodily-felt awareness informing our gestures and movements. The author argues that a psychological focus on our experience of well-being and pathology as embodied beings contributes significantly to a historically relevant critique of ideology. It also provides an essential touchstone in experience for a fruitful individual and collective response to the danger of nihilism. Dr Levin draws on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to clarify Heidegger's analytic of human beings through an interpretation that focuses on our experience of being embodied. He reconstructs in modern terms the wisdom implicit in western and semitic forms of religion and philosophy, considering the work of Freud, Jung, Foucault and Neitzsche, as well as that of American educational philosophers, including Dewey. In particular, he draws on the psychology of Freud and Jung to clarify our historical experience of gesture and movement and to bring to light its potential in the fulfilment of Selfhood. Throughout the book, the pathologies of the ego and its journey into Selfhood are considered in relation to the conditons of technology and the powers of nihilism.

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 16, 12:02 PM:

 

Just skimming around in The Opening of Vision, there are a couple sections that may be of interest.  In this section (as well as elsewhere), Levin talks about poetizing discourse and contrasts it with a metaphysical, propositional discourse.  And in this one, he provides a phenomenological account of his experience in a Dzogchen dark retreat.

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 16, 9:28 PM:

 

Edward, if you're following this thread, you might find this section (pages 47-49) interesting.  He traces out a developmental schema which parallels some of your recent reflections here, where (among other things) higher development involves a return and recovery of earlier stages of embodied cognition.

  theurj : Wyrdo

Re: David Michael Levin

theurj said Apr 17, 8:23 AM:

 

Yes, I’m following and enjoying Levin quite a bit. Pp. 47-9 particularly reinforced and expanded upon my own nebulous speculations. Levin might go a long way toward elucidating what you’re trying to do with this pod. And finally allowing me to understand, and agree with, Dzogchen (miracle or miracles!). And allowing me to finally find a way, with Jackson, to return to a ritual practice that does not necessarily have to buy into the metaphysical foundations upon which it was built. 

Didn’t you say you took this book out of your library? Would you be comfortable with letting me borrow/read it before you return it?

  theurj : Wyrdo

Re: David Michael Levin

theurj said Apr 17, 8:42 AM:

 

Notice that one requires an ego to start the process of integrating what came before: 

“Stage (3) is the moment when, for the first time, this return and retrieval become existentially possible.” 

Recall when I talked about earlier stages (states) being atemporal but not timeless, being bound by time, as transcendent within immanence? He says: 

“Bodies (1) and (2) are ‘transhistorical’ in the sense that they are biological, and therefore not fully determined by historical conditions, even though they are never to be found apart from, or outside of, a social history.” 
And of course to go beyond (3) requires a “return” and integration: 

“Normal development (stages 1-3) is always, more or less, a linear progression; but the process of self-development beyond (3) is not: it is essentially hermeneutical, involving a return, a turning into the body of experience, to retrieve a present sense of the earlier stages. Beyond (3), it is necessary to go ‘backwards” in order to move ‘forwards.’” 

This also makes sense of Goddard’s contention that (3), egoic-rationality, requires a “split”, i.e., subject/object etc. It’s healthy and introduced our amazing scientific discoveries. Granted we must move beyond it (by going back) but we cannot go forward, or back, without (3) in the first place!

I also like how he describes the ontological body (5) as a hermeneutical phenomenology, as “vigilant openness to the invisible.” It reminds me of Derrida, and of those comparisons of him with Merleau-Ponty. Does Levin go into Derrida in this book? If so, in a non-reductive way? Or does he, like so many “meditators” before him, devalue and not fully understand the D?

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 17, 8:56 AM:

 

The comments I've seen from him are appreciative – e.g., “As Derrida has shown us…”  I'll look and see if I can find some quotes.

  theurj : Wyrdo

Re: David Michael Levin

theurj said Apr 17, 9:09 AM:

 

Recall from p. 243 that Levin says that Derrida did not recognize, or at least was silent about, Heidegger’s third sense of presence in Gelassenheit, Anwesenheit. I’m not so sure about that. It seems to me Derrida’s extensive commentary on khora and messianicity deals exactly with this sense of the “impossible” within presence, his version of a hermeneutical phenomenology.

  theurj : Wyrdo

Re: David Michael Levin

theurj said Apr 17, 9:24 AM:

 

This also makes sense of the two truths debate between Gorampa and Tsongkhapa when it comes to conceptual elaboration. Recall that for T conceptual and nonconceptual, as well as samsara and nirvana, nonduality and duality, are mutually entailing. In Levin’s context this means that even when we go to levels (4) and (5), even when we integrate (1) and (2)’s sense of the nonconceptual, we still retain the conceptual duality of (3) and its many useful functions. We don’t have to eliminate (or suspend, or quiet) (3) for “enlightenment” but rather it is a necessary prerequisite of, and ingredient that continues afterward as part of, the “spiritual.” There is no I-I without I!

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 17, 1:40 PM:

 

Edward, yes, I'd be happy to loan the book to you.  It's thick, and I'm quite busy with work, so it will probably take me a little while to get through it; but I wouldn't mind renewing it and loaning it to you.  But, given my own interests and the intersection I'm finding in Levin's work with “post-metaphysics,” the TSK vision, and Dzogchen (among other pet topics), I'm thinking I might invest in his whole “trilogy” so I can spend more time studying them.  In that case, too, I'd be happy to loan them to you.  I'll let you know if I purchase them.

If you haven't read it yet, and it's available on the Google preview, I'd recommend reading the ten-page lead-up to his schema (pp. 36-46).  Reading that section, I am reminded not only of a number of the themes regarding embodiment we've discussed here recently, but of an essay I've wanted to share here, if I could only find an electronic version:  Bracketed Bodies, Pivotal Bodies: Trajectories of the Postmodern Self, by Lee Nichol.  This is a TSK essay, but in it, Lee, like Levin, argues that the “body” can serve as a sort of a “pivot point” for development beyond conventional identity that does not trade on the metaphysical categories post-modernism has deconstructed.

You wrote:  This also makes sense of the two truths debate between Gorampa and Tsongkhapa when it comes to conceptual elaboration. Recall that for T conceptual and nonconceptual, as well as samsara and nirvana, nonduality and duality, are mutually entailing. In Levin’s context this means that even when we go to levels (4) and (5), even when we integrate (1) and (2)’s sense of the nonconceptual, we still retain the conceptual duality of (3) and its many useful functions. We don’t have to eliminate (or suspend, or quiet) (3) for “enlightenment” but rather it is a necessary prerequisite of, and ingredient that continues afterward as part of, the “spiritual.” There is no I-I without I!

Yeah, well said.

