Integral and Inclusivism

In another thread, Kela and Jim started a discussion which I believe deserves its own space.  I'll copy their comments here then will add my own follow-up post.

~*~

KELA WROTE (referencing an article which critiques Integral Theory):

What I do think is useful is this kind of tack:

…Wilber submits all traditions, theories, practices, to the categorical constraints of his “transcendental signified”: the AQALS [sic] model. Wilber's method of colonializing cultural alterity is by its very nature hegemonic, and even predatory. He does this with a number of Eastern thinkers and mystics. To instance this practice, he collapses the entirety of the great Indian sage Sri Aurobindo's work into a single quadrant in his logocentric model (Integral Ideology, Rich Carlson).

Hacker and Halbfass have referred to this strategy as “inclusivism,” and I think a critical account of its nature and function is essential in  this day and age.

JIM RESPONDED:

Hi Kela.

On Tuesday I read the entirety of the article Edward linked to. Just now I read your post and the passage you quoted from the article, and this prompted me to go back to the article to see the context of the passage you quote. So here's the passage you quote with some material that comes before and after it (and all this is at the very end of the article):

…Wilber's work like many other theorists who purport to integrate Eastern philosophical theories into their work, often do so by a form of intellectual imperialism. One could refer to recent subaltern theory which takes issue with the attempts of Euro-centric scholarship to appropriate the voice of the subaltern through imposing interpretations which speak to their own concerns and which in so doing silence the indigenous peoples right to speak for themselves.

To deny the voice of the “other” by forcing the socially constructed signifiers of a euro-centric language regime upon other cultural traditions is to do them violence. For example, Wilber submits all traditions, theories, practices, to the categorical constraints of his “transcendental signified”; the AQALS model. Wilber's method of colonializing cultural alterity is by its very nature hegemonic, and even predatory. He does this with a number of Eastern thinkers and mystics. To instance this practice, he collapses the entirety of the great Indian sage Sri Aurobindo's work into a single quadrant in his logocentric model. In doing this he fails to acknowledge that Sri Aurobindo was also an important cultural figure in India who has written extensively on socio-political matters - a fact he never engages in his work - nor does he appear to realize that his major works are back grounded not only by Western concerns but primarily by Indic Darshan Discourses. Wilber almost never highlights Sri Aurobindo's meditations on the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Gita which certainly backgrounds his writing and provides important keys to its interpretation.

An integral theory which valorizes its own epistemology by denying other traditions, theories, practices [sic] their own voice, or by [sic] simply mis-characterizing them segregates rather than integrates. Any theory which asserts itself ideologically by cannibalizing other traditions and appropriating the voice of alterity as a function of its integral model while discarding the ten thousand nuances, subtleties, traces of culture which are essential to indigenous identity, fails at the level of integration itself. Such theoretical practices are not integral but imperialist, such discourses do not achieve cultural hybridity but rather cultural hegemony. Such an integral theory is colonialist at its worst and patronizing at its best.

You say that you think that a critical account of the nature and function of “inclusivism” is essential today. To get a better sense of what how the term “inclusivism” is used and how it may apply here, I did a quick Google.

One writer paraphrases Hacker, writing that inclusivism is “telling the other, 'What you mean when you say x is what we mean when we say y, and y is a better way to understand it'” (from Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others by Kiblinger).

Based on that quote alone I can see how Ken Wilber can be said to practice the strategy of inclusivism. Whether Wilber intended it or not, I know from experience that he's influenced some of his readers to think that merely saying or implying that their views or perspectives or ideas “transcend and include” those of an other can be substituted for demonstrating a real understanding of that other. (I've heard some Wilberians do this in relation to Jungian psychology, for example. “Wilber's theory transcends and includes Jung.” Not too long ago I did a search here at Gaia - perhaps when it was called Zaadz - for something related to Arnold Mindell's Process Work and the search came up with a post by an apparent Wilber fan who declared that Process Work was “green.” There's no room for discussion when that happens, because the “other” is in effect forced to accept the terms of the Wilberian, in this case the Spiral Dyanmics integral model with its color-coded jargon, etc. And the Wilberian goes on his or her merry way believing that he or she has indeed “transcended and included” whatever it is that he or she has relegated to a lower rung on the integral “holarchical” developmental ladder.)

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

I'm familiar with the term, inclusivism, from the interfaith dialogue scene – particularly in discussions of Christian-Buddhist and Christian-Hindu dialogue.  Paul Knitter, in “New Possibilities for Interreligious Dialogue,” for instance, traces the development of interreligious attitudes from a position of religious exclusivism, to a more accommodating but still ultimately hegemonic inclusivism, to pluralism, which is the position Knitter advocates.  (In other writings, he describes his view as mutualism.)