All the best,

B.

  theurj : Wyrdo

Re: David Michael Levin

theurj said Apr 22, 10:38 AM:

 

Since I have to use a library for internet access while out of town I looked up the pre-trans fallacy chapter in Eye to Eye (Shambhala, 1996). On p. 237 figure 7 sums up the inverse relationshipe between pre and trans “levels.” Recall this is well prior to the WC lattice, which no longer has the “states” above the levels. Nonetheless the figure has 8 levels: 1 = primary matrix; 2 = body; 3 = magic; 4 = mythic; 5 = ego ming; 6 = bodymind; 7 = psychic; 8 = archetype (subtle); 9 = spirit (causal to nondual). According to Wilber 1 and 9 are inversely related, as are 2 & 6, 3 & 7, 4 & 8. The figure is also in the shape of an inverted V, with 1 at the bottom moving up to the apex at 5, then downward to 9. This does not exactly match up with my regression in exact inverse order during the process of meditative state training, but I think the case I've made with the brain research might lend more weight to my hypthesis than Wilber's figure 7, which originally appeared in 1983 I think? Nonetheless, Wilber's intution about these relationships might be explained more postmetaphysically within the WC lattice.

  Mark : ~ ? ~

Re: David Michael Levin

Mark said Apr 18, 8:40 AM:

 

“Reading that section, I am reminded not only of a number of the themes
regarding embodiment we've discussed here recently, but of an essay
I've wanted to share here, if I could only find an electronic version: 
Bracketed Bodies, Pivotal Bodies: Trajectories of the Postmodern Self, by Lee Nichol.”

Well Bruce, you have at least 3 electronic versions of pivotal bodies that I know of about you:
1. Here
2. Integral Life
3. Media Home Server

All the best,
Mark

  Mark : ~ ? ~

Re: David Michael Levin

Mark said Apr 18, 9:09 AM:

 

“May the boundless knowledge that time presents and space allows illuminate the native perspectives of your original face.” ~ Balder

Indeed.

Picture-187
  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 19, 9:54 PM:

 

LOL.  Thank you, Mark.  I'll come pay a visit soon to Media Home Server.

  Mark : ~ ? ~

Re: David Michael Levin

Mark said Apr 19, 10:37 PM:

 

Great Bruce.

Nice post too at IL on Post-metaphysical Buddhism. I particularly liked:

“…the postmodernist discovery of (a) the impossibility of determining
finally the 'truth' of any particular worldview or vision…”



[CULTIVATOR'S NOTE:  I have moved the discussion that followed this post over to a new thread:  Integrity and Integral Spirituality]

  Nickeson : Easy

Re: David Michael Levin

Nickeson said Apr 21, 6:20 PM:

 

Notes on Levin:

Introduction to the Opening of Vision, rage against the nihilistic, hand wringing, lamentation, fear, Old Testaments, Oh God, hand wringing, lamentations, fear. I could do with less, probably a gulf  betwixt cultures.

This shadow stuff–philosophers like Levin make no references outside The Order; philosophy grows like a horse fistula–an isolated interior suppurative
pod with only slight tubes to the outside. One would think philosophy
had just discovered shadows the way that Levin rhapsodies. Vermeer knew
them all, he could show it without words. How Vermeer lit a canvas is
how the Cohen Brothers lit “No Country…”, nihilism incarnate and so
damned well done.  First exercise: Intro to Drawing and Painting,
charcoal a sphere. It is never anything more than shadows, one
negligible highlight. Everything one needs to know of shadows can be
learned at the Smithsonian's National Gallery in DC…find four Claude
Monet's pieces,  two of Rouen Cathedral, two of Waterloo Bridge, soften
the gaze (a little study of Qi Gung is a prerequisite). Be blown away.
(Doing the Qi Gung Five Elements: all five start with that earth/root
chakra connection through the perennial floor, soft knees, soft gaze
into the mid-distance. The soft gaze is all-seeing, Edward, or at least
everything one needs to know, the cognitive unconscious notwithstanding.)

“Our shadows lay claim to us, claiming our being for the lighting of Being,
for the element in which we are rendered visible–visibly shadowed,
visibly reflected. (If this kid wasn't so cute he'd be cheesy.) Shadows
and reflections manifest the fact that our substance belongs to the
gift of light.” (The gift of the light, indeed.) … Shadows and
reflections show us that we are, after all, (Yes! We have to have that
“after all” it is the forerunner, the father of, “at the end of the
day…”) (oops there is literally a kitten on my keyboard) PHENOMENA OF
LIGHT. (!!!) God, what a straight line!

Christmas, lemme see…'89, Santa Fe, NM, this friend and whatever likes repros of paleolithic Venus fetishes, the New Age boutique on Palace has them…I go dressed to the nines in Wal-Mart Blizzardware, colder than hell from building miles and miles of bo'b-wire fence, L is behind the counter,
she has this Venus fetish dressed with rabbit fur…it'd be cute if it
weren't so cheesy. I'm in the market for something gritty and ugly as
paleolithic art. I mention something about the Dark. L counters with
something OF LIGHT.  Her indigo kid comes in. I know this kid, the
Indigo Kid from Hell. He comes in with the Indigo Kid of Chris Griscom,
Shirley's guru. Playdate. (I know this kid 'cause I sub-leased  once
for the winter, D's little crib while she toured the sunny southwest
with L and the Indigo Kid from Hell. [D, she who had once been booted
from Rajneeshpuram, OR, for smoking so much dope…now that's too scary
to consider] And the tour was foreshortened due to the kid who was
jealous of D and her friendship with L and he called her names and
threw tantrums when D and L talked of THE LIGHT for D and L were both
big on the light–PHENOMENA OF LIGHT–but they never spoke again after
the Indigo Kid blitzed their friendship…and Chris…I'm talking with
a designer/builder for whom I'm forging a handrail for a high-end manse
he's just put up. Chris has come to him needing a remodel at The Light
Institute. How was she to know when it was built that her demands for
all those sky-lights would turn the Institute into an unbearable oven
from 9 to 3 and now she wants this guy to shut them down. SHUT DOWN THE
PHENOMENA OF LIGHT! So we're back to the Christmas Spirit counter with
me and L and the Indigo Kid from Hell waxing bratty in mid-distance. I
try to hold up the Darkness End but it has been clear…all CLEAR LIGHT
through the eons. Darkness = Bad. LIGHT = Good. And that is that with L
and Levin and the PHENOMENA OF LIGHT that we are…so I just get the
gritty Gagarino Venus and book it outta there.

Balder wrote this: “And in this one, he provides a phenomenological account of his experience in a Dzogchen dark retreat..”

I was once an editor, sports pages to start, magazines a few years
later…count all the words in a 136 page magazine, count all the words
in a Levin phenomenological account of his Dzogchen dark retreat =
4,264. He wrote that many words in, lemme see, 13 pages. I count 17
words out of that 4,264, that signify something one could hold in their
hands…he mentions “eyes” four times–I'll count them separately, I'll
give him that much. Seventeen words out of 4,264 supposedly about
PHENOMENA!  That is a batting average of 0.003986866791. Who can go
anywhere with that? Philosophy as a horse fistula. For the life of me I
cannot figure out why someone would write their life passion as if they
were a single cell inside a horse fistula striking postures for the
other germs. I respect Rorty because he wrote two best sellers (for
which he was kicked out of The Order). Levin will never write a best
seller because…? Why? Would he rather strike postures than have a
greater effect?

My grandfather was a veterinarian and I wish I could remember his prescription for a horse fistula, ante-high tech antibiotics. But I do recall my Dad; he rocks back with laughter. He tells me some of those wranglers from the rez told him they poured battery acid down a horse fistula and it healed up. God! He had to laugh or he would have cried and tried to kill those wranglers with a baseball bat.

This guy, Levin, he's just so cute, like when he asserts: “Assertions stop the poetizing process. They close the dimensions of sound and sense.”  Don't they just…

But read, y'all, what he write about The Seer (p. 454ff). Levin and
Heidegger all breathless about The Seer. I hung for too many years with
Santa Fe Shamans, too many journeys on too many drums; Seers all and
damned good ones. Don't waste your breath on Seers, David Michael, all
you write is Romance and yesterday's news. Mickey Newberry, who
poetizied C&W more than any poet once sang:

“Yesterday's news forecasts no rain for today,
Yesterday's news is old news,
The sky's are all gray…”

When he is coming down the stretch, Levin quotes the first three lines
of Wallace Stevens's “On the Road Home” like he doesn't even know that
those three and the 18 that follow are worth more than all his three
volumes doubled and all put together.

On the Road Home
  by Wallace Stevens

It was when I said,
“There is no such thing as the truth,”
That the grapes seemed fatter.
The fox ran out of his hole.

You… You said,
“There are many truths,
But they are not parts of a truth.”
Then the tree, at night, began to change,

Smoking through green and smoking blue.
We were two figures in a wood.
We said we stood alone.

It was when I said,
“Words are not forms of a single word.
In the sum of the parts, there are only the parts. The world must be measured    by eye”;

It was when you said,
“The idols have seen lots of poverty,
Snakes and gold and lice,
But not the truth”;

It was at that time, that the silence was largest And longest, the night was roundest, The fragments of the autumn warmest,
closest and strongest.

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 21, 10:37 PM:

 

Thanks, Nickeson.  Anytime some appreciation is being shown for something, we can count on you to drop by, piss on it, and then do your own dance.

Admittedly, you had some nice moves.

  Nickeson : Easy

Re: David Michael Levin

Nickeson said Apr 22, 7:28 AM:

 

Balder,

Thanks for critique.

I need some help with this. I started out with some medium altitude
hopes for Levin's work bolstered by what he wrote concerning a new kind
of vision and a corresponding vocabulary or style of expression. But
what I found was that his failure or refusal to take an actual bodily
position in the perspective he advocated causes him to betray his
project, page after page. It seemed clear that he was most at home in
the quasi-scientific, fully academic, assertive style and vocabulary
that apparently he wanted to transcend. So I have questions…

Does he lack the skill to be a poet? I doubt this. He teaches at
Harvard. On his sabbaticals he can roam around town and take all the
creative writing classes that are offered in Boston. He could take
dancing classes.

Is he afraid that if he breaks out of the standard method of expression
that his peer group will expel him from The Order? Is he bound by
loyalty to always stay within the limits of The Order's Code? (The
price of Levin's books on Amazon hint to me they are primarily text
books; written to be taught by others in The Order and studied by those
seeking membership therein. Hmm. Did he have to stick to the lingua franca and The Order's stock POV for the assurance of selling books?)

I go back to the Stevens' poem. It is a phenomenological wonder…it
not only goes to the things themselves, but to the words of the things
and their sensations and relations and even the ideas around those
things. And though he had this poem in front of him all book long there
is a huge disconnection between Levin and Stevens and I have to wonder
why? This show most in Levin's section on The Seer near the end of “The
Opening…” It is pure Romanticism in the conceptual language of
Science. Didn't Levin see that?

There is something about this book that speaks more than Levin might
know of the self-alienation of Philosophy. It seems decadent.

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 22, 7:54 AM:

 

Hi, Nickeson,

I was going to post an addition to my more emotionally motivated previous post, since I agree with some of your critiques.  (That's usually when we react, no?).  In reading the book so far (and I haven't gotten that far yet), I have found his initial framing of the “problem” he deals with in his book to be rather Romantic in flavor.  In later sections, some of which I've excerpted above, his approach comes across to me as more sophisticated than that, so I've been hoping that he's just building up to the more nuanced argument that I think he is making (or going to make).  But I've been scratching my head in places.  I also have been frustrated by the deep indebtedness of the book to several core texts, primarily because I haven't read them – so I'm reading someone “riffing” on and interweaving melodies I am not very familiar with, and I am guessing I'm missing a lot of his references and allusions.  I've been thinking I probably need to put the book down, bone up more on Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's later work, and then come back to this.  But that goes to your other criticism – there certainly is an academic insularity to the book.  It hasn't bothered me too much, however, because I am primarily looking for resources for my own developing understanding of these issues, and therefore I'm not really looking at the book as a work of art in its own right.  I think I have something to learn from it, even if – as you say, and I agree – it leaves something to be desired in terms of its own poetry.

Anyway, with your second letter, I do find your critique to be rather astute.  I'll carry it in mind as I keep ploughing through these pages.

All the best,

B.

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Apr 23, 9:25 AM:

 

The following is an article from 1995, so it's a little dated, but still worth including here.

Meaning and the History of the Body: Toward a Postmodern Medicine


The human body is an evolutionary biological entity, but it is more than that. It is also an ongoing achievement of socialization and acculturation. As these social processes interact and communicate with the body's biological nature, they shape and transform it. Human beings are sociable from the very beginning—that is to say, our bodies are biologically organized and ordered for social interaction and communication. Consequently, it is not possible to draw the boundary between the body of nature and the body of culture with any precision, certainty, and finality. The boundary has, in fact, been continually redrawn, especially in this century, as the science of medicine accumulates knowledge that incorporates the body into ever more subtle and more intricate models and analyses.
 
In other words, what we interpret as the human body—its development and processes—is formed by communication networks extending within, through, and beyond the visible organism.1
 
More specifically, the point I want to emphasize in this article is that the human body is also formed within the context of the history of medicine. That is, as the interpretations and images of the human body changed historically, these changes were intimately related to the historical development of medicine itself.

 

 

Changing Interpretations of the Body

 
A concern for the nature of the body is at the very heart of medicine—consequently, the history of medicine calls for an interpretation that sheds light on the history of the body. Such an interpretation, ideally, would bring out essential correspondences between evolving conceptions of the body and progressive conceptions of disease and healing.
 
This article presents six parameters for interpreting the history of the body as it figured in the history of medical research. I shall concentrate on the advances that distinguish the medicine of the “classical age” from the medicine which began, broadly speaking, in the seventeenth century, and which I call “early modem”. But as well as highlighting the limitations of late modem medicine, I will also touch on some very recent advances—new ways of thinking that begin to define what could be called a “postmodem” medicine.
 
The following parameters represent not so much dichotomies or dualities but something more like a dialectic or stages of a spiraling progression. As the meaning of the body changes through time, the movement of understanding in each case is toward integration and a transcending synthesis of each pair of parameters. In each case, a new perspective is emerging, forming the basis for a new, postmodern, discourse in medicine.
 