In my understanding – and I invite Kela's input here – inclusivism emerged within Christianity in such positions as Rahner's triumphalism or various Christological “fulfillment” doctrines, where the possibility for salvation was granted to non-Christians (contra the exclusivist position), but only in and through the extra-ecclesial, redemptive work of Christ.  In other words, the ultimate religious fulfillment of non-Christians was granted as a possibility, as opposed to inevitable damnation, but this salvation or realization was ultimately a Christian one.  While other, non-Christian religions were granted a relative value and “truthfulness,” their value and truthfulness were recognized only inasmuch as they could be said to approximate or “reflect” the ultimate truth(s) of the Christian vision.

In this context, Knitter (and others) advocate a pluralist approach as a corrective to this position, which obviously is deserving of the Great Green charge of hegemony. 

So … if Wilber's approach ultimately turns out to be that of inclusivism, it would be a pre-Green position – a possibility which should concern all post-Green aspirants!

Now, of course, Wilber describes his approach as being post-pluralist – as being a step (or several steps) beyond the positions Knitter has outlined.  In this thread, I want to explore how well this claim can be supported, and I believe it can be.  But even if it can be, I also find that it actually has not yet been fully realized, and that there are ways in which the charge of “inclusivism” is merited – or, at the least, that is on target enough that it should invite careful self-reflection within the Integral community. 

I'll return in another post to try to explore how an integral postmetaphysical / integral methodological pluralist approach can avoid the charges of hegemonic inclusivism.  I also would like to hear Kela's thoughts on these issues, since I am unfamiliar with the writers he mentions (Halbfass and Hacker).

Best wishes,

B.

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

Hi Balder,

It may be the case that Wilber's approach is “post-pluralist” in theory, but I think it is important to examine how his approach plays out in actual practice, as practiced by Wilber and Wilberians, and I'm pretty sure you would agree.

I agree with Natasha Todorovic that some Wilberians who believe themselves to be at what Wilber used to call “yellow” may in fact be “yellow false positive.” If someone who may very well be “yellow” or “second-tier” or “third-tier” false positive makes patronizing inclusivist comments like, “TSK is a wonderful approach but it is merely first-tier,” I don't know about you, but it makes me want to tear what's left of my hair out. ;-) I do think this happens in practice, no matter how post-pluralist Wilber's approach may be on paper. I've seen it happen.

- Jim

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

Hi, Jim,

Yes, I completely agree.  I've seen it happen too.  That's what I meant when I said it actually hasn't been adequately realized yet – in practice, the inclusivist approach is often what manifests within Integral discussions in the “community at large.”

I think this is a very important topic, and I thank Kela and you for getting it rolling.

Best wishes,

B.

P.S.  I hadn't heard the term, “yellow false positive,” before, but it made me laugh. 

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

Hi Balder,
Yes, I am aware of the three theological approaches of exclusivism, pluralism, and inclusivism. Hacker used the term in perhaps a bit of an technical manner to refer to certain trends in the Indian tradition.  Following Halbfass, I have broadened the use of the term  and use it to refer in particular to the late Advaitin and Neo-Vedantin approach to other traditions. The Jains can also be said to be “inclusivist” in their approach, though their reductive scheme is not hierarchical like the Advaitins, but rather more like a “circle of viewpoints.” Interestingly, the Jains are able to show dialectically how each position is “incomplete” and hence how positions not only imply each other, but the final (Jain) position of anekanta. The Advaita doxographers are not that sophisticated, though the earlier Advaitin philosophers are, and in their extensive discussion of the problem of error they review dialectically each of the  positions of the other schools and show how each position is problematic and how the Advaitins position resolves each of them. This tendency, along with Shankara's own manner of interpreting scripture in terms of the hermeneutic procedure of “harmonization,” would appear to be the basis of the hierarchical and reductive approach of the later Advaita doxographers. Hacker's main point appears to be that Indian inclusivism is basically a polemical approach, despite its seeming eirenic (there's a good term!) exterior. Hacker and Halbfass see the universalized version of inclusivism of the Neo-Vedantins – “all true religion is Vedanta” – as a form of Hindu self-assertion, as a response to Europe and modernity.

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

Jim: “There's no room for discussion when that happens, because the “other” is in effect forced to accept the terms of the Wilberian.”

I've had some die-hards get down-right ornery in conversation over resistence to “assimilation” (And I'm reminded here of Wilber's “F*** you! No one tells me what to do!” greenie Buddhists, which he seems particularly annoyed with).

 “What are you complaining about!? Their's room for everyone in this model! There's your own point of view right there! Quit griping!”

The front, of course, is that of one big happy mutually validating family where everyone “gets along.”

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

Kela, I have a question for you about your own approach to Eastern texts.  Do you think Rich Carlson's critique of Wilber (for imposing “socially constructed signifiers of a euro-centric language regime upon other cultural traditions”) would also apply to the kind of work that you do, as well as Halbfass, Hacker, Schopen, and others who make a living by critically deconstructing and reconstructing the texts of subaltern peoples?  Might he even call you predatory? 