(1) From abstraction to concreteness. The body recognized by medicine in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance was an abstract construct, an idealized projection of speculative reason, an entity the nature of which was reduced to the logic of an intelligible form. During this period “classical medicine” did not directly took at, nor did it really see, concrete, individual bodies. What it saw, in fact, were confirmations or deviations from disease classifications described in its authoritative texts. It is as if medicine looked at bodies “sideways”, making only occasional glances that turned away from the established texts.
 
However, in the seventeenth century, at the beginning of the modem age, medicine began to think of itself as an empirical science, and it began to insist on the need to understand disease concretely by examining individual bodies. But in the final analysis, what we take to be “concreteness” is only a product of interpretation. Today, as we near the end of the twentieth century (late modernity), medicine is beginning to realize that the “concreteness” of its mechanistic paradigm is not an ultimate truth and that, just as classical medicine projected an interpretive abstraction onto the concrete, lived-in, body, so, analogously, has late modem medicine.
 
—Postmodern medicine is consequently groping toward a new, more adequate concreteness—consistent with the fact that the patient's body is always the site of meaningful experience.
 
(2) From exteriority to interiority. The body of classical medicine was a very subtle body of humors and dispositions; but the perception of its “nature” conformed more to pre-established classifications than to the truth of its observable condition. By contrast, when, in the early modern period, physicians started really to look at the body, what at first they saw was a gross mechanical body, dense and opaque. The body of early modern medicine was seen as an extremely intricate machine, and it was examined, for the most part, from a very detached, external standpoint. The opening up of cadavers for research and learning was therefore emblematic of a revolutionary change in the way medicine began to look at the body. The once sacred body, surrounded by cultural taboos, suddenly became a worldly machine, a matter of interiority, a profane flesh to be seen into and seen through, a presence conceived as if its mechanisms would eventually be transparent for technological knowledge.
 
—However, late modern medicine has penetrated so deeply into the invisible interiority of the flesh that it has begun to abolish the notion of a boundary separating the body's exterior and interior reality. Body and environment are not only inseparable, they are in continuous interaction, and in continuous interdependence. Current research into the logic of the body's immune processes has already signaled the beginning of a postmodern discourse.
 
(3) From qualities to causalities. Classical medicine (influenced by early Greek philosopher-physicians such as Hippocrates in the fourth century BCE) thought of the body as an association of qualities, a substance timelessly qualified by its various states and conditions. By contrast, anatomical pathology initially promised the possibility of penetrating the density of the flesh and finding “first causes” for all diseases. However, as late modern medicine has strictly followed out the logic of its explanatory models, it has increasingly found them inadequate. The very precision of its principle of causal agency, the very power of its explanatory work—and, subsequently, the very successes it celebrated in understanding and controlling diseases caused by bacterial infections—has enabled it to continue revising the simple concept of agency. Now this principle can be given up. Medical knowledge has advanced far enough to conceive a postmodern alternative.
 
Better models were eventually found. In responding to virus epidemiology, late modem medicine has finally been able to reconceptualize the principle of simple agency in the language of host environments, communicative systems, interactive fields, local economies, and planetary ecologies.3 Ultimately, the infectious cultures of biology and epidemiology cannot be isolated from their larger social and political cultures, and so causal explanations cannot be confined to the activities of isolated agents. For modern medicine, the body exists in time and space, a continuous succession of physical states, conditions medicine has long attempted to explain by a causality of spatiotemporal proximities.
 
—But late modern medicine is increasingly finding itself compelled to abandon its model of simple causes and to work out a new model of multifactoral influence: a model for which the network, rather than the straight arrow, might be an appropriate symbol.
 
(4) From states to processes. Early modern medicine abolished the old Aristotelian logic of qualities and set out to understand how the body it was looking at actually works. In its earliest phase, it saw structures and it submitted the body to structural differentiation, concentrating on describing its structural complexity (for example, the layout of the organs). This structuralism may be characterized by saying that late modern medicine increasingly attended to the body's functional complexity and differentiation. By pushing this mechanistic research program to its limits, however, late modern medicine has recently begun to move to a postmodem discourse (a way of thinking and talking about medicine) which can recognize both states and systemic processes. Even so, it should be noted that such a discourse has not yet abandoned an essentially mechanistic way of thinking—and that, in point of fact, very little systems-theoretical thinking in medicine has as yet been driven by the logic of its research to give up the powerful resources of mechanism.
 
I am not proposing here the total abandonment of mechanistic thinking. However, (a) we must take care not to blur the essential distinction between mechanistic and non-mechanistic models, and (b) we must acknowledge that almost all systems-theory discourse today is still operating within the mechanistic paradigm that has prevailed since the beginning of modernity in the seventeenth century. Moreover, (c) we should continue to work with this paradigm, pushing it to its limits and seeing how far we can proceed by its light. This is the only way we have to get beyond it.
 
—Nevertheless, (d) we should also at the same time bold ourselves open to alternative possibilities, exploring, in particular, the possibility of systems-models which are not based on mechanistic principles.


 
(5) From analysis to holism. Whereas classical medicine conceptualized the body as an organic whole, but only abstractly, and only in terms of a pre-established system of categories, modem medicine (in both its early and its late phases) has conceptualized the body more concretely and empirically, but also more mechanistically and more analytically, as a totality of discretely functioning parts.
 
—However, finally able to take up the organicism circulating in cultural discourse since the late nineteenth century, recent medicine has been laboring to use its analytic knowledge as a basis for understanding the body, once again, in more systemic terms, and as an organic whole. The age of postmodern medicine may be said to begin with a theoretical and clinical commitment to the process-holism of systemic understanding.
 
(6) From mechanical isolation to systemic integration. Whereas classical medicine thought of the body as an instance of the sacred whole, a register of the cosmological order, early modern medicine could only begin to understand the body empirically and concretely by making it totally profane —reducing it to a mechanism isolated from the surrounding world: something essentially, or virtually, self-contained and self-sufficient. Recently, however, late modem medicine has begun to restore the body to the larger world-order. With increasing success, it has tried to see the body as a self-regulatory system whose functioning is dependent on, and inseparable from, the larger world, and which consequently can exist only in continuous, psychologically mediated interaction with a complex field of social, cultural, historical, and environmental conditions. Working with this model of the body, late modern medicine has increasingly recognized diseases as meaningful epidemiological processes belonging to distinctive life-world “economies”.
 
—Thus, research programs in epidemiology are now coming together with research programs in the logic of endocrine and immune processes to establish the need for a postmodern medicine capable of understanding the body in all the dimensions of its systemic integration.
 

Seven Models of the Body

 
Each of the previous parameters can serve as guides for assessing how conceptions of the body have progressively changed through time. This progression demonstrates the historically indisputable power of mechanistic and analytic thinking. But the evolutionary implications of mechanistic models and analytic logic have now been followed out to a point where their inherent limitations are finally becoming apparent. Present research suggests that the future of medicine requires a different logic: a new direction in thinking which is more organic and integrative.
 
The historical progression points in the direction of a fundamental paradigm-shift.4 To understand the significance of this change and to sense the new direction it implies, the history of medicine may usefully be conceptualized by reference to a succession of “bodies”. If it is possible to speak of an evolutionary logic, a history marked along the way by paradigm-shifts in models of the body, perhaps the seven models proposed in the remainder of this article will contribute to our understanding of the history of modern and contemporary medicine.
 
(i) The rational body. The body we find represented in the discourse of classical medicine was essentially a rational body, a body pictured in conformity to an aesthetic of rational intelligibility, a sacred and universal body replicating the larger cosmology.
 
(ii) The anatomical body. By contrast, the body which emerged in the clinical and discursive practices of early modern medicine was essentially an anatomical body, a body understood in purely structural terms, a body of organs, displaying the sites for the ancient theory of humours.
 
(iii) The physiological body. Increasingly, though, as knowledge dared to penetrate the veil of the skin and explore the interior it conceals, the body which figured in medical discourse was a physiological body, a body-machine whose structures were seen as mechanisms, and required mechanical explanations of their functions.
 
(iv) The biochemical body of cells and molecules. Making use of old and new technology, analytic medicine began to invade the invisible nature of the flesh, looking with a microscopic eye into the most minute structures of the skin, the musculature, and the organs, and accordingly representing the body as an intricate network of tissues. Yielding to even deeper, and even more analytic, more atomic methods of probing, the body of tissues disclosed itself to be a differentiated cellular body, ultimately analyzable into molecular interactions. Because late modern medicine has faithfully and relentlessly followed out the logic of its analytic, atomic method, and new techniques of research have made possible even more subtle forms of analysis, the body of cells was in its turn disclosed as a gross body, concealing a body of much more subtle nature: a body of biochemical processes. The breakthrough to this dimension brings us into the present. It represents a great achievement—and discloses the latest implications—of analytical medicine, the research program whose mechanistic logic has governed medicine ever since the seventeenth century.
 
(v) The psychosomatic body. In the early years of this century, however, psychosomatic medicine, encouraged by the contributions of psychoanalysis to our understanding of hysterical conversions, introduced a representation of the body which, for the first time, attempted— albeit with only limited conceptual resources—to break away from the analytic methodology, to break out of mechanism, to break through the ontology of distinct minds and bodies, and to think of the body of medicine in a radically new way.
 
However, one limitation that has hobbled psychosomatic discourse comes from the fact that, while advocating the unity of mind and body, it has failed to overcome the dualism which isolated this unity from its environments nature, society, and culture. There is, also, a second and more fundamental limitation, which comes from the fact that it has not sustained the courage of its original intuitive conviction: It talks boldly about a psycho-somatic whole, but it limits the conceptual reference of “psychosomatic” to a very small range of cases and instances. If what we have been calling “mind” and “body” are really one, then all diseases, without exception, are and must be “psychosomatic”. But the discourse of psychosomatic medicine has never been prepared to support such a radical and consequential thesis. It has required a new generation, and a new discursive formation to conceptualize and demonstrate this point. Only now, with the development of psychoneuroimmunology, can the science of medicine begin to represent the body as a psychosomatic unity integrated into its environments, and begin to articulate the networks of causal correlations implied by this representation.
 
(vi) The body of psychoneuroimmunology. (See sidebar below) Now, as we approach the beginning of a new century, revolutionary research into the logic of immunocompetence is realizing the vision inaugurated by psychosomatic medicine, making visible a body of extraordinarily subtle functions and processes. This dynamic, synergic body is seen as a system functioning in a larger system, a multifactoral network of causes and effects, in which effects can also become causes. This body cannot be represented as a “substance”. It has become necessary to represent it, rather, as a system of organized processes, intercommunicating and functioning at different levels of differentiation and integration.
 
A growing body of evidence supports a new concept of disease and a much broadened understanding of epidemiology, according to which diseases do not take place in an environment conditioned only by the forces of nature, but occur, rather, in a field of communication—a world of social, cultural and historical influences and meanings. Thus, epidemiologists and immunologists are beginning to understand that the individual body is also a social body, and is therefore inseparable from the social and cultural life of populations.

 
(vii) The body of experienced meaning. Psychoneuroimmunological research represents a growing body of evidence pointing to the day when medicine will be able to understand how the diseases afflicting us, as well as the body's processes of healing, are sensitive to the effects of bodily experienced meaning, and how, more generally, processes of disease and healing are correlated with experienced meanings. The body which would correspond to this achievement is the body of psychoneuroendocrinology: the body now being brought to light by neurological, immunological and epidemiological research—the first medical body subtle enough to promise the possibility of testable correlations with the phenomenological body of experienced meanings.

For the first time, medicine is equipped with a discourse capable of formulating very specific correlations between (a) the patient's bodily experienced meanings and (b) conditions or states of the medical body, the body which figures in the research and clinical practices of medicine.
 
However, it must be noted that medicine's success in making such correlations does not depend only on advances in medical knowledge. It also depends on the ability of patients to fine-tune their embodied awareness, their sensitivity to processes of bodily experiencing, and their skillfulness in carrying those processes forward into more articulate, more discriminating meanings. For many centuries, Western culture has denied recognition to this ability and consequently made it very difficult for people to enjoy contacting and working with their body's felt meanings the intricate meanings carried by their bodies in co-responsiveness to particular situations and circumstances. At long last, however, our culture has begun to recognize, to legitimate, and to facilitate this natural skill. As experienced-meaning processes become more subtle, more intricate, more discerning, it is reasonable to expect that there will be an increasing convergence between the body of medicine and the body of lived experience, due as much to the learning of this skillfulness in articulating bodily-felt meanings as to the achievements of systemic, postmodern medicine.

The Body of Lived Experience

 
To sum up: the convergence between the body of medicine and the body of experience will be greatly enhanced by a recognition that the human body is more than a biological organism, more than a physical substance—that is, it is also, in short, a “discursive formation”. It is inherently organized in terms of intercommunicating processes, and it is shaped or formed by the evolving historical interpretations with which it interacts.
 
For medicine, the recognition of the body as a “discursive formation” means (a) that it relinquishes the epistemological assumption of naive realism (the assumption that its concepts are observer—neutral and correspond to a totally independent, objective reality); (b) that it comes to terms with its status as a hermeneutical (an interpretive) science; and (c) that its relation to the entity it calls “the body” is mediated by a network of historical assumptions and representations which are never more than provisional and tentative, and remain always open to reassessment.
 