If so, how would you defend what you are doing? 

I do not ask this to criticize you for being a scholar.  I think the work you do is quite interesting and has its own value, but I wonder about your take on Carlson's critique:  if it is useful for taking Wilber to task for saying, “This is what is really going on in such-and-such a tradition,” and using this interpretation as part of his overall edifice of religious/spiritual theory, does it similarly apply to the work of people in your own field?

I ask this in part because I am writing something on inclusivism, based mostly on my own readings in interfaith dialogue.  I agree with you that a good understanding of the dynamics of inclusivism – and the usual alternatives, including exclusivism, pluralism, complementarity, etc – is essential, and of particular relevance to the whole Integral enterprise.

Best wishes,

Balder

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

Hi Balder,

No, to be honest, I don't take such criticisms too seriously. My way of “defending” against such claims is to ignore them. And that is why I said at the beginning of this thread that I don't find this kind of tack very useful. I lived through it during the 80's and 90's, and took it on the chin like a “man”; I've had my fair share of feminists yell at me. :-)

I've always taken a much more traditional and classical approach, which is to say that I've never been all that concerned with these “ethical” issues. My appropriation of late twentieth century thought is more methodological. I'm concerned with the issue of transparency, with clarity and distortion and so on. I appreciate what Wilber's doing; I just think he's wrong on so many counts now that I'm not sure of the real “cash value” of his work anymore. 

I am concerned with the “voice” of the other, but again this has more to do with whether or not it is actually being heard and with whether or not that voice is being properly transmitted. I think it really does little good to claim to “represent” someone in the manner that Wilber does when he claims to “defend” the so called “great tradition” (this is part of Wilber's definition of “punditry”). Inevitably someone comes along and says “you are misrepresenting me.” And then as their “apologist” there is nothing left to do but get upset: “But I'm trying to help you!” To me, Ken's anger at the Boomeritis Buddhists is indicative that something is amiss.

My point, I guess, is that inclusivism attempts to come off as “neutral” when in fact it is inherently polemical in its nature. I think you say something about this presumed neutrality in your blog, and I agree. I think the polemical nature of inclusivism has a distorting effect. And perhaps this issue is at the core of Ken's work. It claims to be scholarly and descriptive, but at its root, it is normative in nature. And as such it cannot help but distort.

I also agree that, at least with respect to the question of “religious truth,” pluralism is not really a “go,” at least for theologians and for those who take “religious truth” seriously. It's the position of those who don't really care about such questions anymore. As such it might at least serve as a good methodological position for descriptive scholars.


cheers,
(a busy) kela

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

This isn't an area I've thought too much about.  I haven't studied very deeply any traditions outside of my own culture, and so I'm not too concerned personally with the problem of inclusivism.  But this seems a variation of a problem that comes up a lot.  In an integral theory, one position has to be central and all other positions have to be subsumed within it.  Is there a way that integralism can avoid this?

Blessings,
Marmalade

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

I posted a recent blog entry related to this thread, if anyone is interested in checking it out. If so moved, feel free to respond there or here.

Integral Theory and Inclusivism

Re: Integral and Inclusivism

I picked up Steve McIntosh's Integral Consciousness recently and noted that he also shares concerns about religious “inclusivism.”  He argues that Integral Theory, to succeed, should limit itself to being a philosophy, rather than trying to empirically describe spiritual reality through the use of “broad science.” 

“…as integral philosophy works out the metaphysics that will frame its worldview in the twenty-first century, it must decide how and where spirit fits in.  In this endeavor, integral philosophy has essentially three options: under what I'll call Option 1 it can incline toward science and declare that the realities of spirit are empirically discoverable and that integral philosophy can serve as a kind of spiritual science; under Option 2 it can incline toward religion by associating itself with a particular religion and by declaring the teachings of that religion to be essentially right; or under Option 3 it can carefully situate itself in between science and religion by recognizing that spirit is real, but that science is too objectivistic and religion is too subjectivistic for either of these institutions to be given the final word on spiritual reality.”

And later on in the chapter, he writes…

“Wilber is admirably attempting to harmonize science and spirituality by seeking a broadly empirical 'trans-path path' that can unite the various approaches of the great wisdom traditions.  But because, as William James discovered early on, spirit consistently shows itself to be elusive to empirical investigation, Wilber's quest for a trans-path path cannot produce a credible spirituality; it can only pretend to do so by effectively exalting and privileging one of the previously existing paths.  Thus by seeking to connect integral philosophy to spirituality through Option 1, Wilber ends up with an approach that looks very much like Option 2.”

McIntosh supports Option 3 as the best way forward for an Integral philosophy which recognizes the reality of spirit and the validity of spiritual experience, but which does not claim to be in possession (at this point) of an empirical map of universal spiritual reality.  I haven't read the chapter yet in which he discusses Option 3 in detail, but I'll read it soon and will write more at that time.