By the same token, insofar as patients themselves begin to understand their bodies in this new way, they too will be freed from counterproductive conceptions of the body and may begin to realize the extent to which the body that they present to medicine for diagnosis and treatment is a body of meaningful experience, a body of significant intelligence, inherently informed about itself, a body the very nature of which can be profoundly changed by virtue of each patient's sensitivity and embodied awareness, and his/her own skillfulness in articulating the body's carried meanings.6
 

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Levin on Hermeneutical Vision

Balder said May 28, 1:46 PM:

 

The seer is, as Heidegger says, exceptional; and what makes the seer's gaze 'exceptional' is precisely the fact that it is neither instrumental nor detached, neither a gaze which sees things in terms of their Zuhandensein (readiness-to-hand), nor a gaze of 'pure seeing,' a seeing of things as Vorhandensein (presence-at-hand), which posits things…as 'sheer perceptual presence,' a 'simple sensory presence of the living present'…

In 'Hegel und die Griechen,' Heidegger argued that



Aletheia is that which, most worthy of thinking, is [still] unthought…For this reason, aletheia remains for us that which above all is to be thought – to be thought as released from any metaphysically bequeathed reference to a notion of 'truth' in the sense of correctness and released from 'Being' in the sense of actuality [Wirklichkeit].


This means that we must also attempt to think aletheia free of the metaphysics of ego-subjects and their objects – a metaphysics which installs them in the objectivity of a linear, serial time order, composed of a succession of self-contained, externally related 'nows.'  The seer's vision is 'exceptional' in this regard, for the seer is one who has achieved a certain freedom from this way of thinking and seeing…

I agree with Heidegger [that] the 'essence' of our being is to exist as an 'ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being.' But what does this mean in terms of our vision?  The sense of 'truth,' here, is of course aletheia.  Aletheia is an experience with truth that is radially open to the presencing of the absent, the invisible: it is, in this sense, ecstatic.  By contrast, correctness involves an experience with truth that sees it as a posited state; it is a vision of truth which denies shadows, adumbrations, the presencing of the invisible, and unconcealment.  It recognizes only two modes of being: Zuhandensein and Vorhandensein – in other words, it can only see totalized presence.

The seer's way of seeing is hermeneutical: hermeneutically circumspective.  Instead of seeing things one-dimensionally, as most of us do today, in this age of reductionism, his gaze sees things in terms of a hermeneutical 'as.'  Just as there are two modes of discourse – the apophantic and the hermeneutical, the assertive and the disclosive, so there are two modes of vision, describable in similar terms.  Here is Heidegger's discussion of the different discursive modes in Being and Time:


The 'as' gets pushed back into the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand.  It dwindles to the structure of just letting one see what is present-at-hand, and letting one see it in a definite way.  This leveling of the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the 'as' with which the present-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion.  Only so does it obtain the possibility of exhibiting something in such a way that we just look at it.


We should note that Heidegger himself implies the homology between vision and discourse by giving an account of the discourse of the language of vision.  Heidegger's analysis continues:


Thus, assertion cannot disown its ontological origin in an interpretation which understands.  The primordial 'as' of an interpretation (hermeneia) which understands circumspectively we call the 'existential-hermeneutical “as”' in distinction from the 'apophantical “as”' of the assertion.


Likewise, the seer's way of seeing things is more primordial than our everyday way: its ecstatic openness, and its corresponding sense of things in the dimensionality of their wholeness, though not understood, and not consciously practiced, by more 'ordinary' mortals, in fact underlies all human perception, and not only that of the seer.  This is what I think Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological explorations of perception and its temporality enable us to appreciate.

Since the seer's capacity for openness is crucial, here, for our understanding of aletheia as an experience with vision, we must briefly return to the fact that the seer's gaze is not ego-logical.  That is to say, it is neither egocentric nor logocentric.  As a spiritually developed being, the seer is a self, not an ego.  The difference is important, so I will briefly define it.  The ego is the self limited to its social identifications: its roles, practices, and socially adaptive routines.  The ego is the active pole in a structure of subject and object.  The self, however, is not identified with any one structure; structurally speaking, it is a process always open to further structuring.  even when the self functions like an ego, it is not totally identified with it.  The self is a sense of living in which all identifications are subject to deconstruction.  Thus we may say that there is no self in the sense of a substance, a fixed identity, and a rigid closure to processes of change.  Instead, there are only different styles, types, and dimensions of experiencing – and different styles, types, and dimensions of integration, unity and coherence.

With the emergence of the ego, there is an inevitable agitation of mind: anxieties and tensions determine the shaping of our visual intentionalities; inveterate tendencies prevail, structuring the field of our vision in very rigid, narrow, and restricted ways.  Ego-logical vision, an assertive mode of vision, always tends to follow the straight line of desire, the shortest, most direct distance between subject and object.  For such a vision, a 'circumspective' experience with aletheia is not possible.  Ego-logical vision is adaptively necessary, of course.  Without its conformity to 'objective' truth, its relationship to correctness, we mortals could not survive.  The ego-logical gaze constitutes the ground of our experience with truth – truth, that is, as correspondence.  But the seer has achieved a different vision, and he enjoys a different experience with truth.  Without rejecting the ego-logical experience of vision and its corresponding truth, he has chosen to develop his visionary capacities beyond their ego-logical stage.

To see aletheically, i.e., to experience aletheia in vision, the seer must learn first of all to relax, to lessen the grip of normal anxieties and tensions.  This relaxation will in turn alter the character of her visual intentionality, allowing new and very different tendencies to come into play, and restructuring the visual process, the formation of the visual Gestalt – the figure/ground, center/periphery, focus/diffusion relationships.  Without the control, the constant, obsessive monitoring of the ego, the seer's gaze is radically decentered, centered in a calm, more restful, more receptive relationship to the openness of the visual field as a whole.  The openness, this visual clearing, is what makes the seer's gaze 'ecstatic' …

As Heinz Kohut, American psychoanalyst, once observed, 'Joy relates to experiences of the total self': that is to say, it is both 'cause' and 'effect' of a process of self-development, and is related, in particular, to the self's journey towards an openness that would make it whole.  The seer's vision, a vision of the 'essential richness of Being,' is rooted in a joyful experience of living in a 'forgetting' release of the past and an openness to the future.  The seer is one who embraces whatever time has to offer.  It is not that he knows the future, in a predictive or prophetic sense, although mystification often understands the visionary capacity in this way, but rather that he has developed a deep understanding of our protentional-retentional structuring of time – the structural intertwining of temporal ecstasies – and overcome the psychopathology of egologically centered time-experience.  Living thus, the seer's vision is centered in a felt sense of the whole – a felt gathering of time as a whole.  The seer has 'already seen' what is yet to happen because she understands the ecstatic intertwining, is free of pathological relationships to time, and is open to whatever may come to pass in the dimensions of the visible.

~ Levin, The Opening of Vision, pp. 460-465 (excerpts)

  theurj : Wyrdo

Re: Levin on Hermeneutical Vision

theurj said May 28, 5:30 PM:

 

In a more recent book Levin says the following, from Sites of Vision (MIT press, 1999). Aside from the usual logocentric misreading of Derrida it’s not half bad: 

Whereas Heidegger made vision hermeneutical, in keeping with the unconcealment (presence/absence) of the truth of being, Derrida makes vision textual. Addressing the same problematic—the reification and totalization of being in a metaphysics or presence—but from a different angle, Derrida demonstrates a postmetaphysical vision by inscribing and encrypting his glances and gazes within the movement of ecriture, subverting the metaphysical eye in the articulations of his texts. In effect…he inscribes a vision, a gaze that has no identity apart from the operations and effects of the text. If, for Heidegger, what was crucial is the figure-ground formation, what is crucial for Derrida is the deconstruction of the absolute frame, the metaphysical delimitation of inside and outside, center and periphery, and the corresponding assignment of epistemic…privileges…to the position at the center. 

Derrida’s strategy throughout his texts is to use his own writing…in order to force metaphysics out into the open, so that we may see the undoing of a metaphysics of presence taking place in the very writing of the discourse assumed to affirm it. 

Derrida textualizes the gaze in an optical writing, a writing that in intelligible to the gaze alone. This vision ecriture becomes a vehicle not only for the deconstruction and decentering of the absolute gaze proclaimed by metaphysics, but also, at the same time, for the display of the possibilities open to vision in a postmetaphysical context. Vision ecriture is Derrida’s strategy for dispelling the spell-binding power of the center and its frame and releasing the anarchic play of possibilities inherent in the ground (427 – 8).

  Mark : ~ ? ~

Re: Levin on Hermeneutical Vision

Mark said May 28, 5:46 PM:

 

i think i'm gettin' a handle on this promotion business

“May the boundless knowledge that time presents and space allows illuminate the native perspectives of your original face.”

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Jun 2, 11:58 AM:

 

I found a full text by Levin on the web:

The Philosopher's Gaze

Excerpt:  “We shall be giving thought, here, to perception: to the formation of the figure-ground Gestalt , the relationship among figure and ground, the field of perception, and the horizon that delimits it. In questioning our experience with vision, we will be working with a number of different texts, but will give special attention to two texts in which the nature—or, say, the character—of our sight, our capacity for vision, is the major topic of thought.[5] These two texts, each one in its own way a record of the boldest, most radical, and most unsettling thinking, are Conversation on a Country Path , a meditation on Gelassenheit (releasement) that Heidegger wrote down in 1944–45, and Merleau-Ponty's 'Working Notes,' fragmentary texts written near the end of his life and published posthumously in a collection bearing the title The Visible and the Invisible .[6]
 
In his Phenomenology of Perception , Merleau-Ponty wrote: 'I am a field, an experience.'[7] Later, in his 1959 'Notes de Travail,' he wrote that, 'the world is a field, and as such is always open.'[8] 'There are fields in intersection, in a field of fields, wherein the 'subjectivities' are integrated' (VIE 227, VIF 281). In fact: 'Each field is a dimensionality, a being is dimensionality itself' (VIE 227, VIF 280). In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological meditations on the logic of the perceptual field, Heidegger's 'Feldwege,' his 'paths in the field,' are given a needed hold on our experience with perception. The question of the figure-ground Gestalt that is formed in perception is of much greater importance than it might at first seem. As this present study will demonstrate, reflection on this matter takes us right into the formulation of a radically hermeneutic phenomenology, and thus into illuminations of the attitude of Gelassenheit , a new approach to the problematic of ontology, and a far-reaching critique of metaphysics. Indeed, it might be argued that, in Heidegger's Gelassenheit essay, there is such a bold re-thinking of the figure-ground formation and its field that the dialogue effects a decisive 'Revolution der Ortschaft des Denkens' (a 'revolution in the topology of thinking').[9]There are, as both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty understood, some quite surprising rewards for a path of thinking that attempts to deconstruct the elegant conception of the ground which has held sway in the discourse of metaphysics by returning to the more elementary experience of the ground in the structure of perception. Similarly, it can be useful to begin with a hermeneutic phenomenology of perception as one way (Weg ) to think anew [i] the subject-object structure and the character of the relationship it involves, [ii] the reduction of the presencing of being (die Anwesenheit des Anwesens ) to being ready-to-hand (Zuhandensein ) and being present-at-hand (Vorhandensein ), which are the only two modes of presencing we recognize in our time, and [iii] the reduction of the immeasurable dimensionality of being, of that which opens up the field or ground of the ontological difference between being and beings, to the ontic dimensions of beings. Taking a position that agrees with Heidegger, the authors of the Dialectic of Enlightenment remark that 'the loss of memory is a transcendental condition for science.'[10] If, because of the increasing instrumentalization of reason, one may suspect an inner connection between the historical development of rationality in the West and the forgetting, or rather the suppression, of the potential for enlightenment inherent in our perceptual capacities, then our reflections here should be read as attempting a certain critical recollection, an anamnesis both of our still unrealized potential—an ontological normativity—and of the historical suffering for which this falling-short is responsible.”

  Balder : Kosmonaut

Re: David Michael Levin

Balder said Jun 5, 8:14 AM:

 

Another excerpt from The Philosopher's Gaze:

PHENOMENOLOGY AS A HISTORICAL MOVEMENT

Phenomenology is a method with its own history. As Husserl first conceived it, the end of phenomenology was to reveal the constitution of meaning in a transcendental realm: although phenomenology must begin in the life-world, its assignment was to arrive at a pure transcendentalism. With Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, however, phenomenology abandoned transcendental reduction, not only beginning but remaining in the life-world: in their work, phenomenology thus became existential. But this transformation is not enough: once the project of phenomenology has been situated in the world, it becomes necessary for it to go through a third moment of evolution. It must now become genuinely experiential: capable of articulating experience in all its hermeneutical intricacy, working with the dimensionality of experience to engage and bring forth from its  depths  newly emerging meaningfulness. It is only when phenomenology has truly understood experience and learned to become experiential, learned how to work with our experience in a way that carries it forward into new configurations of meaningfulness—only then will it have become what from the very beginning it always intended and claimed to be. In a certain sense, this third moment represents a recognition of phenomenology as Hegel conceived it: a hermeneutical work of the spirit, revealing its ever-changing reflexive configurations. But, of course, without any commitment to an immanent end and a dialectic of progress.

PHENOMENOLOGY AS HERMENEUTICS


In the past, hermeneutics has been understood exclusively in relation to the interpretation of texts, or, say, cultural discourses. In my work, however, hermeneutics constitutes the essential phenomenological structure of perception, since the phenomenon never presents itself all at once and, correlatively, perception is always a process of delimited explication, a bringing-forth and bringing-out that is always situated in the “untimely” interplay of presence and absence, concealment and unconcealment. Phenomenology cannot be faithful to the “truth” of the phenomenon unless it is, in this sense, hermeneutical. Moreover, if we would like to be able to work with a structural distinction between shallow experience and deeply thoughtful experience, or a distinction between primordial experience prior to consciousness and experience reflectively retrieved, we will need a phenomenology that is hermeneutical in the sense defined here. But if experience is never ready-made, hermeneutics must not be reduced to the discovery of what is already present, merely taking away its hiddenness. Thus we will be thinking, here, about our looking and seeing, as organs with a capacity for engaging hermeneutically—disclosingly, revealingly—with the being of whatever we may be given to behold. The problematic at stake in the hermeneutics of texts and cultural discourses, namely the avoidance of an imperialism of the same in our relation to what is other, is no less at stake, I believe, when it is a question of our gesturing, our seeing and hearing. Here, too, the violence inherent in the logic of identity all too easily dictates the conditions of our perceptivity. 

ON EXPERIENCE

Many philosophers have claimed empirical, experiential grounding for their thought. However, in spite of good intentions, their thinking has often not only failed to correspond to experience, but to a surprising extent even subverted and betrayed it, without, however, formulating any critical position in relation to its authority. I will not attempt, here, to defend this thesis by narrating once again the history of philosophy. Instead, I will begin my argument with some reflections on the method of phenomenology as it was formulated by Husserl at the beginning of the twentieth century. 

What brought Husserl to the threshold of phenomenology was the problem of meaning: clarifying the meanings of our words by tracing them back to their origin in the acts of transcendental consciousness through which these meanings were first constituted, and reiterating the meaning-forming process, this time with an explicitly reflexive awareness of the way transcendental subjectivity functions in the process. “Back to the things themselves!” he proclaimed, boldly asserting that the phenomenological method, which he formulated in terms of a sequence of “reductions,” is the only authentic positivism, the only true empiricism, and the only way to a realm of knowledge worthy of being called the “science” of all sciences. 

Husserl's battle cry summons us to return to the experience of subjectivity and to insist on its claim to a certain validity and legitimacy. In a time when objectivity has become the dominant paradigm of knowledge, truth and reality, excluding or even denying all reference to experience, this battle cry has played a crucial historical role, a progressive historical role, challenging the hegemony of this paradigm, reaffirming the critical function of subjectivity, and renewing the promise of a rational redemption of lived experience. 

But Husserl's phenomenology is ultimately more concerned with the task of securing for our knowledge an absolute grounding in the meaning-constitutive activity of transcendental consciousness than it is with the task of showing us how to reflect on our own experience just as it is lived. In fact, the latter task is not merely rendered subordinate to the task of laying an absolute foundation; it is ultimately annulled. What might have served as a method for reflectively contacting and working creatively with the reflexively critical constitution of our experience as we actually live it became, instead, a method in the service of a metaphysical program: the rational reconstruction of knowledge by means of an intuitively immediate demonstration that the meanings of our concepts were originally constituted, and can again (nachträglich ) be constituted originarily, outside (or, say, independently of) the material and causal conditions of the natural world, by the pure activity of the transcendental ego. 

We need to retrieve the progressive, critical spirit behind Husserl's affirmation of subjectivity and his formulation of the phenomenological method. Thus, for example, we need his “principle of all principles,” formulated in §24 of his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology: that phenomenologically self-evident seeing (Anschauung ) is the source of authority (Rechtsquelle ) for all knowledge, and that whatever presents itself in this way is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, although only within the limits in which it then presents itself. We also need his methodological suspension of the “natural attitude,” for this enactment of a certain critical distance with regard to conventional wisdom and the culturally predominant interpretation of our reality must be effected before this principle can be put to work. But these steps require that we unhitch the method from his metaphysical agenda. 

What becomes of phenomenology when it is released from the task of tracing the origin of meaning back to the activity of the transcendental ego? Does it necessarily lose its critical potential? Does it necessarily forfeit its autonomy in relation to the opinions, beliefs, convictions, and knowledge-claims constitutive of the natural attitude? Does it necessarily fall back into dogmatic naturalism or realism? Does it necessarily surrender to the forces of irrationalism?—Or does it finally, rather, win for subjectivity, for our experience as we actually live it—and that means, also, for the phenomenon itself and as such—the recognition, the rights, and truth that are due? 

Benjamin and Adorno lamented the withering of experience that is happening, today, at an alarming pace. Why should we care? Why does this matter? What can be done, if anything, to end this process of destruction? What I think we need today—today, perhaps, more than ever—is a method that can recognize and affirm the meaning of our experience as we actually live it: a method that not only can recognize and affirm this, but can also show us how to work with our own reflexively constituted critical interpretation of this experience in a way that engages its immanent tensions and conflicts and carries it forward into a new configuration. When released from its metaphysical destination, phenomenology can then be seen as a powerful agent of enlightenment, a powerful force, already at work within the social, political, and cultural movements of modernity, on behalf of rights and liberties—and the self-fulfilling enlightenment of the individual. 

Now, to be sure, phenomenological reflection is not foolproof; it cannot guarantee that reflection will necessarily cut through all possible forms of self-deception and self-delusion, all possible frames of ideological distortion, all possible forms of historicism and the limitations imposed by narrow cultural perspectivism. But in fact, if the phenomenological suspension of the natural attitude cannot guarantee our release from the pride and prejudice that prevail in our life-world, neither can the reduction to transcendental consciousness. Not even Husserl's transcendental reduction could be demonstrated to guarantee absolutely the critical distance and autonomy of phenomenological reflection. However, it can be argued that the phenomenological method is more likely, in general, to encourage and support the reflexively critical realization of experiential truth than the methods of the objective sciences. And this is sufficient to give phenomenology a critical role of the utmost importance in ethics, morality, politics, and culture. 

In “Subject and Object,” Adorno acknowledges that the rational reconstruction of the transcendental subject seems to set up a neutral and autonomous theoretical position, a position of spectatorial distance, from which the conditions of every society and culture can be critically judged and resisted; but he is equally conscious of the fact that this is really an otherworldly position outside time, space, and history, a false or illusory position, nothing more than the philosopher's fantastical dream of omnipotence, of being able to see with God's eye and God's infallibility. All knowledge is situated, perspectivally conditioned and limited. There can be no getting around this fact. What therefore is needed, he concludes—I think rightly—is neither the assumption of a transcendental subject (a transcendental position) nor the erasure of the subject-position (a move which would in effect establish an omnipotent positivism with no place for resistance, for negativity), but rather the recognition of a concrete, embodied, innerworldly subject, and consequently the possibility of an “immanent critique,” grounded only in this subject's reflexively critical experience and transcending prevailing conditions from within. “For society,” as he says,” is immanent in experience, not an allo genos. Nothing but the social self-reflection of knowledge obtains for knowledge the objectivity that will escape it as long as it obeys the social coercions that hold sway in it, and does not become aware of them.” “Social critique,” he adds, “is a critique of knowledge, and vice versa.” Adorno understands that this will be difficult, that it will require a commitment to ongoing resistance and struggle. But, as he argues with admirable dialectical skill, the assumption of the position of a transcendental subject ultimately cannot solve the problem of critical distance and autonomous reflection, the problem of how a critical social theory, and a correspondingly critical reflective practice, can function while inside a given social and cultural system. 

Rather than positing some hypothetical transcendental subject to preclude a priori the possibility of ideological deception, prejudice, and the social imposition of meaning, and to guarantee, again a priori, the critical suspension of the “natural attitude” and the position of an autonomous social critic, we could instead commit ourselves to working toward a theory and practice of phenomenology that would understand and promote the critical potential inherent in our perceptive capacities as embodied subjects who are thrown into the world and living through situations, responsible for responding appropriately to the claims of whatever gives itself to perception in the interplay of concealment and unconcealment. In question is our capacity for perceptive, hermeneutically revelatory interaction.